Stand and Fight: Lessons from the Transition Mission in Iraq

2008

Book review of "Sudden Justice: America's Secret Drone Wars" published by the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute in the journal Parameters Spring 2017

We welcome the opportunity to share the experiences, challenges, and accomplishments of the U.S. Army Human Terrain System (HTS). HTS is a complex and unique organization that deploys and operates in direct support of deployed commanders and staffs. The mission of HTS, an intelligence enabling capability, is to: recruit, train, deploy, and support an embedded, operationally focused sociocultural capability; conduct operationally relevant, sociocultural research and analysis; develop and maintain a sociocultural knowledge base to support operational decision making, enhance operational effectiveness, and preserve and share sociocultural institutional knowledge.

We welcome the opportunity to share the experiences, challenges, and accomplishments of the U.S. Army Human Terrain System (HTS). HTS is a complex and unique organization that deploys and operates in direct support of deployed commanders and staffs. The mission of HTS, an intelligence enabling capability, is to: recruit, train, deploy, and support an embedded, operationally focused sociocultural capability; conduct operationally relevant, sociocultural research and analysis; develop and maintain a sociocultural knowledge base to support operational decision making, enhance operational effectiveness, and preserve and share sociocultural institutional knowledge.

2009

This compilation of articles originally appeared as a five-part series by Small Wars Journal. Each article was co-authored by one Army soldier/civilian and one university professor/academic as part of a joint research project. This project and product responds to the Army's objectives regarding the integration of cultural social sciences into its training and operations.

A vision of the future — circa early 21st century — that continues to unfold on course, even as we avoid and deny it. But it will be, even as the turmoil and the chaos out there comes home and into us. My great Cassandra-Tiresias lamentation, with all the hopeless fidelity of prophesy!

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PsycEXTRA Dataset, 2000

Historically, guerrilla movements have had more success in the rural countryside than in the city. From the urban uprising of the Paris commune to the urban revolts in Shanghai, most urban insurrections have ended up smashed and leaderless. Usually, it is a mistake for the guerrilla to move into the city. In the city, the guerrilla is surrounded by a thousand eyes and a thousand jealousies. The government can mass forces and move rapidly within the city. The guerrilla force must stay small and fragmented in order to survive. The guerrilla cannot conceal large weapons and cannot conduct on-site training and rehearsals. In Peru, the Sendero Luminoso did well as long as they fought from the mountains and jungles. The government was able to respond effectively only after the movement shifted its forces to the cities. The Peruvian government conducted an effective urban information campaign against the Sendero Luminoso while building and conducting an impressive urban intelligence effort. Then the government smashed the movement. Sendero Luminoso is now resurrecting itself and making a comeback-in the jungles and mountains.

Combat Studies Institute: Art of War Papers, 2013

The British and US experience with the use of local, irregular security forces suggest their importance in assisting the host nation government and counterinsurgent forces. Their successful establishment, training, and employment demonstrate the importance of several prerequisites including partnership with an advisory force, consent of the host nation’s government to exist, and that the security force is accountable to the local civil authority. Without these prerequisites, the local, irregular security force could risk illegitimacy in the eyes of the populace, the host nation government, and the counterinsurgent. However, partnership does not guarantee a local irregular force’s success. The host nation’s involvement in the decision to build irregular forces is important from the beginning of the campaign. Through the examination of archival research and primary source interviews associated with the British experience in North-West Frontier and the Dhofar region of Oman, one can start to understand the prerequisites needed to create a successful mentorship force. The paper examines the method of partnership, selection and traits of the advisors, and the host nation government’s role in building the Punjab Irregular Force and Frontier Corps in the North-West Frontier in India, the firqat in Dhofar, and the Sons of Iraq.

Explores suicide bombers in Iraq between 2003 and 2007. It discusses the ideology, mythology, and strategy of martyrdom, including why foreign fighters become suicide terrorists.