Book Review - Personal Identity. Complex or Simple?

1989

This thesis is concerned with what it is to be a person, and with what is involved in being the same person over time. I begin by making a survey of the major theories of personal identity, and mark some important divisions and distinctions between them, primarily between Reductionism and Non-Reductionism and, within this former category, between the Physical and Psychological Criteria, and argue that none of these ha5 proved to be satisfactory. I stress the importance of the work of Derek Parfit, and in particular his shifting of the agenda away from the relation of identity to that of 'Relation R', and his claim that it is the holding of this latter relation - namely psychological continuity by any means - that contains 'all that matters' to us regarding the future, and not necessarily whether I survive. I show how this theory avoids the pitfalls that defeated the other theories, and propose various developments of it. A critical eye is then cast over the methodolo...

These are some brief reflections that defend, but with qualifications, both reductionist and non-reductionist views of personal identity. But they largely reject Derek Parfit's ideas, and in the end they have more in common with so-called non-reductionism.

Eric Olson and Ned Markosian have, independently, complained that the ways in which the problem of personal identity has been formulated rule out certain views of personal identity just by how the problem is formulated. As a result, both have proposed alternative formulations, each attempting theory neutrality. They have not succeeded, however, since both of their formulations, as well as the formulations that they have rejected, are biased against presentist solutions to the problem, and some are biased against four-dimensionalist solutions, as well as stage theory solutions. In this paper, I show how previous formulations, including Olson's and Markosian's, are biased in the ways mentioned, and I propose a list of criteria that any formulation of the problem must meet in order to be theory neutral. Finally, I attempt a formulation that is neutral. Keywords Personal identity Á Presentism Á Eternalism Á Four-dimensionalism Á Three-dimensionalism Á Stage theory Eric Olson and Ned Markosian have, independently, undertaken the task of formulating the problem of personal identity over time, both of whom have complained that the ways in which the problem has been formulated rule out certain views of personal identity just by how the problem is formulated. 1 For example, consider a standard way in which the problem has been formulated:

This essay considers the place of personal identity within its broader social environment. What is the relationship between social context and personal identity? Why is personal identity so closely guarded, especially in the age of celebrated “individualism?” The answer seems to lie in the role that personal identity plays in traversing the “social map.” Personal identity turns out to be a kind of internal navigation system that allows its possessor to negotiate his or her social world. The essay analyzes, compares and contrasts Nancy Chodorow’s book The Power of Feelings, Margaret Mead’s Coming of Age in Samoa, and Zygmunt Bauman’s Liquid Modernity and Liquid Times – all of them authors who have contributed unique perspectives to the debate over identity. In the final analysis, as social context become less stable or predictable, as the borders and contours of the “map” begin to blur, or as more social forces come along that appropriate or exploit this important tool, personal identity becomes dysfunctional, leaving its owner disoriented and vulnerable.

Most theorists of personal identity have started from “here.” Philosophers usually begin with their own experiences of self and identity and construct a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for personhood that best reflect these experiences. They then ask other philosophers to reflect on their experiences and intuitions in order to determine whether these criteria do indeed reflect what “we” think of as personal identity, often understood to be continuity over time or as the “essence” of who “we” are.

2014

The problem of Personal Identity seems very much complex in nature in the context of Indian as well as Western psychology. Person is simply thought to be the admixture of mind-body complex. However there remains a controversy about the relation between 'person' and 'human being'; whether 'person means human being' is at all a rightly derived conclusion? In one interpretation 'person' is an artificial class, whereas 'human being' is a natural class describing the existing biological species. In another interpretation 'person' is a higher class in order than that of 'human being', because 'human being' is just a mind-body admixture and when he is introduced with the sense of identity within himself (i.e. personal identity) then only he can be considered as a person. Leaving aside this controversy, we have to dedicate our valuable times to discuss the notion of personal identity.

Practical identity and narrative agency, 2008

This paper has two main aims. The first is to propose a new way of characterizing the problem of personal identity. The second is to show that the metaphysical picture that underlies my proposal has important implications for the 3D/4D debate. I start by spelling out several of the old ways of characterizing the problem of personal identity and saying what I think is wrong with each of them. Next I present and motivate some metaphysical principles concerning property instantiations that underlie my proposal. Then I introduce the new way of characterizing the problem of personal identity that I am recommending, and I show that it avoids the difficulties facing the old ways. I also mention several vexing problems that arise in connection with certain popular views about personal identity, and I argue that if we formulate the problem of personal identity in the way that I am proposing, then each of these problems can be handled fairly easily. Finally, I show that there is an additional benefit to adopting my proposal, namely, that several other important problems facing anyone who endorses a 3D view of persistence (as opposed to the 4D, “temporal parts” view of persistence) can all be resolved in a relatively straightforward manner by one who adopts the metaphysical principles concerning property instantiations that underlie the proposal.