"Adam Smith's Solution to the Paradox of Tragedy"

Academia Letters, 2020

Scholars of the Scottish Enlightenment, and Adam Smith in particular, are sometimes quick to attribute the ideas of the literati as an early instigator of the Antislavery movement. However, this quick attribution of proto abolitionism may be problematic. Adam Smith's economic criticisms of the slave system, though widely lauded, did not lead to the voluntary removal of slavery, a fact that Smith himself anticipated as he acknowledged in lectures that the "love of dominion and authority over others will probably make it perpetuall (sic)." 1 Authors such as Charles L. Griswold Jr. have attempted to enhance Smith's antislavery credentials by arguing that he laid the foundation for a moral criticism of slavery through the idea of sympathy and the 'impartial spectator'. 2 This brief essay will seek to touch on the intersection of Smithean sympathy and slavery in Theory of Moral Sentiments and explore why Smith's moral framework failed to find fault with the contemporary slave system. Slavery and Sympathy in the Personal Sphere. In Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith argued that the individual could make moral judgements via sympathy without the need for externally-introduced absolutes. He wrote, [A]s we sympathize with the sorrow of our fellow-creature whenever we see his distress, so we likewise enter into his abhorrence and aversion to whatever his

RECOGNITION OF LIFE. Theoretical, Ethical and Political Perspectives, "ITINERARI", LX, 2021

In Adam Smith's ethics of sympathy, recognition is closely linked to seeking approval and esteem from other social actors. In the light of the undoubtedly great importance granted by Smith to social approval a series of questions arise, such as: Does the search for recognition necessarily imply the adoption by the individual of mimetic behaviours which, by replicating what is socially shared, guarantee approval and esteem? And to what extent does mimesis require a capacity for fiction? In this regard, is it not the case that individual moral evaluations risk being reduced to the conformist reverberation of those of society? The aim of this essay is first of all to understand in which terms Smith, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, understands the link between mimesis, fiction and recognition. To this end, the role played by mimesis and fiction will be scrutinised along the various interconnected dimensions that structure the complex phenomenon of recognition: the emotional, the one linked to public success, and the moral one. Finally, in the light of the peculiar account on mimesis developed by Smith on aesthetic grounds, also the ethical implications of this link will be discussed.

2020

Thought about the relation between tragedy and morality may be divided into two schools. The one, which dominates writing on tragedy, assumes a fundamental compatibility between tragedy and morality. The connection allows of various formulations. It may be held that the experience of tragedy is constituted by moral appraisal, that the telos of tragedy converges with moral ends, or simply that there is at least nothing in the experience of tragedy which disturbs the outlook of morality. The other line of thought, which again comes in different formulations, is that there is on the contrary a dissociation or discrepancy, or in stronger terms, a mutual antagonism, between tragedy and morality. My aim in this paper is to explore one form of the latter view. The association of tragedy with morality has a long and highly distinguished history. Among theoretical writings favouring tragedy's moral significance we find, after Aristotle's oblique account of the relation, a long and unified tradition stretching from Horace, up over the hiatus of medieval culture, to the eighteenth century. Attempts to extract from Aristotle's Poetics an explicit account of the moral significance of tragedy abound in Renaissance humanism. 1 The Horatian view 1 See for example the extracts from Giambattista Giraldi and Lorenzo Giacomini in Michael J.

Adam Smith Review, 2014

According to Adam Smith, when we simulate the actions of others we also evaluate their actions, and thereby sympathize with their condition. I argue that the ‘practical’ simulations of perception discussed in Smith's 'On the External Senses' (ES) share an evaluative component: guiding the body’s interaction with objects in a way that support its health and avoid its harm. Not only does such a discussion help elucidate Smith’s early thoughts about perception in ES, but how ES pre-figures and connects with his later, more developed views of morality and social interaction. It also provides a basis for connecting Smith’s account of perception with recent research in neuroscience, as I argue in this paper’s conclusion.

Social Philosophy and Policy, 2013

David Hume and Adam Smith are usually, and understandably, seen as developing very similar sentimentalist accounts of moral thought and practice. As similar as Hume's and Smith's accounts of moral thought are, they differ in telling ways. This essay is an attempt primarily to get clear on the important differences. They are worth identifying and exploring, in part, because of the great extent to which Hume and Smith share not just an overall approach to moral theory but also a conception of what the key components of an adequate account of moral thought will be. In the process, I hope to bring out the extent to which they both worked to make sense of the fact that we do not merely have affective reactions but also, importantly, make moral judgments.

Modern Philology, 2017

Joshua Reynolds, and Savage had in their cultural moment. Erwin tends to assume that the reader's expertise matches his own, and the breadth of his study oft en risks confusion. For example, a central term of his analysis "textual vision" is used to describe such a wide range of literary allusions to sight and aesthetics that it is rendered quite vague. While Erwin's lack of precision can weaken his arguments, his central thesis that the overturning of classical design was instrumental to the formation of modern British culture in the eighteenth century is both well supported and intriguing.

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2001