De-ontologization of Individuality in Evolutionary Biology

Published in: THAUMAZEIN 8, pp. 260-274., 2020

After the discovery of the DNA in the 1950´s, 20th century biology focused on the concept of the gene. In the 21st century, however, the concept of organism is regaining its primary role in biological thought. At present there is a rapidly growing literature verifying that living beings are able not only to deeply reorganize themselves but also to modify their genomes. The emergence of a theory of organism requires, however, first the elaboration of a logic of organismic causality that proceeds from organismic phenomenality. In the following I will attempt to outline what I label "logic of organisms." In order to achieve this aim I will first try to articulate a "logic of mechanisms" because it constitutes a sharp contrast to the "logic of organisms."

2017

Although natural philosophers have long been interested in individuality, it has been of interest to contemporary philosophers of biology because of its role in different aspects of evolutionary biology. These debates include whether species are individuals or classes, what counts as a unit of selection, and how transitions in individuality occur evolutionarily. Philosophical analyses are often conducted in terms of metaphysics (“what is an individual?”), rather than epistemology (“how can and do researchers conceptualize individuals so as to address some of their scientific goals?”). We review several philosophical distinctions in order to shift attention from metaphysics to epistemology. Many controversies involve epistemological differences rather than metaphysical disagreement. This implies that a pluralist stance about individuality in biology is warranted and has metaphysical consequences because the pluralism emerges from the diversity of scientific interests that investigate...

This is the first book devoted to analyzing most if not all of the competing species concepts out there in biology. In the final chapter the author attempts to pull it all together and develop a species concept that satisfies the requirements of evolutionary biology but at the same time avoids the failings of modern species concepts. The result is a species concept that should be easy to understand and visualize but which, alas, seems to have either been generally overlooked or misunderstood, perhaps because it is truly interdisciplinary, requiring a substantial background in both biology and philosophy (particularly the metaphysics of relations).

HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 8 (2): 475-480. , 2018

First page: Biologists, historians of biology, and philosophers of biology often ask what is it to be an individual, really. This book does not answer that question. Instead, it answers a much more interesting one: How do biologists individuate individuals? In answering that question, the authors explore why biologists individuate individuals, in what ways, and for what purposes. The cross-disciplinary, dialogical approach to answering metaphysical questions that is pursued in the volume may seem strange to metaphysicians who are not biologically focused, but it is adroitly achieved by the editors. Scott Lidgard (a paleontologist and marine ecologist) and Lynn K. Nyhart (a historian of biology) orchestrate a dialogue among historians of biology, philosophers of biology, and practicing biologists over 10 chapters. These are followed by three reflective commentaries written to frame the different disciplinary perspectives and to highlight the historical, biological, and philosophical themes across the chapters. The result is a volume—in structure and in content—that has much to be generously commended. Biological individuality is a hotly discussed topic, but it is also part of a series of long-standing arguments within both the history and philosophy of biology (HPB) and metaphysics. Notable and fervent debates have centered on evolution and the units...

2005

2019

Fundamental Ontology Transformed by Simondon’s Transduction with Ontogenesis and Bataille’s General Economy Individuation and Meta-systems in relation to the Foundational Mathematical Categories -- Abstract: Postulation of Genetic Fundamental Ontology based on Simondon’s idea of Ontogenesis in combination with the idea of Bataille of the General Economy verses the Restricted Economy. Recognition that its architecture has an uncanny resemblance to the View-Order Hierarchy based on the Methodological Distinctions of Klir that is the basis for Architectural Design using Dagger Theory. This field of the intersection of the Ontological Lattice and the Epistemological Lattice seems to share the structure of the Nine Men Morris game of ancient decent. These uncanny resemblances of the Lattice of the structure of Genetic Fundamental with previously identified structures is hard to explain. -- Key Words: Emergent Event, Foundational Mathematical Categories, Emergent Meta-system, Hegel, Sartre, Badiou, Derrida, Deleuze, Fundamental Ontology, Simondon, Ontogenesis, Transduction, Apeiron, Being of Becoming, Bataille

Journal of Philosophy, 2013

Biological theory demands a clear organism1 concept, but at present biologists cannot agree on one. They know that counting particular units, and not counting others, allows them to generate explanatory and predictive descriptions of evolutionary processes. Yet they lack a unified theory telling them which units to count. In this paper, I offer a novel account of biological individuality that reconciles conflicting definitions of “organism” by interpreting them as describing alternative realizers of a common functional role, and then defines individual organisms as essentially possessing some mechanisms that play this role.

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2018

Individuality is an important concept in biology, yet there are many non-equivalent criteria of individuality expressed in different kinds of biological individuals. This paper evaluates these different kinds in terms of their capacity to support explanatory generalizations over the systems they individuate. Viewing the problem of individuality from this perspective promotes a splitting strategy in which different kinds make different epistemic trade-offs which suit them for different explanatory roles. I argue that evolutionary individuals, interpreted as forming a functional kind, face difficulties of individuation and explanatory power that are mitigated by relying on more structurally based properties and non-evolutionary kinds.

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 1994

J. Acad. (N.Y.), 2014

While human beings are without any doubt orders of magnitude removed from animals in the degree of development, no difference in degree alone can constitute a difference in kind. The formalization of this phenomenological inability to define the demarcation of species is not only of utmost highest importance with respect to the conception of human dignity but also to the ethical classification of the human ability to design hybrid-creatures. The heuristic principle of inability motivates an ontological consideration suggesting an unambiguous species-barrier defined by a generic and specific analysis of the human incarnation.