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Outline

Title
Abstract
Introduction
Background on Autonomous Military Robotics
Prohibitions and Limitations on Acquisition
Prohibitions and Limitations on Testing
References
All Topics
Engineering
Control and Systems Engineering

International governance of autonomous military robots

Profile image of George LucasGeorge Lucas

2011

Abstract
sparkles

AI

This article examines the implications of lethal autonomous robots (LARs) in military contexts, highlighting their transformative potential and the pressing need for legal, ethical, and political discussions surrounding their governance. It outlines the historical development of military robotics, reviews the existing legal frameworks, and considers the possibility of international treaties and soft law mechanisms to manage the deployment and use of LARs effectively.

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References (40)

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Solovyeva, Anzhelika and Hynek, Nik (2018): “Going Beyond the ‘Killer Robots’ Debate: Six Dilemmas Autonomous Weapons Systems Raise”. Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, Vo. 11, No. 3, pp. 166-208 ISSN 1802-548x.
Nik Hynek

The debate on and around “killer robots” has been firmly established at the crossroads of ethical, legal, political, strategic, and scientific discourses. Flourishing at the two opposite poles, with a few contributors caught in the middle, the polemic still falls short of a detailed, balanced, and systematic analysis. It is for these reasons that we focus on the nitty-gritties, multiple pros and cons, and implications of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) for the prospects of the international order. Moreover, a nuanced discussion needs to feature the considerations of their technological continuity vs. novelty. The analysis begins with properly delimiting the AWS category as fully autonomous (lethal) weapon systems, capable of operating without human control or supervision, including in dynamic and unstructured environments, and capable of engaging in independent (lethal) decision-making, targeting, and firing, including in an offensive manner. As its primary goal, the article aims to move the existing debate to the level of a first-order structure and offers its comprehensive operationalisation. We propose an original framework based on a thorough analysis of six specific dilemmas, and detailing the pro/con argument for each of those: (1) (un)predictability of AWS performance; (2) dehumanization of lethal decision-making; (3) depersonalisation of enemy (non-)combatant; (4) human-machine nexus in coordinated operations; (5) strategic considerations; (6) AWS operation in law(less) zone. What follows are concluding remarks. Keywords: autonomous weapon systems, killer robots, lethal decisionmaking, military ethics, artificial intelligence, security regulation, humanitarian law, revolution in military affairs, military strategy

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Going Beyond the «Killer Robots» Debate: Six Dilemmas Autonomous Weapon Systems Raise
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Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, 2021

The debate on and around "killer robots" has been firmly established at the crossroads of ethical, legal, political, strategic, and scientific discourses. Flourishing at the two opposite poles, with a few contributors caught in the middle, the polemic still falls short of a detailed, balanced, and systematic analysis. It is for these reasons that we focus on the nitty-gritties, multiple pros and cons, and implications of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) for the prospects of the international order. Moreover, a nuanced discussion needs to feature the considerations of their technological continuity vs. novelty. The analysis begins with properly delimiting the AWS category as fully autonomous (lethal) weapon systems, capable of operating without human control or supervision, including in dynamic and unstructured environments, and capable of engaging in independent (lethal) decision-making, targeting, and firing, including in an offensive manner. As its primary goal, the article aims to move the existing debate to the level of a first-order structure and offers its comprehensive operationalisation. We propose an original framework based on a thorough analysis of six specific dilemmas, and detailing the pro/con argument for each of those: (1) (un)predictability of AWS performance; (2) dehumanization of lethal decision-making; (3) depersonalisation of enemy (non-)combatant; (4) human-machine nexus in coordinated operations; (5) stra-

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Lambèr Royakkers and Peter Olsthoorn (2018) ‘Lethal Military Robots: Who is Responsible When Things Go Wrong?,’ in: Rocci Luppicini (ed.) The Changing Scope of Technoethics in Contemporary Society, IGI Global.
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Related topics

  • Robotics
  • International Law
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