Countering Al Qaeda in Iraq: "Collaborative Warfare" in Action

Journal of Politics and Law, 2012

How is the current United States (US) counterterrorism (CT) strategy suited to combat the evolving threat posed by the Al Qaeda terrorist network? Although in some respects the US CT strategy has delivered the intended results of its sponsors, a number of events in the past several years demand that the US government reorients particular aspects of its approach to transnational terror in order to stay ahead of its adversary in the global war on terror (GWOT). Multilateral and multifaceted traits of the US CT strategy underscores the need to maintain and develop new and effective partnerships with institutions, organizations, and overseas states; but until the US government begins to look at the GWOT -not in terms of big-war paradigm, but instead as new type of war characterized by global insurgency -Al Qaeda and the Global Silafi Jihad will continue to punch above the capacity of Western democracies to manage their position in the GWOT and stay ahead of the game. 152 mitigation and prevention.Although there are a number of collaborative efforts set in motion to allay the current threat matrix, that matrix has proven its capacity topunch above the US' weight in a number of areas and test the capacity of the US' adaptability in responding a global insurgency. As such, America needs to recast its mode of thought in terms of the threat of transnational terrorism in a manner that enables it to forecast the milieu of Al Qaeda aggression, and operate in a way that is more akin to the present-day trends and tactics of the network.

2017

Section 1228 of the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) states, "The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide for the conduct of an independent assessment of the effectiveness of the United States' efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda, including its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents since September 11, 2001." The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)) asked CNA to conduct this independent assessment. This document presents a summary of the results of that assessment.

The correlation of Iraq’s plunging violence in 2007 with rising force levels (the surge) and a new set of counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics offered a tempting recipe for success in irregular warfare. We begin with the overarching question: Did the implementation of U.S. COIN doctrine drive outcomes on the ground, or are there alternate explanations for these outcomes? That is, if correlation is not causation, then what else explains the course of the war in Iraq? To answer these questions, we introduce a specific analytical framework--describing the mechanisms which shift populations into differing degrees of insurgent or counterinsurgent behavior--to guide the selection of facts, topics, and subjects in the sections that follow, as well as to identify important open questions and data requirements needed to evaluate them. While we can't decisively evaluate the efficacy of COIN doctrine in Iraq here, it is important to realize that there are greatly different potential explanations for the actual conduct and course of the war, which furthermore differ by region. The main objective of this study is to show the existence and plausibility of different explanations, and also therefore, to add to the breadth of conceptual tools practitioners should understand when they find themselves thrown into irregular war.

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2006

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The American strategy to combat the 'Islamic State' rests on four pillars. The first is to conduct systematic air campaigns against the terrorists. The second involves increasing support for forces fighting the jihadists on the ground. The third is based on the strengthening of international cooperation in counter-terrorism operations. The fourth involves the provision of humanitarian aid to civilians displaced from the territories occupied by the jihadists. This article analyzes the assumptions, tactics, the most important decisions and actions of the

The United States has engaged in several years of war in Iraq against the Islamic State (IS) since launching Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve in October 2014. The United States estimates that they have killed more than 60,000 IS members, conducted more than 22,000 airstrikes and trained more than 100,000 security forces throughout Iraq. The successful U.S. campaign is in contrast to past operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere and is best encapsulated in the " by, with, and through " approach of letting Iraqis lead operations. This bottom-up approach is tactically successful but is short on strategy, opening the door for Iranian influence in Iraq. The United States is modeling other counterterror operations throughout the world on its Iraq success with other " build partner capacity " programs. Based on two years of fieldwork and interviews, this article examines both the tactical successes and policy implications of the U.S. successes against IS in Iraq.

The rise and expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, poses a serious threat to regional and global security. In response, on September 10, 2014, President Obama initiated a strategy to "degrade and destroy" ISIS through systematic airstrikes and local “partner forces” fighting on the ground. This strategy is based on three key assumptions: first, that ISIS is foreign to Iraq; second, that ISIS will eventually alienate Sunni Arabs; and finally, that Iraq's new government is more inclusive and can thus persuade Sunni Iraqis to break with ISIS and join hands with the government in Baghdad. In this Brief, David Siddhartha Patel explores the origins of each assumption and the reasons why they are not applicable in the present Iraqi political environment. Patel concludes by arguing that the inapplicability of these assumptions means that America's military re-engagement in Iraq -- this time against ISIS -- will be long and difficult. http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb87.html

2020

With continued expenditure of resources in counterinsurgent operations, there is need to determine the elements that bring about success. There is prevailing evidence of long-lasting conflicts whose issues lie with the lack of proper planning and analysis. This paper sought to identify ways in which counterinsurgency operations could be strengthened in light of changing tactics by insurgents. Using a qualitative research design based on literature review of insurgent conflicts around the world, it found that insurgencies cannot outlast governments and local security forces need to be at the forefront of any counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, it found that it was important to plan adequately over the targeted end goals prior to engaging in the conflict. In this way, the counterinsurgency would have a high chance of success. The research reviewed various insurgencies and found that incidents where the insurgents won mostly involved the latter reducing the legitimacy of the government and winning the support of the population. Therefore, the research has added to the body of knowledge on counterinsurgency operations. Keywords: insurgency, counterinsurgency, COIN, government, conflict, intelligence.