PITY AND SYMPATHY: ARISTOTLE VERSUS PLATO AND SMITH VERSUS HUME

Psicologia em Pesquisa, 2014

Th is inquiry examines empathy as used in context even when the word "empathy" is not explicitly mentioned. Th e capacity for empathy, not the mere word, is engaged in diverse intellectual traditions. Th e diff erence between the mention of the word "empathy" and its use is indicated by enclosing the mention in quotation marks. A defi nition of empathy is proposed in which it is a unifi ed multi-dimensional process that includes empathic receptivity, empathic understanding, empathic interpretation, and empathic responsiveness . Th ese aspects of empathy form a unifi ed whole and the application of this defi nition makes sense out of a diversity of apparently confl icting examples, applications, descriptions, and defi nitions of empathy.

Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1999. Considers the concept of sympathy from ancient Greece to the early 19th century, with special attention to its employment as an explanatory principle in physics and medicine and its shift into the world of psychology and morality in the early modern period. Considers figures such as Aristotle, Plotinus, Porta, Paracelsus, Boerhaave, Willis, Whytt, Lévesque de Pouilly, Shaftesbury, Hume, Smith, Henry Mackenzie, Samuel Jackson Pratt, Hannah More, and many others.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2004

In this paper, I argue that Hume’s account of sympathy is substantially unchanged from the Treatise to the second Enquiry. I show that Hume uses the term ‘sympathy’ to refer to three different mental phenomena (a psychological mechanism or principle, a sentiment, and a conversion process) and that he consistently refers to sympathy as a cause of benevolent motivation. I attempt to resolve an apparent difficulty regarding sympathy and humanity by explaining how each is an ‘original principle’ in Hume’s sense. I conclude by suggesting how my interpretation might make a contemporary evaluation of Hume’s account of benevolent motivation possible.

Empathy is central to Hume and Smith's accounts of moral motivation and moral judgment. In this chapter, I will situate their respective theories of empathy in their broader views on cognition and imagination, clarifying the different foci of empathy, the role of the imagination, and the unique evaluative dimension in Smithian empathy. Then, I will explore how empathy lies at the foundation of moral motivation, clarifying how differences between Humean and Smithian empathy explain differences in the nature of this motivation between thinkers, and the respective limitations that it has. Lastly, I will show how both Hume and Smith construct privileged points of view to reconcile the impartial demands of moral judgment with the potential partialities of empathy. I aim to clarify how the role of empathy in moral judgment differs from its role in moral motivation, with resources being available in the former case that are explicitly rejected in the later.

Sympathy is a key principle in Hume's theory of the passions.1 The genesis, phenomenology, and causal properties of these states depend to a great extent on the "propensity to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments" (T 2.1.11.1; SBN 316). Hume's philosophy makes the emotions, and their capacity to be stabilized by sympathy, central to our social life. My chapter examines the various interconnections between sympathy and the passions. After sketching the main elements of the theory of the passions and the principle of sympathy (sections 1 and 2), I consider three aspects of human sociality. First, I examine some characteristics of our relations with our family and friends (section 3). Second, I consider our evaluative practices in this context and how non-verbal behaviour governs not only how other people think and feel about us, but also how we think and feel about ourselves (section 4). Finally, I explain how human beings not only behave benevolently within their families, but can also be sensitive to the suffering of strangers (section 5).

The International Journal of Humanities & Social Studies

Introduction This paper presents Hume's discourse on 'sympathy', showing how he uses this notion to explain 'pity'. Also, there is an attempt to discuss:  The connection between 'sympathy',  The relations of 'resemblance', 'contiguity', and 'cause and effect'  A brief contrastive analysis of Hume and Spinoza on 'sympathy' Hume's notion of 'sympathy' anticipates and approximates the current notion of empathy as emotional sharing, which Spinoza is said to have articulated. Hume's views on emotional sharing, or 'sympathy' as he calls it, bear a striking resemblance to Spinoza's views on 'imitation of affects '{affectum imitatio). In the third part of his Ethics, proposition twenty-seven, Spinoza says: 'If we imagine a thing like us towards which we have had no affect to be affected, with some affect, we are thereby affected with a like affect.' 1 1.1. Hume's Discourse on Sympathy Hume uses the word 'sympathy' both in A Treatise of Human Nature and in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. In the Treatise, the word 'sympathy' is primarily used to denote a special principle for the transference or, as Hume calls it, 'communication', of beliefs, inclinations, and passions between different individuals (T 316). In order to avoid any possible confusion, it should probably be pointed out from the outset that Hume made a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, what he called 'sympathy' and, on the other, what he called 'pity' and 'compassion' and what we today would call 'sympathy'. The feeling of concern for another person, which we today associate with 'sympathy', should not be confused with Hume's brand of 'sympathy.' The former is a passion or emotion, whereas the latter is a principle for the communication of, for instance, passions. The feeling of concern that we today associate with 'sympathy' will be denoted by Hume's own expressions of 'pity' and 'compassion'. As will become evident, Hume's notion of sympathy does not entail emotional sharing. Nor does it entail that emotions acquired through sympathy are felt or experienced in any special way. What the notion does entail, however, or rather what the notion signifies, is a process of acquiring an emotion consistent with how an emotion felt as part of empathy has to be acquired. This is how Hume's notion of 'sympathy', like Spinoza's notion of 'imitation, anticipates the current conception of 'empathy.' According to MacNabb: In the Treatise, 'benevolence' is regarded as an original instinct, but it is a confined benevolence, a desire for the happiness of our own friends; there is no natural and original love of man for man as such. The concern 1 Benedict Spinoza, (1677/1994) 'Ethics' in A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works. Ed. and translated by E. Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press). The method of citation used here is from the Cambridge Companion to Spinoza (1996). E3P27 refers to the Ethics, part 3, proposition 27. Other abbreviations used are 'c' for corollary, 'd' for definition when not following a proposition number, (but 'd' for demonstration when following a proposition number, and 'da' for the definition of the affects and 's' scholium note. Thus E3P27C2d, for example, means Ethics part 3, proposition 27, corollary 2, demonstration.

Empathy is central to Hume and Smith's accounts of moral motivation and moral judgment. In this chapter, I will situate their respective theories of empathy in their broader views on cognition and imagination, clarifying the different foci of empathy, the role of the imagination, and the unique evaluative dimension in Smithian empathy. Then, I will explore how empathy lies at the foundation of moral motivation, clarifying how differences between Humean and Smithian empathy explain differences in the nature of this motivation between thinkers, and the respective limitations that it has. Lastly, I will show how both Hume and Smith construct privileged points of view to reconcile the impartial demands of moral judgment with the potential partialities of empathy. I aim to clarify how the role of empathy in moral judgment differs from its role in moral motivation, with resources being available in the former case that are explicitly rejected in the later.