Assessing the Modernization of Nuclear Postures

Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 2008

This paper considers the evolution of U.S. strategic arms policy after the end of the Cold War. It discusses the internal debates in the U.S. government concerning the structure and purpose of U.S. strategic nuclear forces in the context of strategic arms control agreements during the Clinton period and the reasons for the failure of significant reform. It examines the Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review and the emergence of the ''New Triad'' involving strategic nuclear and conventional offensive strike systems, and active and passive defenses. It also analyzes the reorganization of the defense infrastructure in the context of an international environment in which ''rogue states,'' regional conflicts and sub-state conflicts have become the main contingencies. The paper critically assesses the assumption of U.S. strategic arms policy and concludes that the full implementation of the ''New Triad'' is neither likely nor advisable, but that nuclear weapons should remain weapons of last resort to deter threats to the national survival of the United States.

Journal of International & Area Studies, 2019

The colossal impact of nuclear weapons on the Cold War strategic decision making has resulted in a incredible amount of literature on superpowers' nuclear strategy (cf. Schelling 1960; Freedman , 2003. The literature is focussed on

Stanford University Press eBooks, 2008

This study assesses alternative roles of strategic nuclear weapons in US-Russian relations after expiration of the 2002 Moscow Agreement, a successor agreement to the START I Treaty. A range of alternative nuclear futures beyond a QDR-defined baseline in a post-2012 security environment are explored, focused on the degree in which the U.S. would require nuclear weapons to manage its relationship with Russia and other states, key indicators of changes in U.S-Russian security relationships, future threats and political utility of nuclear weapons under alternative futures and nuclear force postures. Key questions for investigation are: • To what degree will the US need nuclear weapons after 2012? • Will the United States need nuclear weapons to manage its relationship with Russia after 2012? • What direction might future American and Russian nuclear force postures take after expiration of the Moscow Agreement after 2012? What are the indicators of change? • For the US and Russia, will the future political utility of nuclear weapons increase or decrease after 2012? • Given a degree of uncertainty in the US-Russian cooperative relations, what combination of currently planned and programmed strategic force investments offer the least risk? Six alternative nuclear futures are outlines and assessed.

International Affairs, 2001

Russia has to a large extent maintained the arsenal of non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF) it inherited from the Soviet Union, despite drastic reductions in US NSNF. The numbers of Russian NSNF, the variety of their means of delivery, and the levels of readiness and training apparently far exceed those of the United States and its NATO allies. For many of Russia's neighbours in Europe and Asia, certain types of Russian NSNF are seen as 'strategic', in that Moscow could employ them against their national territories. Most Russian NSNF are carried by shorter-range missiles, aircraft and other delivery systems, and are of serious concern to countries in Russia's immediate vicinity. The range and yield of Russian NSNF mounted on air-and sea-launched cruise missiles, however, could in some circumstances give them 'strategic' significance for more distant countries, including the United States. Through their declarations and actions Russian authorities have revealed that they attach great and possibly increasing importance to their NSNF. Russian views and policies could therefore present obstacles to arms control in addition to the significant numerical asymmetry with US NSNF and the intrinsic difficulties facing any effort to negotiate effective constraints on such forces. This article provides a brief overview of current debates in Russia on nuclear weapons before examining several factors that suggest that Moscow's interest in arms control arrangements affecting its NSNF is likely to be limited. Indeed, while Moscow has maintained its demands since the 1950s that all US nuclear forces in Europe be removed, its willingness to retain existing arms control * The views expressed are the author's alone and do not represent those of the Department of the Navy or any US government agency. An earlier version of this article was published as a chapter in Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds, Controlling non-strategic nuclear weapons: obstacles and opportunities (Colorado Springs, CO: US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, 2001). The book chapter version has more extensive documentation than the present article. Special thanks are owed to those who commented on earlier drafts of this article, though they naturally bear no responsibility for the views expressed:

2008

alessandria today, 2025

This study examines the complex interplay between nuclear doctrines, arsenals, and alliances, providing a comprehensive analysis of how nuclear capabilities shape global power dynamics. Beginning with an overview of nuclear weapons' technological evolution, it highlights the stark contrast between the tactical atomic bombs of the mid-20th century and today's thermonuclear devices. The report explores the consistency of global stockpiles, with particular focus on the doctrines and arsenals of key nuclear powers, including the United States, Russia, China, and emerging players such as India and North Korea. It delves into the regional rivalries of Israel-Iran and AUKUS-China, elucidating how alliances, strategic interests, and perceived existential threats influence policy decisions and escalate risks. The role of deterrence, strategic ambiguity, and the integration of advanced technologies such as hypersonic missiles and nuclear-powered submarines are scrutinized to reveal their dual stabilizing and destabilizing effects. Finally, the work evaluates the potential for regional conflicts, such as those involving NATO and Russia or India and Pakistan, to escalate into global crises. By connecting localized disputes with broader economic and geopolitical implications, it underscores the fragility of global stability in a multipolar nuclear world. The study emphasizes the urgent need for renewed diplomatic efforts, enhanced communication channels, and multilateral arms control agreements to mitigate risks and secure a more stable future

2020

The subject of research, the results of which are presented in this article, was nuclear weapons and the policy of their use by Russia. The research aimed to determine the role of nuclear weapons in the security policy of the Russian Federation. The study was based on a chronological and problematic approach. The article's content focuses on answering the following research questions: 1) What is the origin of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union? 2) What was the evolution of nuclear policy and strategy of the Soviet Union expressed in? 3) What was the nuclear policy and strategy of the Russian Federation until 2014? 4) What role do nuclear weapons currently play in the aggressive foreign policy of the Russian Federation? 5) What are the real intentions of the Russian authorities to use nuclear weapons? The article focuses on a synthetic presentation of the strategy of using nuclear weapons to achieve the Russian Federation's foreign policy objectives, poorly explored in Polish literature. Based on research, it has been established that Russia's ambitions to use its nuclear potential to achieve political goals are a serious source of threats to international security and increase the risk of global conflict.

Asian Affairs, 2022

Analysing the alliance system in Europe and Asia in a comparative perspective also demands having a look at the specific role of nuclear weapons in the defence doctrines, and more in particular the role of US extended nuclear deterrence. The main question that this article wants to resolve is: what are the similarities and differences in both regions with respect to extended nuclear deterrence ? This (comparative) descriptive analysis is complimented with the following predictive question: which trends in both regions make that extended nuclear deterrence will be strengthened, weakened, or maybe completely disappear ? To answer these questions, the following structure is followed. First, the concept of extended nuclear deterrence will be described. Next, extended nuclear deterrence will be applied to Europe and Asia. Lastly, three trends that have an impact on the current debate on extended nuclear deterrence are analysed: 1) the deteriorating security situation; 2) the changing balance of power, and more in particular the relative decline of the US and the rise of China; and 3) the evolving nuclear arms control and disarmament regime, including the arrival of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

The Nonproliferation Review, 2002