EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND FACTIVE BASES FOR BELIEF

Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence

An overview of epistemological disjunctivism is offered, including its relationship to metaphysical disjunctivism. Particular focus is then placed on how such a thesis might be cast specifically in terms of evidence. Two issues in particular are discussed: (i) how to locate the proposal within the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction; and (ii) how one might motivate the viability of the proposal.

Doyle, C., Milburn, J., and Pritchard, D. H. (Eds.) New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism (Routledge)., 2019

Epistemological disjunctivism is a view about the normative significance of our perceptual experiences. Although itself neutral on the nature of these experiences, it is commonly thought to smooth the way for metaphysical disjunctivism, the view that veridical and apparent perceptions are of radically different ontological kinds. John McDowell, for instance, is often taken to have argued from the former to the latter. The main aim of this chapter is to show that it isn’t a good idea to hold both forms of disjunctivism together, and a fortiori to move from the one to the other. The cornerstone of the argument is the claim that the conjunction of epistemological and metaphysical disjunctivism entails an implausible disjunctivism about motivating reasons for belief. The upshot is that friends of both forms of disjunctivism face a dilemma: if they think of the two views as logically independent, they shouldn’t hold both together; if they think of them as dependent, they shouldn’t hold either.

Epistemological disjunctivists make two strong claims about perceptual experience's epistemic value: (1) experience guarantees the knowledgeable character of perceptual beliefs; (2) experience's epistemic value is "reflectively accessible". In this paper I develop a form of disjunctivism grounded in a presentational view of experience, on which the epistemic benefits of experience consist in the way perception presents the subject with aspects of her environment. I show that presentational disjunctivism has both dialectical and philosophically fundamental advantages over more traditional expositions. Dialectically, presentational disjunctivism resolves a puzzle disjunctivists face in their posture vis-à-vis skeptical scenarios. More systematically, presentational disjunctivism provides an especially compelling view of disjunctivism as an internalist view of perceptual consciousness by explaining the way perceptual presence manifests the subject's rationality in a distinct way.

According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), ordinary perceptual experience ensures an opportunity for perceptual knowledge. In recent years, two distinct models of this idea have been developed. For Duncan Pritchard (2012, 2015), perception provides distinctly powerful reasons for belief. By contrast, Clayton Littlejohn (2016, 2017, 2018) and Alan Millar (2010, 2011) argue for a version of ED in terms of a "knowledge first" program, on which perception directly provides knowledge, without relying on antecedent reasons or justification. Specifically, both Littlejohn and Millar argue that "reasons first" ED faces a problematic regress. In this paper I defend "reasons first" ED by arguing that experience provides a type of reason that escapes the regress. I also argue that reasons are a fundamental aspect of ED, especially in its anti-skeptical stance.

The grounding or motivating intuitions behind internalism and externalism seem to be fundamentally at odds. If there is ever to be a viable or satisfying solution to the problem, it must satisfy the grounding intuitions behind both sides of the debate. Duncan Pritchard claims his theory of epistemological disjunctivism (ED) does just this, arguing that it could be the holy grail we have all been waiting for. However, I believe the holy grail is already out there in the form of the theory that knowledge is a mental state (KMS). In this paper, I defend the idea the KMS is far better able to satisfy the internalist and externalist intuitions than ED. Introduction: One of the most well-known, and most enduring, debates in epistemology is the debate between internalism and externalism. Both sides seem to be motivated by well-founded and intuitively persuasive arguments, and yet finding a satisfactory response to the dilemma has been notoriously difficult. However, Duncan Pritchard has made progress when he defends what he calls the 'holy grail' of epistemology: a conception of paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that satisfies both the internalist and externalist intuitions. He calls this position Epistemological Disjunctivism (ED). But I believe that there is another conception of knowledge (more generally) which satisfies both internalist and externalist intuitions, and it is my aim in this paper to show how it does so far more satisfactorily than Pritchard's ED. It is the view that knowledge is a mental state (KMS). KMS is the thesis that knowledge is an irreducible state that is mental, and distinct from belief. It involves a rejection of the common conception of the mental as a purely internal realm. The KMS thesis, as I defend it here, is not a unified theory in the literature. The view can be primarily attributed to Timothy Williamson, from his book 'Knowledge and its Limits',1 but is also defended by Jennifer Nagel,2 and Alexander Bird.3 The metaphysical underpinnings of KMS can be attributed to John McDowell and his rejection of the outer/ inner distinction.4 I present the view as 'disjunctivism about knowledge,' though Williamson is not technically a disjunctivist, and McDowell is not (straight forwardly) a disjunctivist about knowledge.5 However, how KMS differs from ED will become clear, and I do not think that these particulars matter when it comes to the heart of the issue.

2016

It is now common to distinguish Metaphysical from Epistemological Disjunctivism. It is equally common to suggest that it is at least not obvious that the latter requires a commitment to the former: at the very least, a suitable bridge principle will need to be identified which takes one from the latter to the former. This paper identifies a plausible-looking bridge principle that takes one from the version of Epistemological Disjunctivism defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard, which I label Reflective Epistemological Disjunctivism, or (RED), to Metaphysical Disjunctivism. Moreover, it identifies a modification the proponent of (RED) could, and should, make to the Internalist component of their theory, and argues that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism remains, even if such a modification is made. The upshot is that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism on the part of (RED) is shown to be particularly robust.

Philosophia, 2018

According to Duncan Pritchard's version of epistemological disjunctivism, in paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge, one's knowledge that p is grounded in one's seeing that p, and one can, by reflection alone, come to know that they see that p. In this paper, I argue that the epistemic conception of introspective indiscriminability is incompatible with epistemological disjunctivism, so understood. This has the consequence that theories of the nature of sensory experience which accept the epistemic conception of introspective indiscriminability—such as phenomenal character disjunctivism and certain forms of naïve realism—are inconsistent with epistemological disjunctivism, so understood. I then argue that proponents of epistemological disjunctivism face a formidable challenge explaining in what sense, if any, one can have purely reflective knowledge of their factive rational support.

Grazer Philosophische Studien 90, 335-346, 2014

In his highly valuable book, Duncan Pritchard presents a particular account of perceptual knowledge, epistemological disjunctivism (ED). Pritchard argues that this view seems plainly false at first sight, but if it were right, it would represent the “holy grail of epistemology” (1), a view that allows us “to have our cake and eat it too” (3). This prospect motivates Pritchard to develop and defend an account that prima facie might seem simply false. It is disputable whether ED really seems plainly false at first sight or whether this intuition is based on a particular philosophical tradition. However, in this paper, I will not discuss whether ED is actually true. Rather, I will investigate whether, if true, it has the advantages over rival accounts that Pritchard claims. I will argue that there is no dialectical advantage for ED over alternative liberal accounts concerning skepticism. Thus, ED is not the Holy Grail for the skeptical problem. Either the Holy Grail is simply an account of basic knowledge, in which case any account allowing basic knowledge is an instance of it or it is a conservative anti-skeptical strategy or the search has to go on.

Journal of Philosophical Research, 2016

A response to commentaries on my book, Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford University Press, 2012), by Sanford Goldberg, Clayton Littlejohn, and Ram Neta. The themes covered include: the viability of the epistemological disjunctivist response to radical scepticism (Goldberg); the extent to which epistemological disjunctivism has dialectical advantages over classical epistemic internalism from an anti-sceptical point of view (Neta); and whether epistemological disjunctivism incorporates the right view of the nature of reasons (Littlejohn).

Epistemological disjunctivism, as defended by e.g. McDowell, Neta and Pritchard, is the view that epistemic justification can be -- and in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge actually is -- both factive (i.e. entails that the belief is true) and reflectively accessible (i.e. can be known by reflection alone). One major problem for this view is the access problem: Apparently, epistemological disjunctivism entails that ordinary external world propositions can be known by reflection alone. According to epistemological disjunctivism, seeing that the sun is shining is reflectively accessible and seeing that the sun is shining entails that it is. Assuming closure of reflective knowledge under known entailment it is also reflectively knowable that the sun is shining. Drawing on joint work with Neta, Pritchard replies that disjunctivism is not committed to this absurdity, but only to the possibility of reflective access to empirical reasons. In this paper I offer an interpretation of this reply, but also an objection to it: My interpretation is based on applying the source/content distinction to epistemic reasons. My objection is based on arguing that the access problem is a problem for any (non-sceptical) version of access internalism. Although Pritchard's reply solves the general access problem, it does not solve the access problem that is generated by the specific commitments of epistemological disjunctivism. Due to the transparency of self-knowledge of propositional perception epistemological disjunctivism cannot meet a central requirement for applying the source/content distinction.