The Problem of Language in Early Modern Thought - Review Essay

The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 2008

Publications of the English Goethe Society, 2016

This essay considers the reception of Müller's axiom, first stated in 1861, regarding the interdependence of language and thought. The response and engagement with this notion by individuals working within the nascent fields of psychology, neurology, paediatrics, education and the law are examined over a period of four decades. Müller was relatively unique in successfully transmitting linguistic ideas to the medical and scientific research communities. Evidence is presented that traces how Müller's theoretical arguments were seen to resonate with new research questions early on, but later became challenged by empirical observations towards the end of the century. 1 This paper will concentrate on the contributions of Darwin to this issue. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) also considered this subject. Spencer defined language as 'an apparatus of symbols for the conveyance of thought … How truly language must be regarded as a hindrance to thought, though the necessary instrument of it'. Herbert Spencer, 'The Philosophy of Style', Westminster Review, 58 (1852), p. 437. Moreover, other contributions to the debate such as those of August Schleicher (1821-1868) might also be fruitfully considered, but will not be addressed here. those in which he was an acknowledged expert, Müller's claims were referenced and discussed. In this chapter, we will demonstrate how Müller's views on language and thought were considered sufficiently noteworthy to warrant responses from those working in remote scientific, medical and legal disciplines over a sustained period. In Britain, at the time that Müller was active in academic circles studying Oriental religions and languages, there was increased interest, particularly in the nascent field of psychology, in typical child development. This was to a great extent stimulated by the many political reforms of the 1870s with regard to the education and social care of children. There was also an increasing need for clinicians and educationalists to determine whether a child was intellectually unimpaired in light of limited language development. Concurrently, medical research led to increasing understanding as to how language is organized in the brain. Much of the evidence came from patients who had suffered language impairment (aphasia) as a result of brain disease or injury. There was also an increased understanding of the organic basis of mental disorders, and of the abnormal thought processes and disturbed language that might occur in patients suffering from such conditions. Physicians subsequently found themselves concerned with the legal aspects of the behaviour of such individuals, offering practical advice to lawyers and judges who were called upon to evaluate evidence from someone deemed impaired in thought, language or both. While others have considered Müller's contributions to the study of religion, myth and classical languages, this chapter focuses on his impact on Victorian considerations of child language acquisition, language impairment and the medical-legal aspects of testamentary capacity. These intellectual spheres are not typically associated with him. Here, the widespread penetration of Müller's ideas is highlighted, and it is argued that this is all the more significant given that there typically tended to be little cross-referencing among those working in disparate fields of humanities and sciences. The following pages document the persistence of Müller's idea on the inter-relation of language and thought until at least the beginning of the twentieth century.

The paper explores the relationship of language and thought with respect to their mutual determination or influence. Two questions are considered crucial: how do we learn the meanings of conventional linguistic signs, including those for abstract concepts, and how do we express our original insights, thoughts and feelings through not-yet-conventional linguistic means. These are followed by succinct answers and extensive elaborations referring to opposite views and linguistic examples from the history of philosophy and cognitive linguistics. It is argued that linguistic expressions, including metaphors, mostly incorporate how people represent (or once represented) the world to themselves through imagination and present (or once presented) the world to others through language. Hence language neither directly shows how we conceive and understand the world nor how we construct it in our thoughts. On the other hand, symbolization through metaphor and metonymy, as well as innovative verbalization, enable our cognition to communicate novel as well as abstract and philosophically demanding meanings.

The Review of Metaphysics, 1997

1988

Review by James C. McKusick. The Philosophy of Language in Britain: Major Theories From Hobbes to Thomas Reid. by Stephen K. Land; The Figural and the Literal: Problems of Language in the History of Science and Philosophy, 1630-1800. by Andrew E. Benjamin; Geoffrey N. Cantor; John R. R. Christie. Some of the most interesting and important recent work in the intellectual history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has concerned itself with the philosophy of language in relation to science and literature. This kind of work promises a fresh understanding of the linguistic and figural basis of the conceptual categories employed by major philosophers during this period. It has become increasingly clear that speculation concerning the nature and origin of language is not merely a digression or afterthought in the work of Locke, Berkeley, Adam Smith, or Thomas Reid. Two recent studies examine the various ways in which problems of language are intrinsic to the era\u27s most vital in...