The Banality of Golden Dawn [A Commentary for Open Democracy]
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Abstract
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This commentary analyzes the rise of Golden Dawn as Greece's third most popular party between 2011 and 2013, attributing its success to public disillusionment with mainstream politics and street-level activism against immigrant crime. It discusses how the party has attempted to navigate its criminal accusations while maintaining its core stance on immigration. The future trajectory of Golden Dawn is uncertain, with potential leadership changes and a shift towards a less violent approach in response to legal challenges.
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In May and in June 2012, the Golden Dawn, an extremist right-wing political party with overtly anti-parliamentary, anti-liberal, pro-racist ideology which perceives the exercise of physical violence as a legitimate way of claiming political power, managed to win a remarkably large number of seats in the Greek national parliament. Despite the absence of a far-right movement in the Greek political scene since the fall of military junta in 1974, the resurrection of it in the 2012 elections came as a surprise to many observers. They often attributed its rise to Greece's financial crisis and the Golden Dawn's ability to offer an easily “digestible” and simplistic explanation for the country’s situation, suggesting that there was a “conspiracy” of internal and external “enemies” against it. Assisted by the gradual obsolescence of politics and the heated immigration issue, the Golden Dawn became the expression of anger of the betrayed and the have-nots. The arrest of its leader and a large number of its prominent members for laundering money and working for a mafia-style terrorist organization, by a leading right-wing coalition government, brought to the surface both the underground operations of the Golden Dawn Party as well as its connections with certain members of the police and the military. The goal of this paper will be to offer shed some light over the sudden rise of the Far-Right to political power and its effect on the political, social and economic arena of post-IMF Greece.
2023
, the far-right neo-Nazi group Golden Dawn (GD) publicly reappeared and held a march and rally in Florina, Northern Greece.[1] This is significant because many group members, including those serving in the Greek Parliament, were convicted in 2020 for heading a criminal organization. Florina is known for being a far-right stronghold due to its proximity to the state of North Macedonia and its Slavic-speaking population. GD organized the demonstration in response to the approval of the "Macedonian Language Center" in Greece as an official NGO.[2] This center teaches the official language of North Macedonia, which is referred to as the Macedonian language.[3] GD and other Greek far-right have recently been rallying around the Macedonia issue, using it as a political asset. In addition to GD, far-right groups like The Hellenic Socialist Resistance (ESA) and APELLA have utilized the Macedonia issue.[4] The District Attorney of Florina has objected to the approval of the Macedonian Language Center, and an appeal hearing date is scheduled.[5] In response to the GD's march, groups opposing far-right organizations, student organizations, and leftist political parties staged a counter-protest.[6]
2014
This thesis examines the rise of the extreme right party Golden Dawn in Greece. The main argument is that it is necessary to understand the developments of the modern Greek state, from independence and throughout the financial crisis, to understand that there is a general tendency in Greece to lean towards the far right in times of crisis. Recent developments in Greece should therefore not be seen as a unique phenomenon, but rather as a confirmation of the importance of nationalism, the effects of populism, and also the heritage of fascism in contemporary Greece. The first part of this thesis therefore looks at the history of Greece from 1821 to 1990 before moving on to a larger discussion on developments from the 1990s. Particular attention will be given to the period from the financial crisis of 2008 up until this day (early May 2014). This thesis also looks at the concepts of nationalism, fascism and populism, and how they are crucial both in defining the concept of the extreme right and for understanding extreme right-wing parties.
Mediterranean Quarterly, 2018
This essay stems from a simple but puzzling question: Why didn't Greece's so-called refugee crisis, which erupted in 2015, cause further significant ascendance of anti-immigrant, extreme right-wing political forces in the country? At first glance, all the preconditions were there:
The electoral rise of Golden Dawn from obscurity to parliamentary representation has drawn attention to its particular neo-fascist discourse. In sharp contrast to the tendency of most far-right movements in Europe to present themselves as being part of the political mainstream, Golden Dawn has never disavowed its openly neo-Nazi references. Its political and ideological discourse combines extreme racism, nationalism and authoritarianism along with traditional conservative positions in favour of traditional family roles and values and the Greek Orthodox Church. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand to situate the ideology and discourse of Golden Dawn in a conjuncture of economic and social crisis, a crisis of the project of European Integration, and examine it aspart of a broader authoritarian post-democratic and post-hegemonic transformation of the State in contemporary capitalism; on the other hand to criticize the position suggested recently that Golden Dawn was also the result of the supposedly “national-populist” discourse of the anti-austerity movement. On the contrary, we will insist on the opposition between the discourses and practices of Golden Dawn and the anti-austerity movement in Greece.
Violence perpetrated against migrants by Golden Dawn was rarely investigated or prosecuted by Greek authorities and was discursively constructed as exceptional, contrary to the norms of Greek democracy and committed by marginalized individuals and groups. The article argues that state responses have been shaped by racialized discourses and policies on migration and racism. Anti-migrant violence has been legitimated through three interlinked discursive strategies: a narrative of ‘isolated events’; the denial of its racialized nature; and the rationalization of both state and non-state anti-migrant violence as a regrettable yet understandable defensive reaction to the threats posed by migration.

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