Epistemology: Introduction

Abstract: Surprisingly few attempts have been made to apply theories in normative epistemology to concrete questions about epistemic policies and practices, in spite of the fact that many of today’s most pressing and hotly debated questions are about the production, transmission and use of knowledge. The paper discusses the prospects for an applied epistemology. Alvin Goldman’s conception of a social epistemology provides an important source of inspiration. But Goldman’s framework needs amendments which are likely to make the task of applied epistemology more complicated. I argue that one needs to pay more attention to different forms of justification and knowledge and other epistemic desiderata. One cannot isolate the project of epistemic evaluation from pragmatic, prudential or moral evaluation. A pure applied epistemology is a contradiction in terms. But this does not mean that the whole project must be handed over to pragmatism. By accommodating factors that are not purely epistemic, one might actually strengthen the position of truth-based normative epistemology vis-à-vis pragmatic or sociological approaches to knowledge.

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1981

is alivc and well and living in Miami, among other places. This despite premature obituaries from Princeton, and derivatively from New Haven. Richard Rorty and Michael Williams, a student of Rorty, in books recently published,' argue that epistemology, as conceived at least since Descartes, is a useless enterprise doomed to failure because o f the incoherence o f its fundamental prob lem. Williams' book is the more accessible. In light of the boldness of its theses, I want in this paper to examine several arguments put forward by Williams in support of his conclusion. 1 want to see whether these arguments are sufficient for their lethal task; and whether what is offered in place o f the defunct discipline avoids the problems supposed insuperable for it, whether indeed what is offered is not simply a more vulnerable epistemological theory. Williams identifies epistemology with what is normally considered one type of epis temological theory: a foundational view of empirical knowledge which appeals to a certain class of perceptual beliefs as basic. He (emotively?) lables this form of epistemic system 'phenomenalism,' thus defining both too broadly and too narrowly for apparent rhetorical purposes. He views epistemological theories of this form as reactions to radical skeptical challenges taken seriously. Radical skepticism questions whether any of our beliefs can be rationally justified; it subjects all our beliefs at once to skeptical doubt. If this challenge is taken seriously, a foundationalist view, which seeks intrinsically credible or immediately or self-justified beliefs, in relation to which other empirical beliefs may be justified, is the natural response according to Williams. He argues that all attempts to provide answers to the radical skeptic are doomed to failure. He attacks both the notion of epistemological foundations and the attempt to move from these foundatons to the justification o f beliefs about physical objects. The moral he draws is that the skeptic is not to be taken seriously, indeed that his doubts are incoherent. A relaxed coherentist concept of justification then recommends itself, but not one to be confused with traditional epistemological theories as reactions to skeptical doubts. This paper will evaluate each of these steps in the argument.

A common presupposition in epistemology is that the processes contributing to the generation of knowledge do not extend beyond the knower's skin. This paper challenges this presupposition. I adduce a novel kind case that causes trouble for a number of even the most promising accounts of knowledge in current literature (virtue epistemological and modal accounts), at least so long as the presupposition is in place. I then look at a couple of recent accounts of knowledge that drop the presupposition and expressly allow the relevant processes to extended beyond the knower's skin. While these accounts can handle the problem case, they encounter difficulties elsewhere: extension occurs too easily and so the accounts predict knowledge where they ought not. Finally, I offer a novel way of extending epistemology and argue that it can steer clear of the problems on both sides.

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2007

Philosophy in Review, 2010

2016

My dissertation is in three parts. In "Evidentialism and Belief Polarization," I consider the epistemic import of a belief revision process known as belief polarization, in which exposure to a mixed batch of evidence reliably causes people to increase confidence in whatever their antecedent belief was. I argue against Tom Kelly's claim that the beliefs that result from this process are justified on evidentialist grounds, and I take stock of what the phenomenon can teach us about evidentialism as a theory of justification. In "Access Is Not Necessary for Justification," I focus on a debate between mentalism and accessibilism, as internalist theories of epistemic justification. I argue against the received view that mentalism, as distinct from accessibilism, is not worth defending. In "Epistemic Oppression and Ameliorative Epistemology," I offer an account of a phenomenon that I call epistemic oppression. It occurs when members of a social group are subject to a systematic and unfair disadvantage within a social epistemic structure, resulting from the operation of a capacity to control exercises of their epistemic agency, thus systematically and unfairly limiting their epistemic flourishing. I argue that the concept of epistemic oppression helps us to identify and understand the kind of wrong that happens in these cases where an agent's capacity for epistemic flourishing is unfairly impeded. iii iii 3.4 Mis-calibrated Intellectual Self-Trust………………………………………………..88 3.5 Oppressive Normative Epistemic Concepts………………………………………….91 4. Epistemic Oppression and Ameliorative Epistemology………………………...………….94 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………100 v v I am greatly indebted to all of my advisors, friends, and family for their advice and support, both personal and professional, during the process of writing my dissertation. Above all, I thank my dissertation advisors, Susanna Siegel, Mark Richard, and Susanna Rinard, for their support, guidance, and feedback through the process. Susanna Siegel, thank you for welcoming me to the department, advising me, and supporting my growth as a philosopher from the very beginning. Your warmth, enthusiasm, and philosophical vigor have been a constant inspiration. Mark, I am ever grateful for your ability to guide me in getting to the heart of big philosophical problems, as well as your patience in poring over the details in order to help me become a clearer and more efficient writer. And thank you for being a firm advocate for myself and so many other graduate students in your role as DGS. We are very lucky to have you. Susanna Rinard, both your careful reading and insightful comments on my work, as well as your astute advice about how to approach and survive both the job market and the profession have been invaluable. I have regularly presented parts of my dissertation at the Metaphysics and Epistemology Workshop at Harvard, and have consistently benefitted from feedback from both faculty and fellows students there. I also thank audience members from MIT'

The Philosophical Quarterly, 1986

which the relevant facts and events cannot happen in a certain pattern. But have I explained the conceptual ban on 'The earth both is and is not round by allusion to a 'theory' which says that geographical facts cannot turn out in the p-and-not-p pattern? I suggest that the assessment of Blackburn's fascinating pattern of argument requires more integration with the general philosophy of modality than it has yet been given. As I have already suggested, this collection contains material that would be helpful here. It also contains another half-dozen fine essays which I pass over merely for reasons of space. Casimir Lewy has, I believe, been well and rightly honoured by his students.

Res Philosophica, 2017

So-called "traditional epistemology" and "Bayesian epistemology" share a word, but it may often seem that the enterprises hardly share a subject matter. They differ in their central concepts. They differ in their main concerns. They differ in their main theoretical moves. And they often differ in their methodology. However, in the last decade or so, there have been a number of attempts to build bridges between the two epistemologies. Indeed, many would say that there is just one branch of philosophy here-epistemology. There is a common subject matter after all. In this paper, we begin by playing the role of a "bad cop," emphasizing many apparent points of disconnection, and even conflict, between the approaches to epistemology. We then switch role, playing a "good cop" who insists that the approaches are engaged in common projects after all. We look at various ways in which the gaps between them have been bridged, and we consider the prospects for bridging them further. We conclude that this is an exciting time for epistemology, as the two traditions can learn, and have started learning, from each other.