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Abstract
Introduction
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Psychology
Cognitive Psychology

Judgment and decision making.

Profile image of Alan SchwartzAlan Schwartz

1998, Annual review of psychology

Abstract
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This chapter reviews research in judgment and decision making from 1992 to 1996, highlighting the evolution and critiques of rational choice theory. It discusses the integration of behavioral assumptions into various subdisciplines, such as behavioral game theory and behavioral finance, contrasting psychological perspectives on decision making with traditional economic models. The chapter emphasizes the significance of understanding errors and biases in judgments, particularly regarding the normative frameworks guiding these definitions.

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