A Quantum-Mechanical Argument for Mind–Body Dualism

Arxiv preprint quant-ph/0108039, 2001

I write as a physicist, with the knowledge that many physicists are studying the mathematical structure of our physical universe and hope to be able to find a 'theory of everything,' or TOE, that will give a complete set of dynamical laws for this structure. This would essentially give the rules for how all the physical quantities in the universe evolve. Such a TOE would not be itself give the boundary conditions also necessary to determine the history of the universe, so it is a misnomer to say that it is a 'theory of everything,' but it is convenient to retain the acronym TOE for this dynamical part of the laws of physics. Some physicists, such as Hartle and Hawking [1], are also seeking to find rules specifying the boundary conditions (BC) of the universe as well. The combination of the TOE and the BC would then give a complete description of the mathematics of the state of the universe and its evolution. (This might be called a 'Theory Of More of Everything,' or TOME.) However, if one takes an even broader view, one realizes that even the TOME (the TOE and the BC) would not really comprise a theory of everything either, since they do not specify what conscious experiences occur within the universe. At least this seems to be the case if the TOME is assumed to be of the general mathematical types that are currently being sought, since such types do not seem by themselves to specify precisely what conscious experiences occur. Nevertheless, there is the general consensus that there should be some sort of 'psycho-physical parallelism' or connection between the mathematical structures described by current and sought-for theories of physics and the conscious experiences * Alberta-Thy-04-01; invited contribution to be published in Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Quentin Smith and Alexandar Jokic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Foundations of Physics

The aim of this paper is to invalidate the hypothesis that consciousness is necessary in the quantum measurement process. In order to achieve this target, I propose a considerable modification of the Schrödinger's cat and the Dead-Alive Physicist thought experiments, called "PIAR", short for "Physicist Inside the Ambiguous Room". A specific strategy has enabled me to plan the experiment in such a way as to logically justify the inconsistency of the above hypothesis and to oblige its supporters to rely on an alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics in which a real world of phenomena exists independently of our conscious mind and where observers play no special role. Moreover, the description of the measurement apparatus will be complete, in the sense that the experiment, given that it includes also the experimenter, will begin and end exclusively within a sealed room. Hence, my analysis will provide a logical explanation of the relationship between the observer and the objects of her/his experimental observation; this and a few other implications will be discussed in the fifth section and in the conclusions.

There have lately been a variety of attempts to connect, or even explain, if not in fact, reduce human consciousness to quantum mechanical processes. Such attempts tend to draw a sharp and fundamental distinction between the role of consciousness in classical mechanics, and on the other hand, in quantum mechanics, with an insistence on the assumed exceptional character of the latter. What is strangely missed, however, is the role of human consciousness as such in the very discovery or creation of both of these physical theories. And this a priori role is far more important than all the possible a posteriori interplays between consciousness and the mentioned two theories of physics, interplays which may happen during one or another specific experiment, measurement, and so on. In this regard it is suggested that the specific features human consciousness may exhibit during interactions with quantum mechanical systems may as well have other explanations which do not appear to be less plausible, or less well founded.

arXiv (Cornell University), 2019

Recent experiments (gedanken or otherwise) and theorems in quantum mechanics (QM), such as new iterations on Wigner's friend and delayed choice, have led many people to claim that QM is not compatible with determinate and intersubjectively consistent experience (what some call absoluteness of observed events), such as experiences of experimental outcomes. In the case of delayed choice the tension is between our experience of free will and a possible "superdeterminism" at work in QM. At the very least, some have suggested that the only way to save absoluteness of observed events, is to give up one or more of the following assumptions: free will, locality, or the completeness of QM. Our goal in this paper is to provide a take on QM that explains why there is and must always be determinate and intersubjectively consistent experience about all experimental outcomes (absoluteness of observed events). Our take accepts the completeness of the theory and requires no invocation of relative states (e.g., outcomes being relative to branches, conscious observers, etc.). And finally, this take requires no allegedly hybrid models such as claims about "subjective collapse." We provide a take on QM that yields a single world wherein all the observers (conscious or otherwise) agree about determinate and definite outcomes, because those outcomes are in fact determinate and definite. We provide a realist psi-epistemic take on QM that saves the absoluteness of observed events and the completeness of QM, without giving up free will or locality. We also show how our realist psi-epistemic account eliminates the measurement problem and, coupled with our take on neutral monism, also eliminates the hard problem of consciousness. The key to all this is to let go of the following offending assumptions: 1) physicalism, 2) fundamentalism, and relatedly 3) dualism about conscious experience, 4) the notion that fundamental explanation is always constructive, causal or dynamical, and relatedly, 5) realism about the wavefunction. Together these assumptions force us into the hard problem, they force us into the measurement problem, and they force us to seek the solutions to these problems in fundamental physics, e.g., by trying to relate these problems to one another directly, with very little success. Sometimes, when a problem is deeply intractable the best move is to jettison the offending assumptions that led to the problem in the first place. This is precisely what we do herein.

In this paper, we will consider understanding to be a state of consciousness that allows something to be conveyed in speech messages. We will consider the content of understanding as the content of those speech messages that this understanding allows us to convey. The objects and events in one's consciousness are definitely the content of understanding. Are there objects and events that are not the content of understanding but something else, such as a real physical field? The answer to this question is not as obvious as it may seem. Wigner, for example, reasoned about the existence of an electric field in this way (1967): All that is relevant is that the concept of the electric field is useful for communicating our ideas and for our own thinking. The statement that it "exists" means only that: (a) it can be measured, hence uniquely defined, and (b) that its knowledge is useful for understanding past phenomena and in helping to foresee further events. (pp. 172, 173) A generalization of Wigner's reasoning leads us to a significant conclusion that has implications for both the field of consciousness studies and physics: what exists is limited to what we can understand and express through speech. In this paper, we will provide justification for this conclusion using both general reasoning and rigorous logic. Additionally, we will explore a quantum mechanics experiment that, if successful, can only be explained based on this conclusion. The Observer's Consciousness Many researchers have noted that the result of a measurement can only appear in the presence of the observer's consciousness. Von Neumann (1955), for example, discussed temperature measurement with a mercury thermometer in this way: But in any case, no matter how far we calculate-to the mercury vessel, to the scale of the thermometer, to the retina, or into the brain, at some time we mast say: and this is perceived by the observer. That is, we must always divide the word into two parts, the one being the observed system, the other the observer. (pp. 419, 420) Wigner (1967) reasoned in this way about the participation of the observer's consciousness in measurement: All that quantum mechanics purports to provide are probability connections between subsequent impressions (also called "apperceptions") of the consciousness, and even though the dividing line between the observer, whose consciousness is being affected, and the observed physical object can be shifted towards the one or the other to a considerable degree, it cannot be eliminated. (p. 172

When I look at the scale of the apparatus I know what it reads. Those absurdly delicate, hopelessly inaccessible, global correlations obviously vanish when they connect up with me. Whether this is because consciousness is beyond the range of phenomena that quantum mechanics is capable of dealing with, or because it has infinitely many degrees of freedom or special super selection rules of its own, I would not presume to guess. But this is a puzzle about consciousness that should not get mixed up with efforts to understand quantum mechanics as a theory of subsystem correlations in the nonconscious world. (David Mermin 1998) The nature of consciousness and the interpretation of quantum mechanics are two subjects that excite great interest. Even more exciting then is the idea percolating through certain quarters that there are deep and significant connections between the two. Among those who have advocated a quantum mechanics-consciousness connection are physicists Roger Penrose, Eugene Wigner and Henry Stapp, philosophers David Chalmers, Michael Lockwood, and Quentin Smith and even a judge, David Hodgson, and an anesthesiologist, Penrose's co-author Stuart Hameroff. 1 Why do these, and many of those who attend the huge consciousness conferences in Tucson, think that quantum theory has anything special to do with consciousness? There seem to be two kinds of reasons. One is that according to the standard way of thinking about quantum theory-aka "the Copenhagen Interpretation"measurement and observation play a central role in physical reality in ways that are utterly different from classical mechanics. The theory's founding fathers said and current orthodoxy concurs that quantum mechanics requires for its very formulation reference to the measurement process; and while it might not be a majority view among physicists, it is often said that a measurement is not completed until it is registered in the mind of a conscious observer. Some physicists have taken this so far as to claim that reality is indeterminate until observed-or as it has been put "the moon is not there until someone looks." The other, complementary, reason is that the problem of understanding the relationship between consciousness and physical phenomena is so hard. Advocates of the quantum-consciousness connection think that it is so hard, in part, because the physical phenomena are understood in terms of classical physics. They suggest that progress can be made on this problem by recognizing that the physical basis of consciousness involves specifically quantum mechanical phenomena.

I survey some of the connections between the metaphysics of the relation between mind and matter, and quantum theory's measurement problem. After discussing the metaphysics, especially the correct formulation of physicalism, I argue that two state-reduction approaches to quantum theory's measurement problem hold some surprises for philosophers' discussions of physicalism. Though both approaches are compatible with physicalism, they involve a very different conception of the physical, and of how the physical underpins the mental, from what most philosophers expect. And one approach exemplifies a a problem in the definition of physicalism which the metaphysical literature has discussed only in the abstract. A version of the paper has appeared in Consciousness and Human Identity, ed. John Cornwell, OUP 1998.

Mind and Matter, 2007

I argue that a dual-aspect theory of consciousness, associated with a particular class of quantum states, can provide a consistent account of consciousness. I illustrate this with the use of coherent states as this class. The proposal meets Chalmers' requirements of allowing a structural ...

Quantum and Consciousness Revisited, 2024