Classical Liberalism Against Populism

National Institute Economic Review, 2022

Much of the media coverage in relation to populism has focused either on populist moments like the Brexit vote or on populist leaders such as Donald Trump or Boris Johnson. Meanwhile, the academic literature on populism is divided between two broad approaches. First, an emphasis in economics on policy (e.g. Dornbusch and Edwards, 1992) and, second, an accentuation in political science on ideology (e.g. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Both approaches capture important aspects, including the rejection of orthodox monetary and fiscal policy positions and a repudiation not only of established elites but also of pluralism and some of the key institutions on which the rule of law and democracy depend. However, these perspectives risk under-exploring some of the long-term structural patterns that are political, economic and social all at once. They include the decline in voter turnout, the collapse of centreleft and centre-right political traditions, the rise in popular support for populist parties or candidates, the effects of deindustrialisation on long-term unemployment and of low wages on falling living standards as well as a sense of powerless and a loss of both community cohesion and identity. The roots of populism go deep and stretch back in time-the economic recessions in the 1980s and early 1990s and the structural upward shift in joblessness, the social crises of the 2000s and 2010s linked to fiscal retrenchment as well as cultural change and the resurgence of extremes such as nationalism and xenophobia (e.g. Aiginger, 2020). The electoral success of populists tends to be a symptom rather than the cause of populism, while the consequences of populist politics (and technocratic responses) are often further to divide countries along both older cultural and class lines as well as newer cleavages of education, age and assets. It is also the case that populist methods, such as the use of demagogic speech in public discussion and political debate, can be deployed by established elites and emerging insurgents alike. Establishment leaders from Margaret Thatcher to Tony Blair and David Cameron resorted to populist rhetoric in ways that were not entirely dissimilar to right-wing populist leaders from Silvio Berlusconi to Donald Trump and Boris Johnson or left-wing ones such as Venezuela's late President Hugo Chavez or the leaders of Syriza and Podemos in Europe. The demon of demagoguery besets democracy that is variously more liberal or more authoritarian (Pabst, 2019). This NIER Special Issue explores the complex phenomenon of populism and popular support for populists from a broad perspective of political economy (Guriev and Papaioannou, 2021). The twin focus is on the drivers of populism and the implications for democracy and the market economy. Although the various contributions differ in terms of their methodology or findings, they share a number of closely connected arguments. One argument is the importance of both formal structures and informal norms to support a functioning democracy, economy and society. Another argument relates to the need for existing political and economic systems to address the grievances underpinning the appeal of populists. A third argument is that populism claims to defend democracy against 'corrupt' and 'unaccountable' elites, but, in reality, it tends to advance authoritarianism, undermines the institutions of representative government and fails to help the most vulnerable groups in society.

Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism, 2023

In this short chapter the first counterstrategy to fight back against populists, both on the left and on the right, is presented. I argue that many supporters of populism are neither aware of the deliberate manipulation that lies behind the strategies used by populists, nor the negative consequences that follow for society at large, for democracy, and in the end for the supporters of the populists themselves. Hence, it is necessary to expose the populist strategies and to explain their consequences.

Springer eBooks, 2021

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The Forum, 2016

Populism undoubtedly has a long history in the politics of the US, and there is no doubt that populism has significantly affected American politics in a variety of ways. However, what exactly is meant by “populism” is frequently ambiguous and ill-defined. Political commentators routinely label individuals or ideas as populist, without even attempting to explain how and why the person or idea in question relates to populism. Scholars are not immune to acting in a similar fashion. Populism’s presence is more often asserted than demonstrated in any convincing way. Here I engage in a thorough examination of the substance of populism in American politics. All elements of American populism – its championing of the common people, it rural roots, its anti-elitism, anti-intellectualism, and anti-government views, and its religious and cultural dimensions – will be explored. The paper closes with an attempt to suss out the place of populism in contemporary American politics.

2020

Populism has been a term of abuse in the English language since it was first coined in the late nineteenth century. But as soon as it entered the political vocabulary of the day, “populism” and “populists” are swiftly appropriated by those discontent with the socioeconomic conditions of the age. In 1892, the Omaha Platform inaugurates the People’s Party of America (or, Populist Party). Four years later, one of the contenders of the 1896 United States Presidential election, Democrat William Jennings Bryan, runs for office with a ticket with a Populist in-print. Over a century later, populism is still very much a term of abuse. Today’s “populist revolt”, punctuated by figures and movements such as US President Donald J. Trump, Brexit, President Jair Bolsonaro from Brazil, Spain’s Podemos party or Greece’s SYRIZA, is a wave of discontent whose figureheads are as much vilified as they are capable of attracting a following of die-hard enthusiasts.

Populism, 2023

The difficulty of defining populism is well-known. As populism lacks a fully articulated ideological foundation, it tends to assume different shapes according to context. Due to this ideological inarticulation, some scholars have rejected the so-called ideational approach to populism. They instead propose its conceptualization as a political style or discourse. This paper advances an alternative approach. We reject the opposition between stylistic and ideational approaches to populism and develop the idea that the form and the content of populism are intrinsically related. We argue that the forms populism adopts cannot be understood in merely strategic or stylistic terms: they presuppose and entail specific ideological contents. Only by tracing the relationship between populist form and content can we make sense of populism as a distinctive phenomenon and explain its ambiguous relationship with liberal democracy.

This article formulates precise questions and 'rules of engagement' designed to advance our understanding of the role populism can and should play in the present political conjuncture, with potentially significant implications for critical management and organization studies and beyond. Drawing on the work of Ernesto Laclau and others working within the post-Marxist discourse theory tradition, we defend a concept of populism understood as a form of reason that centres around a claim to represent 'the people', discursively constructed as an underdog in opposition to an illegitimate 'elite'. A formal discursive approach to populism brings with it important advantages. For example, it establishes that a populist logic can be invoked to further very different political goals, from radical left to right, or from progressive to regressive. It sharpens too our grasp of important issues that are otherwise conflated and obfuscated. For instance, it helps us separate out the nativist and populist dimensions in the discourses of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Trump or the Front National (FN). Our approach to populism, however, also points to the need to engage with the rhetoric about populism, a largely ignored area of critical research. In approaching populism as signifier, not only as a concept, we stress the added need to focus on the uses of the term 'populism' itself: how it is invoked, by whom, and to what purpose and effect. This, we argue, requires that we pay more systematic attention to anti-populism and 'populist hype', and reflect upon academia's own relation to populism and anti-populism.

Economy and Society, 2017

Populism is often thought to mark a sharp break with liberal democracy. But to what extent is this the case? In this contribution the connections between populism and liberal democracy are sketched in the context of several areas where discussions about populisms have stressed their discontinuity with the liberal democratic tradition and its practices. The discussion concentrates upon the notions of the people, their representation, elites, constitutional issues and economic policies. In each case it is suggested that continuities are as strong, and sometimes stronger, than discontinuities in these relationships. The contribution ends with a discussion of how it might be possible to defend liberal democracy from a non-liberal position in the face of the critique from populisms.

This chapter argues that despite the proverbial claim that populism is ill-defined and has too broad a conceptual net, the literature on the subject tends to converge toward four core elements of populism that provides a conceptual and analytical unity. Furthermore, the conceptual core of populism explains why the concept has been able to encompass a wide range of populist manifestations without becoming an empty analy- tical shell. Also, the conceptual cores have helped provide the empirical basis that has given rise to a diverse and innovative literature that seeks to measure and compare cross-nationally populism.

Populism, 2024

This article outlines three provocations to shake up the comfort zone of populism studies. These are: that populism may have become an anachronism and we should think about moving on; that populism may work better as a term of derision, as democracy was for the ancient Greeks; that we should describe it as a historical phenomenon, something that happened in the mid-twentieth century but is no longer current. So, my suggestion to populism scholars is to drop the term, use it to disqualify opponents, or refer to it as something that happened some time ago.