Intuitive and Deliberate Judgments Are Based on Common Principles

Frontiers in psychology, 2017

Recent research suggests that unconventional beliefs are locatable within a generic anomalous belief category. This notion derives from the observation that apparently dissimilar beliefs share fundamental, core characteristics (i.e., contradiction of orthodox scientific understanding of the universe and defiance of conventional understanding of reality). The present paper assessed the supposition that anomalous beliefs were conceptually similar and explicable via common psychological processes by comparing relationships between discrete beliefs [endorsement of urban legends (ULs) and belief in the paranormal] and cognitive-perceptual personality measures [proneness to reality testing (RT) and schizotypy]. A sample of 222 volunteers, recruited via convenience sampling, took part in the study. Participants completed a series of self-report measures (Urban Legends Questionnaire, Reality Testing subscale of the Inventory of Personality Organization, Revised Paranormal Belief Scale and t...

Behavioural Public Policy

We argue that the diverse components of a choice architecture can be classified into two main dimensions – Message and Environment – and that the distinction between them is useful in order to better understand how nudges work. In the first part of this paper, we define what we mean by nudge, explain what Message and Environment are, argue that the distinction between them is conceptually robust and show that it is also orthogonal to other distinctions advanced in the nudge literature. In the second part, we review some common types of nudges and show they target either Message or Environment or both dimensions of the choice architecture. We then apply the Message–Environment framework to discuss some features of Amazon's website and, finally, we indicate how the proposed framework could help a choice architect to design a new choice architecture.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

When people make moral judgments, what information do they look for? Despite its theoretical and practical implications, this question has largely been neglected by prior literature. The recent Path Model of Blame predicts a canonical order in which people acquire information when judging blame. Upon discovering a negative event, perceivers consider information about causality, then intentionality, then (if the event is intentional) reasons or (if the event is unintentional) preventability. Three studies, using two novel paradigms, assessed and found support for these predictions: In constrained (Study 1) and open-ended (Study 2) information-acquisition contexts, participants were most likely, and fastest, to seek information in the canonical order, even when under time pressure (Study 3). These findings indicate that blame relies on a set of information components that are processed in a systematic order. Implications for moral judgment models are discussed, as are potential roles of emotion and motivated reasoning in information acquisition.

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2016

Seeing-perception and vision-is implicitly the fundamental building block of the literature on rationality and cognition. Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman's arguments against the omniscience of economic agents-and the concept of bounded rationality-depend critically on a particular view of the nature of perception and vision. We propose that this framework of rationality merely replaces economic omniscience with perceptual omniscience. We show how the cognitive and social sciences feature a pervasive but problematic meta-assumption that is characterized by an Ball-seeing eye.^We raise concerns about this assumption and discuss different ways in which the all-seeing eye manifests itself in existing research on (bounded) rationality. We first consider the centrality of vision and perception in Simon's pioneering work. We then point to Kahneman's work-particularly his article BMaps of Bounded Rationality^-to illustrate the pervasiveness of an all-seeing view of perception, as manifested in the extensive use of visual examples and illusions. Similar assumptions about perception can be found across a large literature in the cognitive sciences. The central problem is the present emphasis on inverse optics-the objective nature of objects and environments, e.g., size, contrast, and color. This framework ignores the nature of the organism and perceiver. We argue instead that reality is constructed and expressed, and we discuss the species-specificity of perception, as well as perception as a user interface. We draw on vision science as well as the arts to develop an alternative understanding of rationality in the cognitive and social sciences. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our arguments for the rationality and decision-making literature in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, along with suggesting some ways forward.

International Journal of Artificial Intelligence in Education

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is attracting a great deal of attention and it is important to investigate the public perceptions of AI and their impact on the perceived credibility of research evidence. In the literature, there is evidence that people overweight research evidence when framed in neuroscience findings. In this paper, we present the findings of the first investigation of the impact of an AI frame on the perceived credibility of educational research evidence. In an experimental study, we allocated 605 participants including educators to one of three conditions in which the same educational research evidence was framed within one of: AI, neuroscience, or educational psychology. The results demonstrate that when educational research evidence is framed within AI research, it is considered as less credible in comparison to when it is framed instead within neuroscience or educational psychology. The effect is still evident when the subjects’ familiarity with the framing discip...

Revista Colombiana de Ciencias Sociales

La intuición como tema de investigación ha cobrado importancia. Se parte de la Caja de herramientas adaptativa de Gerd Gigerenzer para hallar técnicas para su formación. En su teoría se encuentran pocos aportes explícitos, aunque pueden inferirse algunos; también se presentan propuestas a partir de la discusión con otros autores. Se proponen recomendaciones generales, entre las que destacan el análisis de los heurísticos y la retroalimentación, así como la selección o desarrollo de ambientes de aplicación. Luego, de acuerdo con una clasificación de heurísticos de Gigerenzer (2000, 2007b, 2008), se exponen técnicas específicas. Por último, se retoman aportes de Hogarth (2001, 2003), Klein (2003), Lopera y otros (2010), Sadler-Smith y Shefy (2004, 2007; 2006) para contrastar los hallazgos.

Medical Care Research and Review, 2013

Patient involvement in decisions is central to patient-centered care. Yet many important decisions must be made in complex, ambiguous clinical situations in which all possible options cannot be known, evidence is inadequate to inform patients’ preferences fully, and/or patients are unclear about their desired level of involvement. In these situations, preferences are shaped by affect, framing, and “collaborative cognition” among clinicians, patients, and their families; thus, decisions are often relational, dynamic, iterative, provisional, and/or conditional. Clinicians can help patients achieve greater autonomy by engaging both intuitive and deliberative decision-making processes (“whole mind”) and involving others in exploring, clarifying, and co-constructing patients’ preferences (“shared mind”). Clinical and interpersonal relationships can promote effective decision making through developing a shared attentional focus, tailoring information, and identifying conditions under whic...

Psychological Reports

Decision science is an area of enquiry that crosses many disciplines, from psychology to economics, each with their own perspective of decision making. Traditionally, mathematicians have envisaged decision making as a purely rational endeavour, whereas psychologists and behavioural economists have critiqued this narrative, and suggested that cognitive short cuts are the real mechanisms behind how decisions are made. However, contemporary dual process theorists argue that two systems of the mind exist: system one (intuitive decision making); and, system two (rational decision making). The current review will present a relatively new metaphor for decision making: the unified threshold model. This model is a global approach to decision making which allows both intuitive and rational decision making processes to be explained in a more flexible manner than the dual process model. This review will introduce the reader to different types of threshold models (Counter and Diffusion), their assumptions, and their ability to explain decision making behaviour. Implications and future research will also be discussed. In summary, the aim of this review is to highlight that the unified threshold model of decision making may be a more adequate explanation of decision making data in comparison to previous models and theories.

Medical Education

Minds and Machines, 2015

If citizens' behavior threatens to harm others or seems not to be in their own interest (e.g., risking severe head injuries by riding a motorcycle without a helmet), it is not uncommon for governments to attempt to change that behavior. Governmental policy makers can apply established tools from the governmental toolbox to this end (e.g., laws, regulations, incentives, and disincentives). Alternatively, they can employ new tools that capitalize on the wealth of knowledge about human behavior and behavior change that has been accumulated in the behavioral sciences (e.g., psychology and economics). Two contrasting approaches to behavior change are nudge policies and boost policies. These policies rest on fundamentally different research programs on bounded rationality, namely, the heuristics and biases program and the simple heuristics program, respectively. This article examines the policy-theory coherence of each approach. To this end, it identifies the necessary assumptions underlying each policy and analyzes to what extent these assumptions are implied by the theoretical commitments of the respective research program. Two key results of this analysis are that the two policy approaches rest on diverging assumptions and that both suffer from disconnects with the respective theoretical program, but to different degrees: Nudging appears to be more adversely affected than boosting does. The article concludes with a discussion of the limits of the chosen evaluative dimension, policy-theory coherence, and reviews some other benchmarks on which policy programs can be assessed.

Cognitive, affective & behavioral neuroscience, 2014

In theory, intuitive decisions are made immediately, without conscious, reasoned thought. They are experienced as decisions based on hunches that cannot be explicitly described but, nevertheless, guide subsequent action. Investigating the underlying neural mechanisms, previous research has found the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) to be crucial to intuitive processes, but its specific role has remained unclear. On the basis of a two-stage conceptualization of intuition suggested by Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, and Parker Cognitive Psychology, 22, 72-110 (1990), we attempt to clarify the OFC's role in intuitive processing. We propose that it functions as an early integrator of incomplete stimulus input guiding subsequent processing by means of a coarse representation of the gist of the information. On the subjective level, this representation would be perceived as a (gut) feeling biasing the decision. Our aim in the present study was to test this neural model and rule out alternative e...

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2019

Despite their popularity, dual process accounts of human reasoning and decisionmaking have come under intense scrutiny in recent years. Cognitive scientists and philosophers alike have come to question the theoretical foundations of the 'standard view' of dual process theory and have challenged the validity and relevance of evidence in support of it. Moreover, attempts to modify and refine dual process theory in light of these challenges have generated additional concerns about its applicability and refutability as a scientific theory. With these concerns in mind, this paper provides a critical review of dual process theory in economics, focusing on its role as a psychological framework for decision modeling in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics. I argue that the influx of criticisms against dual process theory challenge the descriptive accuracy of dualistic decision models in economics. In fact, the case can be made that the popularity of dual process theory in economics has less to do with the empirical success of dualistic decision models, and more to do with the convenience that the dual process narrative provides economists looking to explainaway decision anomalies. This leaves behavioral economists and neuroeconomists with something of a dilemma: either they stick to their purported ambitions to give a realistic description of human decision-making and give up the narrative, or they revise and restate their scientific ambitions.

Open Theology, 2016

In the cognitive science of religion (CSR), it is often claimed that religion is a product of information processing system that is nonconscious, automatic and irrational. This view rests on a theoretical basis provided by dual-process accounts (DPA) of reasoning. In this paper, I will provide some examples how DPAs are employed in contemporary theorizing in CSR and point out some problems, which reveal an oversight that may impede the progress of the scientific study of religion. The topic touches on the wider debate on evolutionary debunking arguments but my point concerns CSR theorizing and how it might not be able to understand religion properly.

Memory & cognition, 2016

Two experiments pitted the default-interventionist account of belief bias against a parallel-processing model. According to the former, belief bias occurs because a fast, belief-based evaluation of the conclusion pre-empts a working-memory demanding logical analysis. In contrast, according to the latter both belief-based and logic-based responding occur in parallel. Participants were given deductive reasoning problems of variable complexity and instructed to decide whether the conclusion was valid on half the trials or to decide whether the conclusion was believable on the other half. When belief and logic conflict, the default-interventionist view predicts that it should take less time to respond on the basis of belief than logic, and that the believability of a conclusion should interfere with judgments of validity, but not the reverse. The parallel-processing view predicts that beliefs should interfere with logic judgments only if the processing required to evaluate the logical s...

Frontiers in psychology, 2017

Faced with moral choice, people either judge according to pre-existing obligations (deontological judgment), or by taking into account the consequences of their actions (utilitarian judgment). We propose that the latter coheres with a more general cognitive mechanism - deontic introduction, the tendency to infer normative ('deontic') conclusions from descriptive premises (is-ought inference). Participants were presented with vignettes that allowed either deontological or utilitarian choice, and asked to draw a range of deontic conclusions, as well as judge the overall moral rightness of each choice separately. We predicted and found a selective defeasibility pattern, in which manipulations that suppressed deontic introduction also suppressed utilitarian moral judgment, but had little effect on deontological moral judgment. Thus, deontic introduction coheres with utilitarian moral judgment almost exclusively. We suggest a family of norm-generating informal inferences, in whic...

The Bottom Line

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to review intuition in the context of organizational change. The authors argue that intuition as a concept requires attention and its formulation is necessary prior to its application in organizations. The paper provides a critique of dual process theory and highlights shortcomings in organization theorizing of intuition. Design/methodology/approach The paper is conceptual and provides in-depth theoretical discussions by drawing from the literature on decision and intuition in the context of organizational change. Findings Investigating whether dual process theory is sufficiently clear, the authors found ambiguity. Specifically, the current definition provided by Dane and Pratt is not clear in terms of its four sections: the consciousness of non-conscious processing, involving holistic associations, that are produced rapidly, which result in affectively charged judgments. Finally, the authors note that the evolutionary perspective is missing and ...

Personality and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc, 2017

The nature of harm-and therefore moral judgment-may be misunderstood. Rather than an objective matter of reason, we argue that harm should be redefined as an intuitively perceived continuum. This redefinition provides a new understanding of moral content and mechanism-the constructionist Theory of Dyadic Morality (TDM). TDM suggests that acts are condemned proportional to three elements: norm violations, negative affect, and-importantly-perceived harm. This harm is dyadic, involving an intentional agent causing damage to a vulnerable patient (A→P). TDM predicts causal links both from harm to immorality (dyadic comparison) and from immorality to harm (dyadic completion). Together, these two processes make the "dyadic loop," explaining moral acquisition and polarization. TDM argues against intuitive harmless wrongs and modular "foundations," but embraces moral pluralism through varieties of values and the flexibility of perceived harm. Dyadic morality impacts under...

Memory & Cognition, 2015

According to the default interventionist dualprocess account of reasoning, belief-based responses to reasoning tasks are based on Type 1 processes generated by default, which must be inhibited in order to produce an effortful, Type 2 output based on the validity of an argument. However, recent research has indicated that reasoning on the basis of beliefs may not be as fast and automatic as this account claims. In three experiments, we presented participants with a reasoning task that was to be completed while they were generating random numbers (RNG). We used the novel methodology introduced by Handley, Newstead & Trippas (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37, 28-43, 2011), which required participants to make judgments based upon either the validity of a conditional argument or the believability of its conclusion. The results showed that belief-based judgments produced lower rates of accuracy overall and were influenced to a greater extent than validity judgments by the presence of a conflict between belief and logic for both simple and complex arguments. These findings were replicated in Experiment3, in which we controlled for switching demands in a blocked design. Across all three experiments, we found a main effect of RNG, implying that both instructional sets require some effortful processing. However, in the blocked design RNG had its greatest impact on logic judgments, suggesting that distinct executive resources may be required for each type of judgment. We discuss the implications of our findings for the default interventionist account and offer a parallel competitive model as an alternative interpretation for our findings.

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2015

Over 50 years of research on cognitive style has converged on the importance of individual differences in use of intuition and analysis. This program of research is characterized, however, by two incompatible perspectives about the relation between intuition and analysis. The distinction concerns whether intuition and analysis are opposite poles of a single dimension or whether they are orthogonal constructs. Two studies report meta-analytic investigations of the relation between intuition and analysis. A meta-analysis of the existing research base (k = 80; n = 27 501) showed that intuition and analysis are uncorrelated. A second meta-analysis of combinations of subscales from different cognitive style measures (n = 511) supported the results of the first meta-analysis. Confirmatory factor analysis also supported the existence of two uncorrelated constructs. Overall, the findings support the view that intuition and analysis are independent constructs, rather than opposite ends of a bipolar continuum. In addition, the findings suggest measures of analysis or rationality are not interchangeable.

Journal of Supply Chain Management, 2013

Behavioral operations management, or simply behavioral operations (BOps), aims at understanding the decision-making of managers and at using this understanding to generate interventions that improve the operation of the supply chain. To do so, BOps imports knowledge from a number of fields such as economics, psychology and other social and behavioral sciences. We point out a blind spot in this knowledge: In BOps, the heuristics that people use are typically, although not always, viewed as a liability. The issue with this view is that it does not explain when and in what way heuristics can be an asset. We propose, as a research program for BOps, uncovering the conditions under which the heuristics that supply chain managers use are an asset, as well as the conditions under which they are a liability. We briefly discuss some research on heuristics in BOps and show how the study of quantitative models of heuristics can complement it.

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2015

Can the general public learn to deal with risk and uncertainty, or do authorities need to steer people's choices in the right direction? Libertarian paternalists argue that results from psychological research show that our reasoning is systematically flawed and that we are hardly educable because our cognitive biases resemble stable visual illusions. For that reason, they maintain, authorities who know what is best for us need to step in and steer our behavior with the help of Bnudges.^Nudges are nothing new, but justifying them on the basis of a latent irrationality is. In this article, I analyze the scientific evidence presented for such a justification. It suffers from narrow logical norms, that is, a misunderstanding of the nature of rational thinking, and from a confirmation bias, that is, selective reporting of research. These two flaws focus the blame on individuals' minds rather than on external causes, such as industries that spend billions to nudge people into unhealthy behavior. I conclude that the claim that we are hardly educable lacks evidence and forecloses the true alternative to nudging: teaching people to become risk savvy. Liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people … John Adams, 1765 Bounded rationality is not irrationality. … On the contrary, I think there is plenty of evidence that people are generally quite rational; that is, they usually have reasons for what they do.

An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource, 2015

We distinguish between situations of risk, where all options, consequences, and probabilities are known, and situations of uncertainty, where they are not. Probability theory and statistics are the best tools for deciding under risk but not under uncertainty, which characterizes most relevant problems that humans have to solve. Uncertainty requires simple heuristics that are robust rather than optimal. We propose to think of the mind as an adaptive toolbox and introduce the descriptive study of heuristics, their building blocks, and the core capacities they exploit. The question of which heuristic to select for which class of problems is the topic of the normative study of ecological rationality. We discuss earlier views on the nature of heuristics that maintained that heuristics are always less accurate because they ignore information and demand less effort. Contrary to this accuracy-effort trade-off view, heuristics can lead to more accurate inferences-under uncertainty-than strategies that use more information and computation. The study of heuristics opens up a new perspective on the nature of both cognition and rationality. In a world of uncertainty, Homo sapiens might well be called Homo heuristicus. Both Simon's question and our answer to it seem deceptively simple. Simon argues against the backdrop of a historic tradition that views the maximization of some notion of utility, the prescriptions of probability theory, or logical Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephan Kosslyn.

Memory & Cognition

Dual process theories postulate the existence of two levels of processing, Type 1, which uses belief-based cues to make very rapid inferences, and Type 2, which uses more conscious, working memory-based processes that are, in principle, capable of making rulebased judgments. There is a common assumption that Type 1 processes are more rapidly produced, while Type 2 processes take more time. Evidence for this assumption is mixed.

Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze price decision-making through a practice-based approach. The paper investigates the micro-level practices used to arrive at sales price decisions. Design/methodology/approach In this study, a qualitative study approach is used to develop findings abductively. The data are gathered through an in-depth case study at two firms: semi-structured interviews, meeting observations, shadowing and pricing documents. Findings This paper finds that pricing is a collective decision-making process involving multiple actors across the organization. The case firms work on solving information, coordination and control problems to arrive at sales prices by enacting interlinked practices. Pricing is therefore neither a structure nor a single decision but a process consisting of multiple micro-level practices that enable firms to make pricing decisions. Originality/value This paper develops a practice-based approach to pricing that conceptualize the micro...

JCO Precision Oncology, 2017

PurposeIn patients with advanced cancers, tumor genomic profiling (TGP) can reveal secondary germline findings (SGFs) with regard to inherited disease risks. This study examined the process by which patients with advanced cancers would decide about whether to learn these SGFs and their preferences about specific challenging decision scenarios, including whether patients should be required to receive SGFs and whether SGFs should be returned to the family after a patient’s death.Patients and MethodsWe conducted qualitative semistructured interviews with 40 patients with advanced breast, bladder, colorectal, or lung cancer who had undergone TGP. Data were collected on participants’ perspectives about the hypothetical decision to learn their SGFs, including their anticipated approach to the decision-making process, and their preferences about challenging decision scenarios. Data were evaluated by thematic content analysis.ResultsWe identified themes with regard to participants’ preferred degree of decisional autonomy, perceived vital role of doctors, information needs, and anticipated process of deliberation. Although participants reported that this decision was ultimately their own, many wanted input from family and trusted others. Oncologists were expected to provide decision guidance and key clarifying information. Most participants stated that patients should be able to make a choice about receiving actionable SGFs, and a majority stated that SGFs should be available to family after a patient’s death.ConclusionThese results provide insight into SGF decision-making processes of patients with advanced cancers, which can allow clinicians to provide patients with optimal decision support in this context. Patients with advanced cancers have specific information needs and decision-making preferences that educational and communication interventions should address to ensure that patients make informed choices about learning SGFs.

Frontiers in Psychology

Coherence-building is a key concept for a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms of intuition and insight problem solving. There are several accounts that address certain aspects of coherence-building. However, there is still no proper framework defining the general principles of coherence-building. We propose a fourstage model of coherence-building. The first stage starts with spreading activation restricted by constraints. This dynamic is a well-defined rule based process. The second stage is characterized by detecting a coherent state. We adopted a fluency account assuming that the ease of information processing indicates the realization of a coherent state. The third stage is designated to evaluate the result of the coherence-building process and assess whether the given problem is solved or not. If the coherent state does not fit the requirements of the task, the process re-enters at stage 1. These three stages characterize intuition. For insight problem solving a fourth stage is necessary, which restructures the given representation after repeated failure, so that a new search space results. The new search space enables new coherent states. We provide a review of the most important findings, outline our model, present a large number of examples, deduce potential new paradigms and measures that might help to decipher the underlying cognitive processes.

Brain Sciences

Reinforcement learning studies in rodents and primates demonstrate that goal-directed and habitual choice behaviors are mediated through different fronto-striatal systems, but the evidence is less clear in humans. In this study, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data were collected whilst participants (n = 20) performed a conditional associative learning task in which blocks of novel conditional stimuli (CS) required a deliberate choice, and blocks of familiar CS required an intuitive choice. Using standard subtraction analysis for fMRI event-related designs, activation shifted from the dorso-fronto-parietal network, which involves dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) for deliberate choice of novel CS, to ventro-medial frontal (VMPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex for intuitive choice of familiar CS. Supporting this finding, psycho-physiological interaction (PPI) analysis, using the peak active areas within the PFC for novel and familiar CS as seed regions, showed funct...

Zeitschrift für Psychologie

Research on the motives individuals have to punish criminal offenders suggests that punitive reactions are primarily driven by retributive, not utilitarian, motives. To explain this, several authors have suggested a dual process model (DPM) of punitive reactions. According to this model, punitive reactions are the product of two distinct types of processing (type I and type II), which differentially support retributive vs. utilitarian punishment motives. In response to cases of criminal wrongdoing, type I swiftly outputs a retributive reaction. In contrast, for utilitarian motives to play a role, this reaction has to be overridden by type II processing, which only happens rarely. In this article, we argue that despite its popularity, there is little concrete evidence for the DPM. We then report the results of a preregistered study investigating the effect of increased processing effort on retributive vs. utilitarian punitive reactions. We argue that the results fail to support the DPM.

Frontiers in psychology, 2014

Situation Model of Anticipated Response consequences in tactical decisions (SMART) describes the interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes in skill acquisition and thus the dynamic interaction of sensory and motor capacities in embodied cognition. The empirically validated, extended, and revised SMART-ER can now predict when specific dynamic interactions of top-down and bottom-up processes have a beneficial or detrimental effect on performance and learning depending on situational constraints. The model is empirically supported and proposes learning strategies for when situation complexity varies or time pressure is present. Experiments from expertise research in sports illustrate that neither bottom-up nor top-down processes are bad or good per se but their effects depend on personal and situational characteristics.

European Journal of Social Psychology, 2011

A three-phase longitudinal study (spread over a month's time) was carried out to investigate attitude's persistence and linkage to behavior as it may be affected by the processing of information about the communication source. The following three independent variables were manipulated: (i) contents of the source of information (implying the communicator to be expert or inexpert on the topic of the communication); (ii) length of the source information (brief versus lengthy); and (iii) message recipients' involvement in the issue at hand (high versus low). Replicating prior research when the source information was brief, it exerted greater persuasive impact under low versus high involvement, and when it was lengthy, it exerted greater persuasive impact under high versus low involvement. Of greater importance, the newly acquired attitudes were more persistent and were linked more strongly to actual behavior when the source information was lengthy (versus brief) provided the recipients had high (versus low) involvement in the issue. These findings were interpreted to mean that just like with the message/issue information in prior research, when processed extensively, source information, too, may contribute to the formation of persistent and behavior-driving attitudes.

Philosophies, 2020

We defend two theses: (1) Knowledge how and knowledge that are two distinct forms of knowledge, and; (2) Stanley-style intellectualism is neuro-psychologically implausible. Our naturalistic argument for the distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that is based on a consideration of the nature of slips and basic activities. We further argue that Stanley’s brand of intellectualism has certain ontological consequences that go against modern cognitive neuroscience and psychology. We tie up our line of thought by showing that input from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, on multiple levels of analysis, cohere in supporting the distinction between two separate forms of knowledge. The upshot is a neuro-psychologically plausible understanding of knowledge.

International Journal of Social Robotics, 2021

In recent years, the rapid ageing of the population, a longer life expectancy and elderly people’s desire to live independently are social changes that put pressure on healthcare systems. This context is boosting the demand for companion and entertainment social robots on the market and, consequently, producers and distributors are interested in knowing how these social robots are accepted by consumers. Based on technology acceptance models, a parsimonious model is proposed to estimate the intention to use this new advanced social robot technology and, in addition, an analysis is performed to determine how consumers’ gender and rational thinking condition the precedents of the intention to use. The results show that gender differences are more important than suggested by the literature. While women gave greater social influence and perceived enjoyment as the main motives for using a social robot, in contrast, men considered their perceived usefulness to be the principal reason and, ...

Philosophical Psychology, 2018

In order to explain the effects found in the heuristics and biases literature, dual-process theories of reasoning claim that human reasoning is of two kinds: Type-1 processing is fast, automatic, and associative, while Type-2 reasoning is slow, controlled, and rule based. If human reasoning is so divided, it would have important consequences for morality, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Although dual-process theorists have typically argued for their position by way of an inference to the best explanation, they have generally failed to consider alternative hypotheses. Worse still, it is unclear how we might test dual-process theories. In this article, I offer a one-system theory, which I call the Sound-Board Account of Reasoning, according to which there is one reasoning system which is flexible, allowing the properties used to distinguished Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning to cross-cut one another. I empirically distinguish my theory from the two dominant versions of dual-process theory (parallel-competitive and default-interventionist dual-process theory) and argue that my theory's predictions are confirmed over both of these versions of dual-process theory.

Philosophical Psychology, 2015

In response to the claim that the properties typically used to distinguish System 1 from System 2 cross-cut one another, Carruthers, Evans, and Stanovich have abandoned the System 1/System 2 distinction. Evans and Stanovich both opt for a dual-process theory, according to which Type-1 processes are autonomous and Type-2 processes use working memory and involve cognitive decoupling. Carruthers maintains a two-system account, according to which there is an intuitive system and a reflective system. I argue that these defenses of dual-process theory face two problems. First, as pointed out by Sloman, these new dual-process theories cast the net of "reasoning" too wide. Second, and more importantly, this singular distinction cannot accomplish the explanatory work needed to support dual-process theory. These theorists must fall back on using various properties from the Standard Menu in explanations, thereby committing these accounts to a "Standard View" that they had hoped to avoid. Thus, these theorists face a dilemma: either the distinction between intuitive and reflective (or autonomous and working memory involving) falls back on using the properties of the Standard Menu, or it lacks the explanatory promise that made dual-process theory attractive. Recently, in response to the claim that these properties cross-cut one another , some prominent two-system theorists have abandoned the System 1/ System 2 distinction and adopted monothetic 1 dual-process accounts. Carruthers ( ) maintains a two-system theory that distinguishes intuitive from reflective reasoning, which, he argues, is different than the received S1/S2 distinction. According to Carruthers, intuitive processes are unconscious while reflective processes are conscious. Stanovich (2009, 2011, 2009), and Stanovich & Evans (2013a/b) have abandoned two-system theory, but

Social Cognition, 2015

The Journal of Creative Behavior, 2013

Openness to experience is the broadest personality domain of the Big Five, including a mix of traits relating to intellectual curiosity, intellectual interests, perceived intelligence, imagination, creativity, artistic and aesthetic interests, emotional and fantasy richness, and unconventionality. Likewise, creative achievement is a broad construct, comprising creativity across the arts and sciences. The aim of this study was to clarify the relationship between openness to experience and creative achievement. Toward this aim, I factor analyzed a battery of tests of cognitive ability, working memory, Intellect, Openness, affect, and intuition among a sample of English Sixth Form students (N = 146). Four factors were revealed: explicit cognitive ability, intellectual engagement, affective engagement, and aesthetic engagement. In line with dualprocess theory, each of these four factors showed differential relations with personality, impulsivity, and creative achievement. Affective engagement and aesthetic engagement were associated with creative achievement in the arts, whereas explicit cognitive ability and intellectual engagement were associated with creative achievement in the sciences. The results suggest that the Intellectual and Openness aspects of the broader openness to experience personality domain are related to different modes of information processing and predict different forms of creative achievement.

Cogent Education, 2015

Tertiary education has been actively moving over the last two decades from the lecturer-centred to the student-centred approach, focusing more on "what the student does" rather than on "what the student is" or "what the teacher is". We, as academics, teacher educators, and teachers, do attend many workshops and seminars promoting student-centred learning. However, the question that arises is "are we prepared to truly develop from the conventional lecture-based learning, which is hard to eliminate, to the innovative student-centred learning, which may be hard to accept, adopt, and sustain?" The way we plan, organise and deliver knowledge might be mostly epistemological. However, there exists an ontological stance on how we perceive knowledge and on our belief-informed opinions-of "the most effective pedagogy" in organising and emphasising such knowledge. This paper will present a personal reflective study on the ontological-epistemological discourse that a novice academic experienced in first accepting the idea of a student-centred learning approach, implementing such strategy and in reflecting back on this experience. This study promotes a rethinking of our teaching and learning practice as an ontological and epistemological form of inquiry and generates insights which may be further extended and researched. This paper finally offers a reread of the

Business Research, 2019

Intuition can lead to more effective decision-making than analysis under certain conditions. This assumption can be regarded as common sense. However, dominant research streams on intuition effectiveness in decision-making conceptualize intuition inadequately, because intuition is considered either detrimental or as a form of analysis. Current findings in general intuition research show that intuition is a holistic form of information processing that is distinct from analysis and can be superior in some cases. To reconcile this mismatch, this article first critically assesses dominant conceptions on intuition effectiveness and then offers a re-conceptualization that builds on current findings of general intuition research. Basically, the article suggests the structuredness of the decision problem as the main criterion for intuition effectiveness, and proposes organization information processing theory to establish this link conceptually. It is not the uncertainty but the equivocalit...

Frontiers in Psychology, 2016

Motivation and cognitive capacity are key factors in people's everyday struggle with uncertainty. However, the exact nature of their interplay in various contexts still needs to be revealed. The presented paper reports on two experimental studies which aimed to examine the joint consequences of motivational and cognitive factors for preferences regarding incomplete information expansion. In Study 1 we demonstrate the interactional effect of motivation and cognitive capacity on information preference. High need for closure resulted in a stronger relative preference for expectancyinconsistent information among non-depleted individuals, but the opposite among cognitively depleted ones. This effect was explained by the different informative value of questions in comparison to affirmative sentences and the potential possibility of assimilation of new information if it contradicts prior knowledge. In Study 2 we further investigated the obtained effect, showing that not only questions but also other kinds of incomplete information are subject to the same dependency. Our results support the expectation that, in face of incomplete information, motivation toward closure may be fulfilled efficiently by focusing on expectancy-inconsistent pieces of data. We discuss the obtained effect in the context of previous assumptions that high need for closure results in a simple processing style, advocating a more complex approach based on the character of the provided information.

BRQ Business Research Quarterly, 2020

This research focuses on the role of gender and physical attractiveness in judging severity of unethical workplace behavior. Scenarios with possible ethical dilemmas (commonly referred to as “gray areas” of behavior) were displayed to 4,483 subjects. Our findings show that “gray area” behavior was evaluated as more ethical if performed by male employees compared with women. We also found that attractiveness moderated the connection between gender and tolerance toward unethical work behavior. People judge more severely the same unethical action by plain-looking employees rather than attractive-looking employees, in accordance with the attractiveness-leniency effect—but only for women perpetrators. The physical attributes of men were not found to be relevant. We explore a number of explanations for this discrimination based on Expectation States Theory and Social Role Theory. JEL CLASSIFICATION: C91; J71.

Social Neuroscience, 2020

To reduce the escalation of intergroup conflict, it is important that we understand the processes related to the detection of group-based threat and reconciliation. In the present study, we investigated the neural mechanisms of such processes using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). Functional neuroimaging techniques may shed light on quick, automatic responses to stimuli that happen outside of conscious awareness and are thus increasingly difficult to quantify relying only on participants' self-reported experiences. They may further provide invaluable insight into physiological processes occurring in situations of sensitive nature, whereby participants-deliberately or not-may withhold their honest responses due to social desirability. Non-Muslim Western Caucasian participants watched short video clips of stereotypical Middle-Eastern Muslim males threatening their ingroup, offering reconciliation to the ingroup, or making a neutral statement. Threatening statements led to increased activation in the amygdala, insula, supramarginal gyrus, and temporal lobe. Reconciliation efforts led to increased activation in the prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate gyrus, and caudate. The results suggest that threat detection is a relatively automatic process while evaluating and responding to reconciliation offers requires more cognitive efforts. The implications of these findings and future research directions are discussed.

Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 2013

Since the Enlightenment, rationality has been set above intuition and associated with male thought, while intuition has become linked with female thought. Do these stereotypes still exist today? If they do, are they the same for different domains of life? And are they stable across age groups, gender, and culture? We investigated these questions in two countries that differ in women’s traditional roles, using representative national samples of 1,016 people in Germany and 1,002 people in Spain. Participants reported their beliefs about men and women’s intuitions for nine personal and professional domains. The main results are as follows: Substantial stereotypes about intuition exist, are highly domain-specific rather than general and, strikingly, do not differ in sign and size between age groups. Moreover, in every domain, substantial in-group preferences exist: Females believe more strongly in the intuitive power of women, and males in that of men. Across domains, stereotypes about ...

Current Psychology

Researchers recognize the affinity of habits-as-heuristics and habits-as-routines. This paper argues that the affinity should not be surprising, as both kinds of habits are the outcome of rational choice. The paper finds that the dual process theory, once reconstructed as based on rational choice, reveals that the affinity runs deep, as three-fold parallelism: i) the cognitive economy responsible for habits-as-heuristics parallels what this paper calls the “physiological economy” responsible for habits-as-routines; ii) the occasional slipup of heuristics generated by the cognitive economy parallels the occasional slipup of routines of the physiological economy; and iii) the breakdown of heuristics of the cognitive economy parallels the breakdown of routines of the physiological economy. The rationality-based dual process theory can explain—whereas the single process theory cannot—why slipups do not induce the decision makers to abandon the pertinent habit, but breakdowns do.

Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2020

As shown in our previous paper ('Regression I. Experimental approaches to regression', JAP, 65, 2, 345-65), the common mechanism of regression can be described as reversible dedifferentiation, which is understood as a relative increase of the proportion of low-differentiated (older) systems in actualized experience. Experimental data show that regression following disease (chronic tension headache) is followed by adaptation and an increase in system differentiation in that experience domain which contains systems responsible for that adaptation. The results of mathematical modelling support the idea that reversible dedifferentiation can be one of the mechanisms for increasing the effectiveness of adaptation through learning. Reversible dedifferentiation, which is phenomenologically described as regression, is a general mechanism for restructuring the organism-environment interactions in situations where behaviours that were effective in the past become ineffective. Reversible dedifferentiation has evolved as a component of adaptation when new behaviours are formed and large-scale modifications in the existing behaviours are required in the face of changes in the external and/or internal environment. Thus, the authors believe that this article provides evidence for Jung's view that regression is not only a 'return' to past forms of thinking, affects and behaviour, but that regressive processes provide a significant impetus for psychological growth and development.

Augmented Humanity, 2021

This multidisciplinary work analyzes the impact of digitalization on civilized humanity, conceived in terms of purposive, goal-directed agency. More particularly, it examines the close collaboration of human and artificial agents as augmented agents, viewing them both as complex, open adaptive systems, which vary dynamically in context. This first chapter explains general metamodels of agentic form and function, where metamodels are defined as families or related sets of models. From this perspective, augmented agency presents a new class of agentic metamodel, for individuals, groups, and collectives. At the same time, however, new risks and dilemmas emerge, which reflect the challenge of combining and supervising different human and artificial capabilities and potentialities. Problems of this kind are a recurrent topic throughout the book.

Frontiers in Environmental Science

There is growing interest within and beyond the economics community in assessing the value of information (VOI) used in decision making. VOI assessments often do not consider the complex behavioral and social factors that affect the perception, valuation, and use of information by individuals and groups. Additionally, VOI assessments frequently do not examine the full suite of interactions and outcomes affecting different groups or individuals. The behavioral and social factors that we mention are often (but not always) innately-derived, less-than-conscious influences that reflect human and societal adaptations to the past. We first discuss these concepts in the context of the recognition and use of information for decision making. We then find fifteen different aspects of value and information pertinent to VOI assessments. We examine methodologies and issues related to current VOI estimation practices in economics. Building on this examination, we explore the perceptions, social fa...

Geological Society, London, Special Publications, 2015

Integrated Environmental Modelling (IEM) is an invaluable tool for understanding the complex, dynamic ecosystems that house our natural resources and control our environments. Human behaviour affects the ways in which the science of IEM is assembled and used for meaningful societal applications. In particular, human biases and heuristics reflect adaptation and experiential learning to issues with frequent, sharply distinguished, feedbacks. Unfortunately, human behaviour is not adapted to the more diffusely experienced problems that IEM typically seeks to address. Twelve biases are identified that affect IEM (and science in general). These biases are supported by personal observations and by the findings of behavioural scientists. A process for critical analysis is proposed that addresses some human challenges of IEM and solicits explicit description of (1) represented processes and information, (2) unrepresented processes and information, and (3) accounting for, and cognizance of, p...

Scientific Reports

Effective behavioral interventions are essential to address urgent societal challenges. Over the past decade, nudging interventions (i.e., arranging the environment to promote adaptive behavioral choices) have surged in popularity. Importantly, effective application of the nudging approach requires clear guiding principles with a firm basis in behavioral science. We present a framework for nudging interventions that builds on evidence about the goal-directed inferential processes underlying behavior (i.e., processes that involve context-dependent inferences about goals and the actions available to achieve these goals). We used this framework to develop nudging interventions that target context-relevant cognitive inferences. We examined the effectiveness of these inference nudging interventions for promoting two important types of societal behavior: pro-environmental actions and adherence to COVID-19 guidelines. As predicted, two online studies revealed that inference nudging interve...

Cerebral Cortex

Much research finds that lying takes longer than truth-telling. Yet, the source of this response time difference remains elusive. Here, we assessed the spatiotemporal evolution of electrical brain activity during honesty and dishonesty in 150 participants using a sophisticated electrical neuroimaging approach—the microstate approach. This uniquely positioned us to identify and contrast the entire chain of mental processes involved during honesty and dishonesty. Specifically, we find that the response time difference is the result of an additional late-occurring mental process, unique to dishonest decisions, interrupting the antecedent mental processing. We suggest that this process inhibits the activation of the truth, thus permitting the execution of the lie. These results advance our understanding of dishonesty and clarify existing theories about the role of increased cognitive load. More broadly, we demonstrate the vast potential of our approach to illuminate the temporal organiz...

Teachers College Record: The Voice of Scholarship in Education, 2013

Background/Context A fundamental tension has long existed between school reform proposals and actual teaching practice. Despite a large literature on teacher change, the discontinuity between innovation and practice continues and many attempts to reform teaching fail to be enacted in most classrooms. Purpose/Objective/Research Question/Focus of Study The purpose of this paper is to present a bridging methodology for connecting pedagogical innovations to the practical demands of teaching. The methodology is framed within practicality theory, which is an ecologically grounded analysis of the design issues and constraints that practitioners face in the everyday work of teaching. To conduct lessons, teachers must construct procedures (instrumentality) that fit circumstances (congruence) within available time and resources (cost). Underlying these practicality dimensions is a set of reasoning processes that can be understood from the perspective of three strands of research on bounded ra...

Psychotherapy research : journal of the Society for Psychotherapy Research, 2016

Little attention has been paid to the nuanced and complex decisions made in the clinical session context and how these decisions influence therapy effectiveness. Despite decades of research on the dual-processing systems, it remains unclear when and how intuitive and analytical reasoning influence the direction of the clinical session. This paper puts forth a testable conceptual model, guided by an interdisciplinary integration of the literature, that posits that the clinical session context moderates the use of intuitive versus analytical reasoning. A synthesis of studies examining professional best practices in clinical decision-making, empirical evidence from clinical judgment research, and the application of decision science theories indicate that intuitive and analytical reasoning may have profoundly different impacts on clinical practice and outcomes. The proposed model is discussed with respect to its implications for clinical practice and future research.

Journal of Cybersecurity, 2019

The use of cyber operations as a foreign policy instrument continues to stimulate academic interest towards interstate behavior in this domain. With continued investment in offensive cyber capabilities, there is an urgency to provide both academics and policy-makers with a better grasp of this phenomenon. While the past decade saw the growth of frameworks that highlight systemic and/or technological factors, this article investigates the role of pre-existing beliefs in the attribution of malicious cyber operations. Through survey experiments, it highlights the phenomenon of seizing and freezing with respect to attributive judgements in response to degradative cyber operations. With respect to theory, the results contribute to the emerging study of the cognitive–affective aspects of cyberspace. As for policy, the results illustrate the potential for biased judgements in response to incidents and reinforces the need to develop mechanisms that minimize its impact on state behavior.

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2017

Dual process theory proposes clusters of features that form two dichotomous groups in cognition. One standing internal issue is defining what the reference of these two dichotomous groups could be in the mind or brain. Does dual process theory speak of two systems, types, minds, modes, kinds or just metaphors? A particular common answer is that differences in clusters of features are evidence of different underlying systems, often called system 1 and system 2. However, the suggestion to abandon the 'system' terminology is now common in the literature, but the consequences of doing so need to be addressed. This work reviews and critically discusses previous suggestions.

New Horizons in Managerial and Organizational Cognition, 2017

This book comprises the second volume in the recently launched New Horizons in Managerial and Organizational Cognition book series. Volume 1 (Sund, Galavan, & Huff, 2016), addressed the topic of strategic uncertainty. This second volume comprises a collection of contributions that variously report new methodological developments in managerial and organizational cognition, reflect critically on those developments, and consider the challenges that have yet to be confronted in order to further advance this exciting and dynamic interdisciplinary field. Contextualizing within an overarching framework the various contributions selected for inclusion in the present volume, in this-opening chapter we reflect more broadly on what we consider the most significant developments that have occurred over recent years and the most significant challenges that lie ahead.

Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 2022

We review the state of forensic mental health assessment. The field is in much better shape than in the past; however, significant problems of quality remain, with much room for improvement. We provide an overview of forensic psychology's history and discuss its possible future, with multiple audiences in mind. We distill decades of scholarship from and about fundamental basic science and forensic science, clinical and forensic psychology, and the law of expert evidence into eight best practices for the validity of a forensic psychological assessment. We argue these best practices should apply when a psychological assessment relies on the norms, values, and esteem of science to inform legal processes. The eight key considerations include (a) foundational validity of the assessment; (b) validity of the assessment as applied; (c) management and mitigation of bias; (d) attention to quality assurance; (e) appropriate communication of data, results, and opinions; (f) explicit consideration of limitations and assumptions; (g) weighing of alternative views or disagreements; and (h) adherence with ethical obligations, professional guidelines, codes of conduct, and rules of evidence.

Studies on Entrepreneurship, Structural Change and Industrial Dynamics, 2018

Derived from unifying dual-process theories of cognitive psychology, we propose a new concept of deliberate intuition as a construct of higher-level cognition that integrates intuitive and deliberate judgments. We introduce "Wuity" cognition embedded into Chinese philosophy, medicine and practices, which is defined by the capability of deliberate intuition and intuitive insights, based on imagery reasoning and non-dualistic thinking and manifested as mindful observation and visual analogy. We develop a framework of three features of Wuity and six steps of Wuity-based innovation. As a case study illustrating our method, we analyze Elon Musk"s way to innovate and discuss common aspects of Wuity as a higher cognition and creative thinking way of innovators in East and West.

Environment Systems and Decisions, 2020

There is great value in understanding the public's reactions to terror attacks, though such reactions pose stark challenges for sound psychological investigation. Reactions to terrorism (as with any other threat) involve emotional and cognitive components, and the degree to which they reciprocally interact is not well understood. Furthermore, much of the literature on the public response to terrorism is based on the construct of "risk perception," whose precise definition and correlates are still ambiguous. This study aimed to more clearly disentangle the various emotional and cognitive facets that predict individuals' response to the terrorism threat in the United States. We employed a longitudinal survey from a representative U.S. sample (n = 1057) and measured attitudinal and cognitive reactions to the threat of terrorism at both time points. An autoregressive latent variable model was used to assess the stability of such variables over time, as well as their reciprocal effects on one another. Participants' emotional and cognitive reactions to the threat of terrorism evolved independently over time, contrary to the predictions of some prior risk perception literature. Furthermore, measurements of risk perception depended mostly on prior estimates of attack likelihood, emphasizing the importance of individuals' assessments of hazard probability in the risk judgment process.

Cambridge University Press eBooks, 2020

Educational studies, 2020

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. The manuscript has undergone copyediting, typesetting and review of the resulting proof before it was published in its final form. The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is available in

Celal bayar Üniversitesi sağlık bilimleri enstitüsü dergisi, 2023

Öz Günümüzde öğrenme, problem çözme, karar verme gibi kavramlar birbirini takip eden ve nasıl gerçekleştiği tartışmalı olan konulardır. Bu doğrultuda öğrenme ve beynin işleyişini anlamak için hücre topluluklarının uyarılması ve beynin bazı bölümlerinin baskın kullanılmasına bağlı olarak değişen durumları ifade eden birçok fikir veya model ileri sürülmüştür. Problem çözme süreçlerinde striatum, lateral prefontal korteks ve prefrontal korteks önemli olup bu yapıların haricinde hipotalamus ve oksitosinin salınımının etkili olduğu bildirilmektedir. Karar verme süreci ise limbik sistem, bazal gangliyonlar, talamus, serebellum ve ponsu içeren subkortikal yapılar ile prefrontal bölgenin alanları arasındaki etkileşimlerle gerçekleşmektedir. Ayrıca bu bölgelerin aktivasyonlarında Tip-1 ve Tip-2 karar verme sürecine göre değişiklikler meydana gelmektedir. Bu yapıların hasarı sonucunda karar verme ve problem çözme süreçlerinde etkilenimler olmaktadır. Karar verme süreçlerine etki eden birçok sürecin kontrolündeki anatomik yapılar bilinirken karar verme sürecine etki ettiği bilinen üstbilişin kontrolüne dair net bir bilgi bulunmamaktadır. Ayrıca bu kavramların etkili bir şekilde gerçekleşmesi için yapılabilecek uygulamalar ve bunların klinik ortama entegrasyonu önemli bir husustur. Bu derlemede öğrenme, problem çözme, karar vermenin gerçekleştiği yapılardaki süreç ve bu süreçlerin geliştirilmesine yönelik iyileştirme önerileri konu alınmıştır

Clinical Psychological Science, 2013

The past decade has witnessed a surge in research on training paradigms aimed at directly influencing cognitive processes in addiction and other psychopathology. Broadly, two avenues have been explored: In the first, the aim was to change maladaptive cognitive motivational biases (cognitive bias modification); in the second, the aim was to increase general control processes (e.g., working memory capacity). These approaches are consistent with a dual-process perspective in which psychopathology is related to a combination of disorder-specific impulsive processes and weak general abilities to control these impulses in view of reflective longer-term considerations. After reviewing the evidence for dual-process models in addiction, we discuss a number of critical issues, along with suggestions for further research. We argue that theoretical advancement, along with a better understanding of the underlying neurocognitive processes, is crucial for adequately responding to recent criticisms...

Cambridge University Press eBooks, 2020