Chance or Intelligence

Evolutionary indeterminists argue that, in addition to any indeterminism introduced by quantum events, at least some evolutionary processes are themselves fundamentally indeterministic. That is, they maintain that the chance element in evolutionary processes results from indeterminism in the processes themselves, rather than simply from our cognitive limitations. Not everyone has been persuaded. A number of philosophers have argued that claims for evolutionary indeterminism are premature at best and deeply confused at worst. They maintain that evolutionary processes can and should be understood as deterministic processes. According to them, "chance" is merely a word denoting our ignorance of causes. This controversy is now one of the liveliest topics in the philosophy of biology. This article reviews the main arguments on each side, showing how the issues at stake in this debate raise fundamental questions about the nature of science as an explanatory enterprise and of the world it seeks to explain.

Biological Research, 2009

The so-called theory of intelligent design (ID) has gained a growing reputation in the Anglo-Saxon culture, becoming a subject of public debate. The approaches that constitute the core of this proposal, however, have been poorly characterized and systematized. The three most significant authors of ID are certainly Michael Behe, William Dembski and Stephen Meyer. Beyond the differences that can be distinguished in the work of each of them, the central fact in their arguments is the complexity of living organisms, which according to these authors, escapes any kind of natural explanation. In effect, according to the authors of ID, the irreducible complexity that can be detected in the natural world would allow to infer design in a scientifically valid way, even though many of them prefer to remain silent regarding the identity and attributes of the designer. We think that under this proposal, remains a deep epistemological confusion, since its very structure combines methodologies that are beyond the scope of historical and natural evolutionary theories. We also reject the claim that ID is a legitimate scientific theory, because it does not exhibit the classical characteristics that a scientific kind of knowledge must have.

2014

Various kinds of causation occur in nature. Famously, Jacques Monod (1972) characterised the only options as chance and necessity. But he missed a key further kind of causation that certainly occurs in the real universe: namely purpose or goal-seeking (Ellis 2005). By omitting this key causal category – which inter alia explained why he wrote his book his analysis was prevented from relating adequately to deep philosophical issues, even though he claimed to answer them. The same comment applies to more recent books by Susskind, Hawking and Mlodinow, Krauss, and others.

In the preceding essay, mathematician and probability theorist William Dembski notes that human beings often detect the prior activity of rational agents in the effects they leave behind. Archaeologists assume, for example, that rational agents produced the inscriptions on the Rosetta Stone; insurance fraud investigators detect certain ‘‘cheating patterns’’ that suggest intentional manipulation of circumstances rather than ‘‘natural’’ disasters; and cryptographers distinguish between random signals and those that carry encoded messages.

Biological Theory, 2017

construction of the field, as it were. This article is more of a think piece than a research report, raising issues that may be of interest to readers of this thematic issue. Because I will be discussing "dogma" throughout this piece, some explanation of what I mean by the term is warranted. The Online Etymological Dictionary 2 says the English word "dogma" derives from the Latin dogma, meaning "philosophical tenet," and from the Greek dogma, meaning "opinion, tenet," literally "that which one thinks is true." I generally think of "dogma" as a belief or set of beliefs that an adherent is not willing to question, explore, evaluate, or debate. Beliefs are not bad things in and of themselves. It is often necessary to embrace and articulate a certain set of beliefs-presuppositions, axiomatic premises, or assumptions, if you will (depending on whether you're a philosopher, an astrophysicist, or a cultural studies scholar)-in order to proceed with a line of inquiry. But as the philosopher C.S. Peirce (1955[1940], p. 10) observed, an inquirer must be willing to question, or test, those presuppositions. "Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into such a condition that we shall behave in some certain way, when the occasion arises. Doubt has not the least such active effect, but stimulates us to inquiry until it is destroyed." According to the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 3 "dogma" is "in general, a belief held unquestioningly and with undefended certainty. In the Christian Church, [it is] a belief communicated by divine revelation." Abstract While the scientific discourse on astrobiology-the study of the origin, evolution, and distribution of life in the universe-leans toward optimism about the possibility of extraterrestrial life, optimistic thinking is tempered by the limits of evidence and observations gathered thus far. Most astrobiologists assume that "first contact" with extraterrestrial life, if it is ever to occur, will likely be the discovery of microbial life elsewhere in our solar system. But in popular culture, "first contact" tends to be characterized as contact with extraterrestrial intelligence. This article will touch on theory and research relating to the origins and evolution of life and intelligence on Earth and speculation about extraterrestrial life and intelligence.

This philosophical investigation critically examines Stephen J. Gould's concept of contingency in biological evolution, challenging his influential claim that evolutionary history is fundamentally random and unpredictable. By engaging with Gould's seminal work "Wonderful Life" and drawing on the convergence theory proposed by paleobiologist Simon Conway Morris, the paper systematically deconstructs the notion of evolutionary randomness. The central argument unfolds through multiple interconnected lines of reasoning. First, Morris's extensive documentation of convergent evolution—where different species independently evolve remarkably similar structures and behaviors—demonstrates that evolutionary pathways are more constrained and directional than Gould's contingency thesis suggests. From camera eyes in diverse species to complex behaviors like eusociality, these convergences indicate underlying biological "design constraints" that narrow the range of possible evolutionary outcomes. Philosophically, the paper exposes critical conceptual flaws in Gould's understanding of contingency. By analyzing the nature of causation, the authors argue that Gould inconsistently treats evolutionary events as both determined by initial conditions and fundamentally unpredictable. Drawing on philosopher Brendan Sweetman's analysis, the paper contends that every biological event has a causal explanation rooted in physical and chemical processes, rendering the concept of pure randomness scientifically incoherent. The investigation further addresses potential objections, including quantum mechanical indeterminacy, by introducing Bohmian Mechanics as a deterministic alternative that delivers identical empirical results. This approach reinforces the paper's core thesis: that evolutionary processes, while complex, operate within a fundamentally law-governed, predictable framework. Ultimately, the paper presents a nuanced view of evolution as a process with significant structural constraints, where apparent randomness reflects human epistemic limitations rather than ontological uncertainty. By challenging Gould's contingency thesis, the authors propose a more structured understanding of life's development—one that recognizes both the remarkable creativity and the underlying lawfulness of evolutionary processes.

This essay explores power, information and complexity in relation to the origin of life on earth. The origin of life requires decomposition of energy into power and information because such decomposition is necessary for feedback. The articulation of the decomposition of energy into power and information permits a significant correction of Francis Bacon’s dictum, Knowledge is power, which is one of the conceptual foundations of modern linear, reductionist science. Knowledge is not power; rather, knowledge orients power. The difference that life makes is seen as a different way of using energy, such as solar radiation, that is available to everything on earth. The difference in use is a consequence of living matter forming within the constraints of earth’s surface, which is the envelope of life or the biosphere. Complexity theory is used to conceptualize life as a consequence of morphogenetic constraints. Specific conditions of the earth, such as distance from the sun, speed of rotation and revolution, speed and extent of axis inclination, solar radiation, terrestrial and lunar gravitation, presence of free oxygen and protective ozone, Coriolis force, and ubiquity of water and land, are constraints on the existence of anything on or near the earth’s surface. Taken together, these constraints situate life on earth as neither a miracle, a mystery nor an accident. Life is rather a consequence. When we consider life as a consequence of morphogenetic constraints in the biosphere, then selection appears as an emergent feedback property of life. Viewed in this way, there are no random beginnings in life (Holland (2) 147-8), there are never infinite degrees of freedom in morphogenesis, there are no tinkered together contraptions in life (Kauffman 637 (1993)), and there is no order for free (Waldrop 120-5). This view also allows for a significant correction of the hypothesis that life occurs at the edge of chaos (Kauffman 29-279 (1993); Lewin 44-62; Waldrop 198-240): life occurs not at the edge of chaos but at the edges of different orders, none of which is chaotic. The viewpoint of this paper may be briefly characterized as structuralism with theories of transformation and structure. (Crutchfield 527-9)

2006

There are various questions that arise in connection with the "intelligent design" (ID) controversy. This introductory section aims to distinguish five of these questions. Later sections are devoted to detailed discussions of each of these five questions. The first (and central) question is the one that has been discussed most frequently in the news lately: