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Swarms

Profile image of Maya BrehmMaya Brehm

2019, Swarms

Abstract

Swarms of network enabled drones exhibit autonomous behaviour and are pursued by several states, including to attack targets. The prospect of ‘essentially unlimited numbers’ of weaponized mini-drones has raised fears of ‘scalable weapons of mass destruction’ and lent a sense of renewed urgency to ongoing policy deliberations on ‘lethal autonomous weapons systems’. This bulletin briefly summarizes reported military advances in swarming technologies as well as recent policy commentary on the topic. It flags potential risks from the perspective of international and human security and disarmament, and suggests some areas of concern.

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References (101)

  1. UK Ministry of Defence et al, '£2.5m Injection for Drone Swarms', press release, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/25m-injection-for-drone-swarms.
  2. S. Russell et al, 'Why You Should Fear "Slaughterbots" -A Response', IEEE Spectrum: Technology, Engineering, and Science News, 23 January 2018, https:// spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligence/why-you-should-fear- slaughterbots-a-response. Framing concern about autonomous weapons and swarms in terms of 'weapons of mass destruction' can be critiqued on various grounds. But even commentators rejecting the scenario of terrorists launching thousands of 'slaughterbots' consider it 'a reasonable possibility' that they could release '[s]omething like a truck full of 50 drones' (P. Scharre, 'Why You Shouldn't Fear "Slaughterbots"', IEEE Spectrum, 22 December 2017, https://spectrum.ieee.org/ automaton/robotics/military-robots/why-you-shouldnt-fear-slaughterbots).
  3. D. Gayle, 'UK, US and Russia Among Those Opposing Killer Robot Ban', The Guardian, 29 March 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/mar/29/uk- us-russia-opposing-killer-robot-ban-un-ai. Similarly, regarding Australia, see K. Finnane, 'Killerbots, Guided by Pine Gap, Same as Any Other Weapon?', Alice Springs News Online, 2 April 2019, http://www.alicespringsnews.com.au/2019/04/02/killerbots- same-as-any-other-weapon-argues-australia-at-un/.
  4. S. J. A. Edwards, 'Swarming and the Future of Warfare', Dissertation in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements of the Doctoral Degree in Public Policy Analysis, Pardee Rand Graduate School, 2005, pp. 179-286.
  5. 'On the homeland security front, security swarms equipped with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) detectors, facial recognition, anti- drone weapons, and other capabilities offer defenses against a range of threats' (Z. Kallenborn, 'The Era of the Drone Swarm Is Coming, and We Need to Be Ready for It', Modern War Institute, 25 October 2018, https://mwi.usma.edu/era-drone-swarm- coming-need-ready/.)
  6. 6 This bulletin does not address issues raised by satellite swarms. See, e.g., 'Satellite Swarms Dynamics and Control', European Space Agency, https://www.esa. int/gsp/ACT/projects/swarmcontrol.html; M. Bartels, 'Tiny Satellites Pose a Swarm of Opportunities -And Threats', Space.com, 5 December 2018, https://www.space. com/42621-tiny-satellites-offer-opportunities-and-threats.html.
  7. P. Scharre, Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm, Center for a New American Security, October 2014, p. 5, https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas. org/documents/CNAS_TheComingSwarm_Scharre.pdf?mtime=20160906082059. 'Swarming, coordinated action can enable synchronized attack or defense, more efficient allocation of assets over an area, self-healing networks that respond to enemy actions or widely distributed assets that cooperate for sensing, deception and attack' (ibid, p. 6).
  8. The Preamble to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), equally concerned with the prevention of unnecessary suffering, the protection of civilians, the ending of the arms race and disarmament attests to this. See, e.g., O. Bring, 'Regulating Conventional Weapons in the Future -Humanitarian Law or Arms Control?', 24(3) Journal of Peace Research (1987);
  9. K. Carter, 'New Crimes Against Peace: The Application of International Humanitarian Law Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms to Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties', The Markland Group and Canadian Council on International Relations (eds), Treaty Compliance: Some Concerns and Remedies, 1998.
  10. J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict, RAND Corporation, 2000, p 50, https://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB311. html. See also Edwards, 'Swarming and the Future of Warfare', p. 66 and Appendix A. 'Swarming involves the convergent action of several units that continue to attack by dispersing, maneuvering, and reinitiating combat (pulsing)' (ibid, p. 66).
  11. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict, pp. vii, 6, 43. Arquilla and Ronfeldt cite the tactics of 'generations of terrorists and criminals', the Zapatista movement and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in support of their thesis (ibid, p. 2).
  12. Edwards, 'Swarming and the Future of Warfare', p. 68.
  13. See, e.g., R. Gorrell et al, 'Countering A2/AD with Swarming', Research Report Submitted to the Faculty in Partial Fulfilment of the Graduation Requirements for the Degree of Master of Operational Arts and Sciences, AIR Command and Staff College, Air University, 2016.
  14. I. Lachow, 'The Upside and Downside of Swarming Drones', 73(2) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (4 March 2017) 96, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.12 90879.
  15. On swarm robotics, see, e.g., H. Hamann, Swarm Robotics: A Formal Approach, 2018;
  16. G. Valentini, Achieving Consensus in Robot Swarms, 2017.
  17. See, e.g., A. L. Alfeo et al, 'Swarm Coordination of Mini-UAVs for Target Search Using Imperfect Sensors', 12(2) Intelligent Decision Technologies (7 March 2018) 149-62, https://doi.org/10.3233/IDT-170317.
  18. Lachow, 'The Upside and Downside of Swarming Drones', 97.
  19. D. Hambling, Change in the Air: Disruptive Developments in Armed UAV Technology, UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2018, p. 5, http://www. unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/-en-726.pdf.
  20. Scharre, The Coming Swarm, pp. 35, 38. Scharre envisages that 'a human might task a swarm of missiles with a set of targets, but let the missiles coordinate among themselves to determine which missile will hit which target', or 'a human might task a group of vehicles to maintain coverage over an area … and the vehicles might coordinate to determine how best to cover the area' (ibid, p. 36).
  21. Ibid, p. 38.
  22. Z. Kallenborn and P. C. Bleek, 'Swarming Destruction: Drone Swarms and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons', The Nonproliferation Review (2 January 2019) 4.
  23. V. Boulanin and M. Verbruggen, Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems, SIPRI, November 2017, p. 63, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/ files/2017-11/siprireport_mapping_the_development_of_autonomy_in_weapon_ systems_1117_1.pdf.
  24. M. N. Schmitt and J. S. Thurnher, '"Out of the Loop": Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict', 4 Harvard Law School National Security Journal (2013) 271, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Vol-4- Schmitt-Thurnher.pdf.
  25. Kallenborn, 'The Era of the Drone Swarm Is Coming'.
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  27. Boulanin and Verbruggen, Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems, p. 63.
  28. K. Osborn, 'Air Force Developing Swarms of Mini-Drones', Military.com, 27 May 2015, https://www.military.com/defensetech/2015/05/27/air-force-developing- swarms-of-mini-drones.
  29. Scharre, The Coming Swarm, p. 31. 28 Boulanin and Verbruggen, Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems, p. 63.
  30. 'Modern air-launched decoys like the Miniature Air-Launched Decoy, or MALD, are smaller and more capable than their predecessors. Able to fly complex routes and to carry out evasive manoeuvres, these systems are effectively single-use UAVs. These systems can carry a range of payloads. Some decoys like the MALD-J carry electronic warfare radar-jamming technology, and Raytheon has tested a version with a warhead to destroy defensive systems' (Hambling, Change in the Air, p. 3.) 30 UK Ministry of Defence et al, '£2.5m Injection for Drone Swarms'.
  31. NATO, Technology Trends Survey: Future Emerging Technology Trends, NATO HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Defence Planning Policy and Analysis Branch, February 2015, p. 32, https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2012/ fc_ipr/technology_trend_survey_v3.pdf.
  32. Hambling, Change in the Air, p. 12.
  33. Scharre, The Coming Swarm, p. 30.
  34. T. Nurking, 'Wonders at the Threshold: Operational Priorities, Tensions and the Future of Military Platforms and Systems', Q. Ladetto (ed.), Defence Future Technologies: What We See on the Horizon, November 2017, 55. 35 Whereas it is often argued that swarms would be 'dramatically cheaper than standalone weapons systems' in service (e.g. Lachow, 'The Upside and Downside of Swarming Drones', 98. For a more nuanced argument about cost, see Scharre, The Coming Swarm, pp. 13-16. Shmuel has cautioned that '[n]othing can simultaneously be cheap, fast, maneuvrable, and have long range' (S. Shmuel, 'The Coming Swarm Might Be Dead on Arrival', War on the Rocks, 10 September 2018, https:// warontherocks.com/2018/09/the-coming-swarm-might-be-dead-on-arrival/)
  35. Scharre, The Coming Swarm, p. 30.
  36. NATO, Technology Trends Survey, p. 32.
  37. Kallenborn, 'The Era of the Drone Swarm Is Coming'.
  38. G. Vásárhelyi et al, 'Optimized Flocking of Autonomous Drones in Confined Environments', 3(20) Science Robotics (18 July 2018) 2. 40 Shmuel argues that '[t]ruly large swarms will have to be made of simple machines, with either limited speed, limited range, limited protection (both physical and electronic), limited or cheap payload -and probably all of the above. If either the platform or its payload is not cheap and simple to mass produce, the very idea of the swarm -the multitude -will be undermined' (Shmuel, 'The Coming Swarm Might Be Dead on Arrival'). See also A. McCullough, 'The Looming Swarm', Air Force Magazine, http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2019/April%202019/The- Looming-Swarm.aspx, quoting the US Air Force acquisition chief: '[B]efore swarming can move "beyond the world of science and technology," … questions do need to be answered: "How do you certify it? How do you test it and evaluate it? Who owns it? Is it a weapons system? Does the platform using it own the autonomy -and swarming and collaboration -or is there a program for swarming and collaboration that plugs that autonomy into all sorts of platforms?"'.
  39. Hambling, Change in the Air, p. 2; Scharre, The Coming Swarm, p. 37.
  40. UN General Assembly, Ways and means for making the evidence of customary international law more readily available, Memorandum of the Secretariat, UN doc A/77/172, 14 February 2019, §77. See also McCullough, 'The Looming Swarm', citing a DARPA programme manager: '"This is something that can be implemented within the next year or two years and actually be used with our current weapons system, or derivatives of our current weapons system."'
  41. In 2017, the US military completed its MAST (Micro Autonomous Systems and Technology) research programme, launched in 2008 with the goal of understanding technologies that enable autonomous micro-robots to work together (D. McNally, 'Army Completes Autonomous Micro-Robotics Research Program', US Army Research Laboratory, 25 August 2017, https://www.arl.army.mil/www/default. cfm?article=3065).
  42. 'Raytheon Gets $29m for Work on US Navy LOCUST UAV Prototype', Naval Today, 28 June 2018, https://navaltoday.com/2018/06/28/raytheon-wins-contract-for-locus- inp/. See also D. Smalley, 'News: Navy's Autonomous Swarmboats Can Overwhelm Adversaries', Office of Naval Research, 14 April 2015, https://www.onr.navy.mil/en/ Media-Center/Press-Releases/2015/LOCUST-low-cost-UAV-swarm-ONR. 45 Perdix drones are 3D-printed and weigh 290 grams, with a wingspan of around 30 cm ('Perdix Fact Sheet', Office of the [US] Secretary of Defense, n.d., https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Perdix%20Fact%20Sheet. pdf?ver=2017-01-09-101520-643).
  43. J. Gimber, 'The Rise of the Drone Swarm', UK Defence Journal, 15 February 2019, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-rise-of-the-drone-swarm/.
  44. DARPA, 'Friendly 'Gremlins' Could Enable Cheaper, More Effective, Distributed Air Operations', 28 August 2015, https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2015-08-28.
  45. 'CODE Demonstrates Autonomy and Collaboration with Minimal Human Commands', DARPA, 19 November 2018, https://www.darpa.mil/news- events/2018-11-19.
  46. Boulanin and Verbruggen, Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems, p. 31; D. Smalley, 'News -Autonomous Swarmboats: New Missions, Safe Harbors', Office of Naval Research, 14 December 2016, https://www.onr.navy.mil/en/ Media-Center/Press-Releases/2016/Autonomous-Swarmboats.
  47. S. N. Romaniuk and T. Burgers, 'China's Swarms of Smart Drones Have Enormous Military Potential', The Diplomat, 3 February 2018, https://thediplomat. com/2018/02/chinas-swarms-of-smart-drones-have-enormous-military-potential/;
  48. D. Hambling, 'If Drone Swarms Are the Future, China May Be Winning', Popular Mechanics, 23 December 2016, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/ research/a24494/chinese-drones-swarms/.
  49. Boulanin and Verbruggen, Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems, p. 102. See also Kania, 'Swarms at War'.
  50. European Defence Agency, 'Pilot Project EuroSWARM and SPIDER activities completed', 23 February 2018, https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/ latest-news/2018/02/23/pilot-project-euroswarm-and-spider-activities-completed.
  51. Boulanin and Verbruggen, Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems, p. 197.
  52. UK Ministry of Defence and The Rt Hon Gavin Williamson CBE MP, 'Defence in Global Britain', speech by Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson, GOV.UK, 11 February 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/defence-in-global-britain.
  53. V. Insinna, 'French Air Force Chief: France and Germany Working on Export Controls for Future Fighter', Defense News, 8 February 2019, https://www. defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/02/08/french-air-force-chief-france-and- germany-working-on-export-controls-for-future-fighter/.
  54. Hambling, Change in the Air, pp. 5-6.
  55. 'To … increase the effectiveness of small-unit combat forces operating in urban environments, DARPA has launched its new OFFensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics (OFFSET) program. OFFSET seeks to develop and demonstrate 100+ operationally relevant swarm tactics that could be used by groups of unmanned air and/or ground systems numbering more than 100 robots' (DARPA, 'OFFSET Envisions Swarm Capabilities for Small Urban Ground Units', 7 December 2016, https://www.darpa.mil/news- events/2016-12-07).
  56. '[I]n the far-term, humans will form integrated teams with nearly fully autonomous unmanned systems, capable of carrying out operations in contested environments. This could include heterogeneous swarms of UAS directly supporting soldiers on the ground through ISR or aerial strikes' (US Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 2017-2042, 28 August 2018, p. 21, https://www. documentcloud.org/documents/4801652-UAS-2018-Roadmap-1.html#document).
  57. T. Eshel, 'Russian Forces in Syria Repelled Massive Drone Attack on Hmeimim and Tartus', Defense Update, 8 January 2018, https://defense-update.com/20180108_ uav_attack.html; 'Houthis Destroyed UAE Patriot System in Central Yemen With Swarm of Drones -Reports', South Front, 24 February 2018, https://southfront.org/houthis- destroyed-uae-patriot-system-in-central-yemen-with-swarm-of-drones-reports.
  58. Scharre, The Coming Swarm, p. 26. See, e.g., Hamann, Swarm Robotics, pp. 96 et seq. 61 Lachow warns that '[w]hen a system is reacting in real time to a dynamically changing environment, and basing its decisions on a simple set of rules, it is possible that unanticipated behaviours will naturally arise' (Lachow, 'The Upside and Downside of Swarming Drones', 98). In 2018, the UN Secretary-General noted that due to the complexity of an artificial intelligence system, 'the outputs of such a system may never be entirely predictable or explainable. Moreover, this unpredictability means that when algorithms fail, they do so in ways an operator never would' (Report of the Secretary- General on current developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament efforts, UN doc A/73/177, 17 July 2018, §15).
  59. Importantly, these challenges go beyond protection from attacks. See, in particular, C. Jenks and R. Liivoja, 'Machine Autonomy and the Constant Care Obligation', Humanitarian Law & Policy, 11 December 2018, https://blogs.icrc.org/ law-and-policy/2018/12/11/machine-autonomy-constant-care-obligation/.
  60. See, e.g., Autonomous Weapons Systems: Technical, Military, Legal and Humanitarian Aspects, expert meeting report, Geneva, Switzerland, 26 to 28 March 2014, ICRC, November 2014, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/report-icrc-meeting- autonomous-weapon-systems-26-28-march-2014; M. Brehm, Defending the Boundary: Constraints and Requirements on the use of Autonomous Weapon Systems under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, Academy Briefing no 9, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, May 2017, https:// www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Briefing9_interactif.pdf. 64 Report of the 2016 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), UN doc CCW/CONF.V/2, 10 June 2016, §40. 65 Ibid, §67. 66 Ibid, §68.
  61. '[L]arge numbers of low-cost attritable robotics can be controlled en masse by a relatively small number of human controllers' (Scharre, The Coming Swarm, p. 14). 68 Ibid, p. 40. 69 The reconfiguration of human-machine relations could place unacceptable demands on operators. Scharre notes that '[h]uman performance modification technologies, including pharmaceuticals ... or other modification techniques, such as transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), could allow humans to pay attention, process information and react faster' but cautions that ethical and social issues need to be addressed (ibid, p. 34). A former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions warned in respect of swarms 'that technology is being developed that is beyond humans' capacity to supervise effectively and in accordance with applicable law [and that u]nless adequate precautions are taken and built into systems, the likelihood increases that mistakes will be made which will amount to clear violations of the applicable laws' (Interim report by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, UN doc A/65/321, 23 August 2010, §41).
  62. Z. Kallenborn and P. C. Bleek, 'Drones of Mass Destruction: Drone Swarms and the Future of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons', War on the Rocks, 14 February 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/drones-of-mass-destruction- drone-swarms-and-the-future-of-nuclear-chemical-and-biological-weapons/. Scharre argues that '[w]hile autonomous systems may not be more susceptible to spoofing or cyber attacks, the consequences if an enemy were to gain control of a highly autonomous system -or an entire swarm -could be much greater' (P. Scharre, 'Counter-Swarm: A Guide to Defeating Robotic Swarms', War on the Rocks, 31 March 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/03/counter-swarm-a-guide-to-defeating- robotic-swarms/).
  63. See, e.g., Article 36, Drones in the Use of Force: A Way Forward, Briefing Paper, October 2018, https://www.efadrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/A36- drones-use-of-force-way-forward.pdf.
  64. 'The Air Force has long discussed using swarms of miniaturized drones for attack and surveillance missions … commanders can use the swarm for a single objective, like a major attack, or disperse the bots across a region for 24/7 surveillance' (L. Seligman, 'How Swarming Drones Could Change the Face of Air Warfare', Defense News, 17 May 2016, https://www.defensenews.com/2016/05/17/how-swarming- drones-could-change-the-face-of-air-warfare/).
  65. 'Attritable UAVs can be used with even less political consequence than existing armed UAVs as they are so easily replaced. Another aspect of UAVs is that they are increasingly difficult to attribute' (Hambling, Change in the Air, p. 14.) 74
  66. Scharre, The Coming Swarm, p. 33. 75 Lachow, 'The Upside and Downside of Swarming Drones', 100.
  67. J.-M. Rickli, 'The Impact of Autonomous Weapons System on International Security and Strategic Stability', in Q. Ladetto (ed.), Defence Future Technologies, p. 63. 77 '[S]mall UAVs are not regulated and would not require an extensive scientific research or industrial base to produce. Manufacture would be relatively hard to spot - compared to the production of traditional military hardware such as manned aircraft, ships or ballistic missiles -as it would resemble any other consumer electronics assembly' (Hambling, Change in the Air, p. 12).
  68. T. X. Hammes, Technologies Converge and Power Diffuses: The Evolution of Small, Smart, and Cheap Weapons, Policy Analysis, Cato Institute, 27 January 2016, p. 5, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/technologies-converge-power- diffuses-evolution-small-smart-cheap#full. www.article36.org
  69. E.g. J. Kraska and R. Pedrozo, 'China's Capture of U.S. Underwater Drone Violates Law of the Sea', Lawfare, 16 December 2016, https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas- capture-us-underwater-drone-violates-law-sea.
  70. Hambling, Change in the Air, p. 1.
  71. AeroVironment, 'Switchblade', Datasheet, 2017, https://www.avinc.com/images/ uploads/product_docs/SB_Datasheet_2017_Web_rv1.1.pdf.
  72. M. Bolton and W. Zwijnenburg, 'Futureproofing the Draft Arms Trade Treaty: A Policy Brief', 21 March 2013, https://politicalminefields.files.wordpress. com/2013/03/futureproofing-the-draft-arms-trade-treaty-42.pdf.
  73. Under what conditions is a swarm, respectively its components, a 'weapon', 'weapon system', 'unmanned aerial vehicle', 'unmanned combat aircraft', or a mixture thereof? See Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Commentary on the Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, Harvard University, 2010, pp. 54-56.
  74. See, in particular, A. Norris, Legal Issues Relating to Unmanned Maritime Systems, US Naval War College, 2013, pp. 21-64, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=731705;
  75. M. N. Schmitt and D. S. Goddard, 'International Law and the Military Use of Unmanned Maritime Systems', 98(902) International Review of the Red Cross (August 2016) 567-92, Kraska and Pedrozo, 'China's Capture of U.S. Underwater Drone Violates Law of the Sea'.
  76. Hammes, Technologies Converge and Power Diffuses, p. 9.
  77. Scharre, The Coming Swarm, p. 20.
  78. Ibid, pp. 10, 15, 20, 29.
  79. In addition, saturation with explosive force is one of the counter-measures to swarms under discussion. Shmuel envisages engaging swarms 'with large volumes of dumb and cheap munitions' (Shmuel, 'The Coming Swarm Might Be Dead on Arrival'). Directed energy weapons are also explored as countermeasures, raising a host of concerns, including for the protection of infrastructure critical to civilian wellbeing.
  80. See, e.g., K. Mizokami, 'The Army's Real-Life "Phaser" Would Knock Out an Entire Drone Swarm with One Shot', Popular Mechanics, 14 November 2016, https://www. popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a23881/the-army-is-testing-a-real-life- phaser-weapon/; Article 36, Directed Energy Weapons, Discussion Paper, November 2017, http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/directed-energy- weapons.pdf
  81. K. Mizokami, 'The Army Wants Artillery Rockets That Blast Swarms of Tank- Killing Drones Into the Sky', Popular Mechanics, 7 February 2017, https://www. popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a25090/army-rocket-launched-tank-killing- quadcopters/.
  82. For a discussion, see M. Homayounnejad, Autonomous Weapon Systems, Drone Swarming and the Explosive Remnants of War, TLI Think! Paper 1/2018, Kings College London, 2018, pp. 47-61.
  83. Ibid, p. 12.
  84. Homayounnejad notes that although research into using drones in such environments has thus far focused on unarmed drones, 'the research potentially has applications for swarms of explosive munitions' (ibid, p. 10).
  85. Ibid, p. 12.
  86. Ibid, p. 33.
  87. Hambling, Change in the Air, p. 14 (emphasis added).
  88. See, e.g., N. Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law, 2008; Study on Targeted Killings, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, Addendum, UN doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, 28 May 2010.
  89. Russell et al, 'Why You Should Fear "Slaughterbots"'.
  90. These norms are enshrined in the 1868 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight (St. Petersburg Declaration).
  91. See, e.g., Scharre, 'Why You Shouldn't Fear "Slaughterbots"' and Homayounnejad, who considers that deploying a 'one-gram shaped charge to puncture the human cranium … clearly offers law-abiding militaries a great deal of utility' (Homayounnejad, Autonomous Weapon Systems, Drone Swarming and the Explosive Remnants of War, pp. 10-11). Similarly, Kallenborn and Bleek put forth the view that 'the ability of drone swarms to serve as sophisticated chemical-and biological-weapon (CB) delivery systems could significantly increase the utility of these weapons' without any reference to the unequivocal, comprehensive bans under treaty and customary international law of chemical and biological weapons (Z. Kallenborn and P. C. Bleek, 'Swarming Destruction', 3).
  92. Nurkin, 'Wonders at the Threshold', p. 55; NATO, Technology Trend Survey: Future Emerging Technology Trends, NATO HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Long Term Requirements Branch, September 2011, p. 52, http:// indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/Technology_Trend_Survey_Final%20
  93. Version_Publish.pdf.
  94. In a report published in July 2018, the UN Secretary-General remarks in relation to the research agenda of UNIDIR that '[p]otentially important areas of inquiry do not always generate support from donors … because cutting-edge issues may not yet be on the multilateral disarmament agenda, for example, developments in drone swarming technology' (Thirty-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research: Report of the Secretary-General, 31 July 2018, UN doc A/73/284, § 29). 102 Report of the Secretary-General on current developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament efforts, §10.
  95. Scharre, The Coming Swarm, p. 35. 104 Ibid, pp. 36, 41.
  96. Homayounnejad, Autonomous Weapon Systems, pp. 61, 63. 106 Ibid, pp. 15, 18. 107 For example, there was a discussion of 'how meaningful human control could be applied over autonomous swarms' during the 2018 session of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) (Report of the 2018 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN doc CCW/GGE.1/2018/3, 23 October 2018, §32).
  97. For more information, see The United Nations Office at Geneva, '2019 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)', https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/ (httpPages)/5C00FF8E35B6466DC125839B003B62A1?OpenDocument. 109 Scharre considers that '[w]hile militaries will need to embrace automation for some purposes, humans must also be kept in the loop on the most critical decisions, particularly those that involve the use of force or movements and actions that could potentially be escalatory in a crisis' (Scharre, The Coming Swarm, pp. 33 and 34). See also the website of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, https://www. stopkillerrobots.org. 110 Report of the 2018 session of the GGE on Emerging Technologies, § §28, 40-54.
  98. UNIDIR, Increasing Transparency, Oversight and Accountability of Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 2017, p. 1, http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/ pdfs/increasing-transparency-oversight-and-accountability-of-armed-unmanned-aerial- vehicles-en-692.pdf.
  99. European Parliament recommendation to the Council on the 73rd session of the United Nations General Assembly, EU doc 2018/2040(INI), 5 July 2018, http://www. europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2018-0312&langua ge=EN&ring=A8-2018-0230. See also The European Forum on Armed Drones, Call to Action, https://www.efadrones.org/call-to-action/.
  100. U.S. Department of State, Joint Declaration for the Export and Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Media Note, 28 October 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/262811.htm. 114 '[A]rmed unmanned aerial vehicles are covered by categories IV and V of the [UN] Register [of Conventional Arms]' (Continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development: Note by the Secretary- General, UN doc A/68/140, 15 July 2013, p. 2). See also R. Stohl and S. Dick, The Arms Trade Treaty and Drones, Stimson Center, August 2018, p. 12: 'it is important for stakeholders to ask how to make controls over drone technologies sustainable. When thinking about technological innovations for UAVs -particularly outside military categories -it is helpful to identify characteristics of drones that pose particular security concerns that require greater oversight and control. These may include characteristics … such as … swarming capability', https://www.stimson.org/sites/ default/files/file-attachments/Stimson_The%20Arms%20Trade%20Treaty%20 and%20Drones_August%202018.pdf. 115 Schmitt and Goddard, 'International Law and the Military Use of Unmanned Maritime Systems', 579.
  101. E.g., Homayounejad trusts that 'the technical features of LAWS munitions will raise the bar of what is "possible" and "practical"' in relation to recording and clearance requirements given the advanced data collection and storage capacities of such devices (Homayounnejad, Autonomous Weapon Systems, p. 34). Similar arguments were made about armed drones in respect of casualty recording. Yet, unprecedented technical capabilities for observing and documenting drone strikes have not thus far translated into greater transparency and accountability. 117 UNGA Res 73/32, 11 December 2018, operative §4.

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