Physics, Inconsistency, and Quasi-Truth, I

Synthese, 2014

For two reasons, physics occupies a preeminent position among the sciences. On the one hand, due to its recognized position as a fundamental science, and on the other hand, due to the characteristic of its obvious certainty of knowledge. For both reasons it is regarded as the paradigm of scientificity par excellence. With its focus on the issue of epistemic certainty, philosophy of science follows in the footsteps of classical epistemology, and this is also the basis of its 'judicial' pretension vis-à-vis physics. Whereas physics is in a strong competitive relationship to philosophy and epistemology with respect to its position as a fundamental science - even on the subject of cognition, as the pretension of 'reductionism' shows. It is the thematic focus on epistemic certainty itself, however, that becomes the root of a profound epistemological misunderstanding of physics. The reason for this is twofold: first, the idea of epistemic certainty as a criterion of 'd...

2008

The two previous papers developed quantum mechanical formalism from classical mechanics and two additional postulates. In the first paper it was also shown that the uncertainty relations possess no ontological validity and only reflect the formalism’s limitations. In this paper, a Realist Interpretation of quantum mechanics based on these results is elaborated and compared to the Copenhagen Interpretation. We demonstrate that von Neumann’s proof of the impossibility of a hidden variable theory is not correct, independently of Bell’s argumentation. A local hidden variable theory is found for non-relativistic quantum mechanics, which is nothing else than newtonian mechanics itself. We prove that Bell’s theorem does not imply in a non-locality of quantum mechanics, and also demonstrate that Bohm’s theory cannot be considered a true hidden variable theory. 1

2008

In this paper we will analyze certain famous controversies, paradoxes, and disputes from physics. All these problems have been created under a pseudo-paradigm the unicorn-world or the existence of one unique ontological world. We replace this unicorn-world with the epistemologically different worlds. Then we apply this perspective to the great debates regarding fields and waves. From our perspective, we will scrutinize the problem of gravity and Newton vs. Einstein theories, the relationship between the general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics (mainly the problems of infinities produced by the unification of these theories), quantum gravity (the problem of space), black holes, and holographic principle. In the last part, we will try to establish the philosophical foundations for rejecting the (super)string theory from an EDWs perspective.

Foundations of Science, 1998

ABSTRACT. We put forward the hypothesis that there exist three basic attitudes towards inconsistencies within world views: (1) The inconsistency is tolerated temporarily and is viewed as an expression of a temporary lack of knowledge due to an incomplete or wrong theory. The resolution of ...

In this paper I argue in favour of a moderate and selective version of scientific realism with respect to the existence of some physical theoretical objects and the truth of some statements about them. The analysis of common sense or ordinary experience reveals that existence and truth assertions concerning familiar objects are warranted if they satisfy what we call the criteria of presence and invariance. Ordinary objects exemplify a form or a structure determined by constant and changing features with respect to the variation of the conditions of observation and a content given in sensory presence. It is claimed that some theoretical physical objects that possess a structure or a form determined by invariant and variable characteristics relatively to a specified group of transformations and a content provided by observations on which the measurement of those characteristics is grounded can also be justifiably asserted to exist. We further show that this defence of scientific realism in physics doesn't fall prey to the objections that have been raised against the usual vindication of scientific realism based on the no-miracle argument. Some standard objections to scientific realism, such as the underdetermination theories by observations and the pessimistic metainduction, are examined and shown to be unconvincing.

Foundations of Physics, 2010

Quantum theory is a tremendously successful physical theory, but nevertheless suffers from two serious problems: the measurement problem and the problem of interpretational underdetermination. The latter, however, is largely overlooked as a genuine problem of its own. Both problems concern the doctrine of realism, but pull, quite curiously, into opposite directions. The measurement problem can be captured such that due to scientific realism about quantum theory common sense anti-realism follows, while theory underdetermination usually counts as an argument against scientific realism. I will also consider the more refined distinctions of ontic and epistemic realism and demonstrate that quantum theory in its most viable interpretations conflicts with at least one of the various realism claims. A way out of the conundrum is to come to the bold conclusion that quantum theory is, possibly, wrong (in the realist sense).

The general view is that all fundamental physical laws should be formulated within the framework given by quantum mechanics (QM). In a sense, QM therefore has the character of a metaphysical theory. Consequently, if it is possible to derive QM from more basic principles, these principles should be of general, philosophical nature. Here, derive the formalism of QM from well-motivated epistemic principles. A key assumption is that in a proper physical theory, the introduction of entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle is in conflict with the theory. First, an epistemic formalism is developed, using concepts like knowledge and potential knowledge, identifying a physical state $S$ with the potential knowledge of the physical world. It is demonstrated that QM emerges from this formalism. However, Hilbert spaces, wave functions and probabilities are defined in certain well-defined observational contexts only. This means that the epistemic formalism is broader than QM. In the fundamental layer of description, the physical state $S$ is a subset of a state space $\mathcal{S}=\{Z\}$, such that $S$ always contains many elements $Z$. These elements correspond to unattainable states of complete knowledge of the world. The evolution of $S$ cannot be determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements $Z$, unlike the evolution of an ensemble in classical phase space. The evolution of $S$ is described in terms of sequential time $n\in \mathbf{\mathbb{N}}$, which is updated according to $n\rightarrow n+1$ each time an event occurs, each time potential knowledge changes. Sequential time $n$ can be separated from relational time $t$, which describes distances between events in space-time. There is an entire space-time associated with each $n$, in which $t$ represents the knowledge at sequential time $n$ about the temporal relations between present and past events.

The quantum paradigm as a discreet method of describing the structure of the material world, fundamentally based on quantum mechanics, is in contradiction with the electromagnetic theory of light. Promoting a mechanical vision of subatomic phenomena has been a step backwards in knowledge by going back to a convoluted theory regarding the corpuscular character of light which was extended over the structure of the material world. The complexity of the processuality of the material world as a unity between the discreet corpuscular character and the continuous electromagnetic manifestations reveal a new theory of the physical reality, in a complex epistemic vision, in which the two ontological entities are not mutually exclusive, but rather they coexist in a unified theoretical system explained by a new electrodynamic approach of the material world which reveals a spatiotemporal universe is both knowable and predictable.

2010

There are various reasons for favouring ψ-epistemic interpretations of quantum mechanics over ψ-ontic interpretations. One such reason is the correlation between quantum mechanics and Liouville dynamics. Another reason is the success of a specific epistemic model , in reproducing a wide range of quantum phenomena. The potential criticism, that Spekkens' restricted knowledge principle is counter-intuitive, is rejected using 'everyday life' examples. It is argued that the dimensionality of spin favours Spekkens' model over ψ-ontic models. van Enk's extension of Spekkens' model can even reproduce Bell Inequality violations, but requires negative probabilities to do so. An epistemic account of negative probabilities is the missing element for deciding the battle between ψ-epistemic and ψ-ontic interpretations in favour of the former. * I owe a special thanks to Dr. Jeremy Butterfield for supervising this paper, generously providing encouragement, comments and advice. I also thank Dr. Alex Broadbent and an anonymous reviewer in the History and Philosophy Department, Cambridge University for helpful comments.