Drew Johnson

University of Oslo, Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas, Post-Doc

University of Connecticut, Philosophy, Graduate Student

Followers

Following

Co-author

Public Views

I am a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Oslo. I am working on the GoodAttention project (ERC, PI Sebastian Watzl).

I am also a member of UConn's ECOM (Expression, Communication, and Origins of Meaning) research group.

For the Academic Year 2021-2022, I was a Research Fellow at the University of Connecticut Humanities Institute. I received my PhD from the University of Connecticut in 2022.
Supervisors: Dorit Bar-On

less

Interests

Uploads

Papers by Drew Johnson

Epistemological Disjunctivism: Perception, Expression, and Self-Knowledge

So-called basic self-knowledge (ordinary knowledge of one&#39;s present states of mind) can b... more So-called basic self-knowledge (ordinary knowledge of one&#39;s present states of mind) can be seen as both &#39;baseless&#39; and privileged. The spontaneous self-beliefs we have when we avow our states of mind do not appear to be formed on any particular epistemic basis (whether intro-or extro-spective). Nonetheless, on some views, these self-beliefs constitute instances of (privileged) knowledge. We are here interested in views on which true mental self-beliefs have internalist epistemic warrant that false ones lack. Such views are committed to a form of disjunctivism about basic self-knowledge. We begin by presenting an influential disjunctivist view about perceptual knowledge (Pritchard 2008, 2012, and elsewhere) and articulate a problem for it. We then consider two versions of disjunctivism about basic self-knowledge – one &#39;constitutivist&#39;, the other &#39;neo-expressivist&#39; – and argue that both can avoid an analogue of this problem for self-knowledge. However, we give reasons for preferring the disjunctivism yielded by neo-expressivism. We conclude by considering briefly whether an acceptable disjunctivism about mental self-beliefs can point the way toward a sensible disjunctivism about perceptual beliefs.

Hinge Epistemology, Radical Skepticism, and Domain Specific Skepticism

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2019

This paper explores how hinge epistemology (specifically, Duncan Pritchard’s brand of hinge epist... more This paper explores how hinge epistemology (specifically, Duncan Pritchard’s brand of hinge epistemology) might fruitfully be applied not only to the problem of radical skepticism, but also to certain domain specific (or ‘local’) skepticisms, and in particular, moral skepticism. The paper explains the idea of a domain specific skepticism, and how domain specific skepticisms contrast with radical skepticism. I argue that a domain specific skeptical problem can be resolved in just the same way as radical skepticism, if there are hinge commitments within that domain. I then suggest that there are hinge commitments in the moral domain, and use this to address a moral skeptical problem due to our apparent inability to know moral nihilism to be false.

Download

Disjunctive luminosity

Correspondence Drew Johnson, Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 0626... more Correspondence Drew Johnson, Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269. Email: drew.johnson@uconn.edu Abstract Williamson's influential anti-luminosity argument aims to show that our own mental states are not “luminous,” and that we are thus “cognitively homeless.” Among other things, this argument represents a significant challenge to the idea that we enjoy basic self-knowledge of our own occurrent mental states. In this paper, I summarize Williamson's anti-luminosity argument, and discuss the role that the notion of “epistemic basis” plays in it. I argue that the anti-luminosity argument relies upon a particular version of the basis-relative safety condition on knowledge. This commitment is significant because basic self-knowledge seemingly lacks any kind of distinct epistemic basis, such as inference, observation, testimony, etc., despite representing a genuine kind of knowledge of contingent matters of fact. I consider a disjunctivist account ...

Download

Proper Function and Ethical Judgment: Towards a Biosemantic Theory of Ethical Thought and Discourse

Erkenntnis, 2021

This paper employs Ruth Millikan's biosemantic theory of representation to develop a proposal abo... more This paper employs Ruth Millikan's biosemantic theory of representation to develop a proposal about the function of ethical claims and judgments. I propose that ethical claims and judgments (or ethical 'affirmations') have the function of simultaneously tracking the morally salient features of social situations and directing behavior that coordinates in a collectively beneficial way around those features. Thus, ethical affirmations count as a species of what Millikan labels 'Pushmi-Pullyu' representations that simultaneously have a descriptive and a directive direction of fit. This proposal supports a version of motivational internalism that can accommodate a surprising range of actual failures of motivation. I also briefly situate this proposal in the metaethical literature, contrasting it with other hybrid views incorporating elements of cognitivism and expressivism.

Download

Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility

Episteme, 2021

Why is it that some instances of disagreement appear to be so intractable? And what is the approp... more Why is it that some instances of disagreement appear to be so intractable? And what is the appropriate way to handle such disagreements, especially concerning matters about which there are important practical and political needs for us to come to a consensus? In this paper, I consider an explanation of the apparent intractability of deep disagreement offered by hinge epistemology. According to this explanation, at least some deep disagreements are rationally unresolvable because they concern 'hinge' commitments that are unresponsive to rational considerations. This explanation, if correct, seems to have troubling implications for how we should respond to deep disagreement. If my position on a topic is not responsive to rational considerations, then what choice have I but to dogmatically hold to that position, and simply dismiss the views of those with whom I disagree? I address this problem by identifying an attitude of intellectual humility that is appropriate to have towards one's hinge commitments, and suggest that this attitude provides the basis for a non-rational, constructive way to resolve deep disagreement.

Download

Millikan Beyond Concepts Summary Notes

by Dorit Bar-On and Drew Johnson

The notes below were produced by Dorit BarOn in preparation for meetings of a reading group on Be... more

Download

Hinge Epistemology, Radical Skepticism, and Domain Specific Skepticism

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2019

Download

Epistemological Disjunctivism: Perception, Expression, and Self-Knowledge

by Dorit Bar-On and Drew Johnson

New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism (Doyle, Milburn, Pritchard eds.), Routledge Studies in Epistemology, 2019

So-called basic self-knowledge (ordinary knowledge of one's present states of mind) can be seen a... more So-called basic self-knowledge (ordinary knowledge of one's present states of mind) can be seen as both 'baseless' and privileged. The spontaneous self-beliefs we have when we avow our states of mind do not appear to be formed on any particular epistemic basis (whether intro-or extro-spective). Nonetheless, on some views, these self-beliefs constitute instances of (privileged) knowledge. We are here interested in views on which true mental self-beliefs have internalist epistemic warrant that false ones lack. Such views are committed to a form of disjunctivism about basic self-knowledge. We begin by presenting an influential disjunctivist view about perceptual knowledge (Pritchard 2008, 2012, and elsewhere) and articulate a problem for it. We then consider two versions of disjunctivism about basic self-knowledge – one 'constitutivist', the other 'neo-expressivist' – and argue that both can avoid an analogue of this problem for self-knowledge. However, we give reasons for preferring the disjunctivism yielded by neo-expressivism. We conclude by considering briefly whether an acceptable disjunctivism about mental self-beliefs can point the way toward a sensible disjunctivism about perceptual beliefs.

Download

Drafts by Drew Johnson

Fundamental Moral Error and the Nature of Certainty

I examine the problem of fundamental moral error for expressivist quasi-realism and some prominen... more I examine the problem of fundamental moral error for expressivist quasi-realism and some prominent responses to it, with particular focus on what I take to be the most plausible response, offered in Ridge (2015). However, Ridge’s response to the problem of fundamental moral error relies upon certain assumptions about the nature of certainty, assumptions that, despite their sensible appearance, have not gone without challenge. I examine a particular way of challenging these assumptions deriving from recent work in hinge epistemology. I conclude that, at the very least, this shows that expressivist quasi-realism cannot remain epistemically neutral, but instead must take on substantive commitments about the nature of certainty.

Download

Draft -Please Do Not Quote or Cite Without Permission 1 'Transparent' Rules and Basic Self-Knowledge: A Critical Study of Alex Byrne's Transparency and Self-Knowledge

by Dorit Bar-On and Drew Johnson

Inquiry

Download

Drew Johnson

Uploads

Papers by Drew Johnson

Drafts by Drew Johnson

Log In