Costly ( but quiet ) exit in dictator games

European Journal of Marketing

Purpose This study aims to investigate the relationship between young people’s Conspicuous Donation Behaviour (CDB) on social media platforms and their offline donation behaviour, specifically intentions to donate and volunteer time. It also explores materialism, self-esteem and self-monitoring as CDB trait antecedents, as a form of conspicuous consumption on social media. Finally, it considers the influence of altruism on these relationships. Design/methodology/approach A survey was conducted of regular Facebook users mentioning a charity brand on Facebook in the past year. Data from 234 participants were analysed and hypotheses tested using structural equation modeling. Findings Results confirm two forms of CDB – self and other-oriented. Materialistic consumers are more likely to engage in both forms of CDB on Facebook. High self-esteem increases self-oriented CDB; high self-monitoring increases other-oriented CDB. Self-oriented CDB is positively associated with donation intention...

PLOS ONE

We propose a novel laboratory experiment to document the pressure to share income within social networks in Africa. We find that the redistributive pressure exerted via the possibility of receiving a claim increases altruism, while the possibility of hiding from such claim reduces it. Our results indicate that sharing norms are crucial drivers of giving to other members of the network. We also find that pressure to share has a detrimental effect on the undertaking of profitable but risky investments.

Journal of Research on Adolescence

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BuR - Business Research, 2013

Although reciprocity is fundamental to all social orders, management research offers few reviews of the concept’s theoretical origins and current applications. To help bridge this gap, we elucidate the dominant understandings of reciprocity, ask which areas of research emerge from them, and explore how they interconnect. Our bibliometric methodology detects four clusters of management research on reciprocity. Across these clusters, authors subscribe mainly to substantialist ontology, marginalize morally oriented motives consistent with relational ontology, and largely assume that benefit-oriented motives underlie reciprocity. We outline the advantages of a moral-oriented relationalist concept of reciprocity and discuss potential areas for its development in management research.

The Journal of Development Studies

Donor country publics typically know little about how much aid their governments give. This paper reports on three experiments conducted in Australia designed to study whether providing accurate information on government giving changes people's views about aid. Treating participants by showing them how little Australia gives or by showing declining generosity has little effect. However, contrasting Australian aid cuts with increases in the United Kingdom raises support for aid substantially. Motivated reasoning likely explains the broad absence of findings in the first two treatments. Concern with international norms and perceptions likely explains the efficacy of the third treatment.

Experimental Economics, 2012

We extend the results of Bartling and Fischbacher (Rev. Econ. Stud. 79(1):67-87, 2012) by showing that, by delegating to an intermediary, a dictator facing an allocation decision can effectively shift blame onto the delegee even when doing so necessarily eliminates the possibility of a fair outcome. Dictators choosing selfishly via an intermediary are punished less and earn greater profits than those who do so directly. Despite being powerless to influence the fairness of the outcome, an intermediary given the choice between two unfair outcomes is punished more than when the dictator chooses one directly. This is not the case when the intermediary merely can initiate the random selection of one of the outcomes. Our findings reinforce and clarify the usefulness of agency as a tool to evade perceived culpability.

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2015

Evolutionary game theory typically focuses on actions but ignores motives. Here, we introduce a model that takes into account the motive behind the action. A crucial question is why do we trust people more who cooperate without calculating the costs? We propose a game theory model to explain this phenomenon. One player has the option to "look" at the costs of cooperation, and the other player chooses whether to continue the interaction. If it is occasionally very costly for player 1 to cooperate, but defection is harmful for player 2, then cooperation without looking is a subgame perfect equilibrium. This behavior also emerges in population-based processes of learning or evolution. Our theory illuminates a number of key phenomena of human interactions: authentic altruism, why people cooperate intuitively, one-shot cooperation, why friends do not keep track of favors, why we admire principled people, Kant's second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, taboos, and l...

Frontiers in Psychology, 2016

We hypothesize that when honesty is not motivated by selfish goals, it reveals social preferences that have evolved for convincing strategically vigilant partners that one is a person worth cooperating with. In particular, we explain how the patterns of dishonest behavior observed in recent experiments can be motivated by preferences for social and self-esteem. These preferences have evolved because they are adaptive in an environment where it is advantageous to be selected as a partner by others and where these others are strategically vigilant: they efficiently evaluate the expected benefit of cooperating with specific partners and attend to their intentions. We specify the adaptive value of strategic vigilance and preferences for social and self-esteem. We argue that evolved preferences for social and self-esteem are satisfied by applying mechanisms of strategic vigilance to one's own behavior. We further argue that such cognitive processes obviate the need for the evolution of preferences for fairness and social norm compliance.

Palgrave Communications, 2017

Philanthropic decision-making is important both for its potential to provide insight into human behaviour and for its economic significance. In recent years, investigations of charitable-giving behaviour have expanded substantially, including explorations from a variety of disciplinary perspectives such as economics, marketing, sociology, public administration, anthropology, evolutionary biology, political science and psychology. These investigations have resulted in a wealth of experimental results with each investigation accompanied by a discussion of potential theoretical implications. Most commonly, the various theories employed are helpful with regard to the narrow result of the investigation, but are not always useful in explaining the wider universe of results. Taking a comprehensive view of charitable-giving behaviour is thus limited to either employing a wide assortment of overlapping theoretical models, selectively applying each to fit individual phenomena, or merely referencing an ad hoc assortment of potential motivations. This circumstance suggests the value of a more unified, comprehensive approach to understanding the complete range of experimental and empirical results in charitable giving. This article proposes a comprehensive framework for philanthropic decision-making using a simple evolutionary approach incorporating interrelated fitness-enhancing strategies. The framework is then used in an extensive review of experimental and other empirical results in philanthropic decisionmaking. This review supports the framework proposition that giving depends on the tangibility of a gift's impact on altruism (direct or code), reciprocity (transactional or friendship) and possessions relative to its alternatives. Five example principles of fundraising practice demonstrate the practical applicability of this proposition: advance the donor hero story (tangibility of direct or code altruism); make the charity like family (friendship reciprocity); provide compatible publicity and benefits (transactional reciprocity); minimize perceived loss (possessions); and manage decision avoidance (relative to its alternatives). Understanding philanthropic behaviour from this perspective provides explanation and guidance for a wide range of charitable-giving behaviours and fundraising practices even in areas less amenable to traditional experimental investigation, such as charitable bequests and major gifts.

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Joint action enables us to achieve our goals more efficiently than we otherwise could, and in many cases to achieve goals that we could not otherwise achieve at all. It also presents us with the challenge of determining when and to what extent we should rely on others to make their contributions. Interpersonal commitments can help with this challenge – namely by reducing uncertainty about our own and our partner’s future actions, particularly when tempting alternative options are available to one or more parties. How we know whether a commitment is in place need not, however, be based on an explicit, identifiable event; in many cases, joint action is stabilized by individuals’ experience of an implicit sense of commitment, which is sensitive to subtle situational cues such as the effort costs invested by one or more agents. While an emerging body of work has investigated the conditions under which a sense of commitment may emerge and/or be strengthened, little attention has been pai...

Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 2021

A dislike of waiting for pain, aptly termed 'dread', is so great that people will increase pain to avoid delaying it. However, despite many accounts of altruistic responses to pain in others, no previous studies have tested whether people take delay into account when attempting to ameliorate others' pain. We examined the impact of delay in 2 experiments where participants (total N = 130) specified the intensity and delay of pain either for themselves or another person. Participants were willing to increase the experimental pain of another participant to avoid delaying it, indicative of dread, though did so to a lesser extent than was the case for their own pain. We observed a similar attenuation in dread when participants chose the timing of a hypothetical painful medical treatment for a close friend or relative, but no such attenuation when participants chose for a more distant acquaintance. A model in which altruism is biased to privilege pain intensity over the dread of pain parsimoniously accounts for these findings. We refer to this underestimation of others' dread as a 'Dread Empathy Gap'.

PLOS ONE, 2020

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different information sharing mechanisms in a common-pool resource game, with a view to finding a mechanism that is both efficient and inexpensive for the managing agency. More precisely, we compare the observed extraction levels produced as a result of three mechanisms: a mandatory information sharing mechanism and two voluntary information sharing mechanisms that differ in the degree of freedom given to the players. Our main result is that a voluntary information sharing mechanism could help in reaching a lower average extraction level than that observed with the mandatory mechanism.

Games, 2018

Decreasing social sensitivity (i.e., the ability of a person to perceive, understand, and respect the feelings and viewpoints of others), has been shown to facilitate selfish behavior. This is not only true for exogenous changes in social sensitivity, but also for social sensitivity influenced by someone's social cognition. In this analysis, we examined one measure of social cognition, namely a person's Theory of Mind (ToM), to examine differences in decision-making in standard non-strategic and strategic environments (dictator and ultimatum games). We found that participants with higher ToM gave a greater share in the non-strategic environment. In the ultimatum game, however, ToM showed no correlation with the offers of the ultimators. Instead, we found that general intelligence scores-measured by the Wonderlic test-shared a negative, albeit weak, correlation with the amount offered in the ultimatum game. Thus, we find that lower social cognition is an important explanatory variable for selfish behavior in a non-strategic environment, while general intelligence shares some correlation in a strategic environment. Similar to the change in social sensitivity created by a specific game design, social sensitivity influenced by individual personality traits can influence behavior in non-strategic environments.

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2018

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Journal of Public Economics

We study experimentally the decision of an individual to steal or pay for an object that is produced at a cost by another individual. We consider two conditions. In the first condition, subjects caught stealing are sanctioned with a nominal fee. In the second condition, the sanction is increased by making the identity of the individual public (shaming). We also collect skin conductance responses to better understand the emotional arousal conducive to choices. Behaviorally, we show that stealing decreases significantly when shaming is introduced. More importantly, the emotional response at the time of decision strongly correlates with behavior. In particular, subjects who are more aroused are more likely to steal in the first condition, and also more likely to stop stealing in the second condition. Based on this physiological evidence, we develop a theoretical model where current decisions contribute to a "moral stock", which in turns affects the future cost of stealing and therefore the future decisions. The structural estimation of this model provides a good fit while capturing the heterogeneity across individuals.

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2021

Does the impulse to delegate a decision only arise when delegation mimics a selfish decision vs. a generous one? We address this question using a dictator experiment with two possible payment allocations and an option to delegate the payment decision to another player. Two delegation treatments are considered, one in which the delegation option is payoff-equivalent to a direct choice of a "selfish" allocation (better for the dictator, worse for the receiver) and another where it is equivalent to the direct choice of generous / equal payments. Dictators exhibit a significantly greater propensity to delegate in the selfish delegation treatment than in the generous delegation treatment. Results are consistent with "Machiavelli preferences" that only favor delegation when it promotes self-interested / other-harming outcomes.

Information Systems Research

Companies in platform-based business markets have widely embraced freemium business models, in which profit is primarily determined by a minority of paying customers. However, the key challenge of these models is transitioning participants from free users to paying consumers. To encourage paid consumption, companies often rely on product differentiation such as providing consumers who pay for products or services with enhanced features. Product differentiation can be broadly classified into two categories: taste differentiation and quality differentiation. The authors demonstrate that extending the magnitude of taste differentiation is an effective differentiation strategy. Quality differentiation, however, is a double-edged sword and should be used with care. Increasing product differentiation leads to greater perceived value of the service, but undermines fairness perceptions.

Business Ethics Quarterly, 2011

ABSTRACT:Individuals often lie for psychological rewards (e.g., preserving self image and/or protecting others), absent economic rewards. We conducted a laboratory experiment, using a modified dictator game, to identify conditions that entice individuals to lie solely for psychological rewards. We argue that such lies can provide a ready means for individuals to manage others’ impression of them. We investigated the effect of social distance (the perceived familiarity, intimacy, or psychological proximity between two parties) and knowledge of circumstances (whether parties have common or asymmetric information) on the frequency of lying. We found that lying occurs more frequently when social distance is near and that the effect is exacerbated when information is asymmetric. Our theoretical development suggests that, under these conditions, individuals’ need to manage others’ impression is magnified. We discuss the implications of our findings.

Frontiers in psychology, 2015

This paper provides a starting point for psychological research on the sense of commitment within the context of joint action. We begin by formulating three desiderata: to illuminate the motivational factors that lead agents to feel and act committed, to pick out the cognitive processes and situational factors that lead agents to sense that implicit commitments are in place, and to illuminate the development of an understanding of commitment in ontogeny. In order to satisfy these three desiderata, we propose a minimal framework, the core of which is an analysis of the minimal structure of situations which can elicit a sense of commitment. We then propose a way of conceptualizing and operationalizing the sense of commitment, and discuss cognitive and motivational processes which may underpin the sense of commitment.

Scientific Reports, 2021

The intergenerational sustainability dilemma (ISD) is a situation of whether or not a person sacrifices herself for future sustainability. To examine the individual behaviors, one-person ISD game (ISDG) is instituted with strategy method where a queue of individuals is organized as a generational sequence. In ISDG, each individual chooses unsustainable (or sustainable) option with her payoff of $$X$$ X ($$X-D$$ X - D ) and an irreversible cost of $$D$$ D (zero cost) to future generations in $$36$$ 36 situations. Future ahead and back (FAB) mechanism is suggested as resolution for ISD by taking the perspective of future generation whereby each individual is first asked to take the next generation’s standpoint and request what she wants the current generation to choose, and, second, to make the actual decision from the original position. Results show that individuals choose unsustainable option as previous generations do so or $$\frac{X}{D}$$ X D is low (i.e., sustainability is endang...

Economic Inquiry, 2019

We present a novel experiment demonstrating strategies selfish individuals utilize to avoid social pressure to be altruistic. Subjects participate in a trust game, after which they have an opportunity to state their beliefs about their opponent's actions. Subsequently, subjects participate in a task designed to "reveal" their true beliefs. Subjects who initially made selfish choices falsely state their beliefs about their opponent's kindness. Their "revealed" beliefs were significantly more accurate, which exposed subjects' knowledge that their selfishness was unjustifiable by their opponent's behavior. The initial false statements complied with social norms, suggesting subjects' attempts to project a more favorable social image. (JEL C9, D03, D83)

Judgment and Decision Making

The present study investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boost voluntary contributions in a repeated public goods game. We manipulate two separate factors in a two-person public goods game: i) group composition (Selfish Subjects vs. Conditional Cooperators) and ii) common knowledge about group composition (Information vs. No Information). In addition, we let the subjects signal expectations of the other’s contributions in the experiment’s second phase. Common knowledge of Selfish type alone slightly dampens contributions but dramatically increases contributions when signaling of expectations is allowed. The results suggest that group-cooperation heuristics are triggered when two factors are jointly salient to the agent: (i) that there is no one to free-ride on; and (ii) that the other wants to cooperate because of (i). We highlight the potential effectiveness of group-cooperation heuristics and proposesolution thinkingas the schema of reasoning underlying the heuristics. The ...

Management Science, 2021

What is the value of pledges if they are often reneged upon? In this paper, we show—both theoretically and experimentally—that pledges can be used to screen donors and to better understand their motives for giving. In return, nonprofit managers can use the information they glean from pledges to better target future charitable giving appeals and interventions to donors, such as expressions of gratitude. In an experiment, we find that offering the option to pledge gifts induces self-selection. If expressions of gratitude are then targeted to individuals who select into pledges, reneging can be significantly reduced. Our findings provide an explanation for the potential usefulness of pledges. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.

Experimental Economics, 2012

Recent research argues "betrayal aversion" leads many people to avoid risk more when a person, rather than nature, determines the outcome of uncertainty. Unfortunately, previous studies conflate betrayal aversion with established preference effects including loss-aversion. Using a novel investment-game experiment that varies how strategic uncertainty is resolved, we here provide rigorous evidence on detrimental effects of betrayal aversion. The impact is substantial: holding fixed the probability of betrayal, the possibility of knowing that one has been betrayed reduces investment by about one-third. We suggest emotion-regulation underlies this result and explains the importance of impersonal, institution-mediated exchange in promoting economic efficiency.

Judgment and Decision Making, 2013

Subjects donate individually (control group) or in pairs (treatment group). Those in pairs reveal their donation decision to each other. Average donations in the treatment group are significantly higher than in the control group. Paired subjects have the opportunity to revise their donation decision after discussion. Pair members shift toward each others' initial decisions. Subjects are happier with their decision when their donations are larger, but those in pairs are less happy, controlling for amount donated. These findings suggest reluctant altruism due to peer pressure in charitable giving.

PLOS ONE, 2019

People often consider themselves as more moral than average others (i.e., moral superiority) and present themselves as more moral than they actually are (i.e., moral hypocrisy). We examined whether feelings of moral superiority-as a manifestation of self-enhancement motives-motivates people's hypocritical behavior, that is, their discrepant moral performances in public versus private settings. In three studies (total N = 1,151), participants distributed two tasks (one favorable and one unfavorable) between themselves and an anonymous partner, with the option of using an ostensibly fair randomizer (e.g., a self-prepared coin). We found that when experiencing feelings of moral superiority (vs. non-superiority), people, especially those who highly identified with moral values (Studies 1 and 2), were less likely to directly give themselves the favorable task, but they were not less likely to cheat in private after using the randomizer (Studies 1 to 3). Both self-enhancement motives and moral identity have implications for hypocritical behavior, by motivating public moral appearances but not private moral integrity.

Games

How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based on the other's intended generosity. Participants successively face three game types, the ultimatum, yes-no and impunity game, or (between subjects) in the reverse order. Although only the impunity game appeals to intrinsic generosity, we confirm conditioning even when sanctioning is possible. Based on our data, we distinguish two major types of participants in all three games: one yielding to the weakest social influence and the other immune to it and offering much less. This is particularly interesting in the impunity game where other-regarding concerns are minimal.