The Field of Meaning: A Conditional Theory of Consciousness

The integrated information theory (IIT) is one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. It functions as a guiding framework for a great deal of research into the neural basis of consciousness and for attempts to develop a consciousness meter. In light of these developments, it is important to examine whether its foundations are secure. This article does just that by examining the axiomatic method that the architects of IIT appeal to. I begin by asking what exactly the axiomatic method involves, arguing that it is open to multiple interpretations. I then examine the five axioms of IIT, asking: what each axiom means, whether it is indeed axiomatic and whether it could constrain a theory of consciousness. I argue that none of the five alleged axioms is able to play the role that is required of it, either because it fails to qualify as axiomatic or because it fails to impose a substantive constraint on a theory of consciousness. The article concludes by briefly sketching an alternative methodology for the science of consciousness: the natural kind approach.

Everybody knows what consciousness is: it is what vanishes every night when we fall into dreamless sleep and reappears when we wake up or when we dream. Thus, consciousness is synonymous with experience -any experience -of shapes or sounds, thoughts or emotions, about the world or about the self. It is also common knowledge that our consciousness depends on certain parts of the brain. For example, the widespread destruction of the cerebral cortex leaves people permanently unconscious (vegetative), whereas the complete removal of the cerebellum, even richer in neurons, hardly affects con-

Synthese, 2020

In this paper I argue that the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness has an underlying emergentist metaphysics, specifically of a kind that has received minimal attention and we may call functionalist emergentism. I will try to show that in this scientific theory conscious experience is a functional-role property possessed by the whole system, not by their parts, which is dependent on, but also (purportedly) causally powerful over and above, the properties of the parts. However, I will argue that depicting conscious experience as a functional-role emergent property threatens the whole coherence of the theory because, by definition, functional-realizers do all the causal work associated with the instantiation of any functional-role property on any occasion. Hence, to preserve the causal power of consciousness, which, as we will see, is one of the fundamental building blocks of the theory, linked to the assertion of the very existence of consciousness, phenomenal properties should be rethought as realizers of the relevant informationally integrated causal-roles.. Finally, I would like to thank ANID-Chile (ex CONICYT) for a three-year doctoral scholarship that allowed me to do much of the research presented in the present article.

PLoS Computational Biology, 2014

This paper presents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness 3.0, which incorporates several advances over previous formulations. IIT starts from phenomenological axioms: information says that each experience is specific -it is what it is by how it differs from alternative experiences; integration says that it is unified -irreducible to noninterdependent components; exclusion says that it has unique borders and a particular spatio-temporal grain. These axioms are formalized into postulates that prescribe how physical mechanisms, such as neurons or logic gates, must be configured to generate experience (phenomenology). The postulates are used to define intrinsic information as ''differences that make a difference'' within a system, and integrated information as information specified by a whole that cannot be reduced to that specified by its parts. By applying the postulates both at the level of individual mechanisms and at the level of systems of mechanisms, IIT arrives at an identity: an experience is a maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS, a constellation of concepts in qualia space), and the set of elements that generates it constitutes a complex. According to IIT, a MICS specifies the quality of an experience and integrated information W Max its quantity. From the theory follow several results, including: a system of mechanisms may condense into a major complex and non-overlapping minor complexes; the concepts that specify the quality of an experience are always about the complex itself and relate only indirectly to the external environment; anatomical connectivity influences complexes and associated MICS; a complex can generate a MICS even if its elements are inactive; simple systems can be minimally conscious; complicated systems can be unconscious; there can be true ''zombies'' -unconscious feed-forward systems that are functionally equivalent to conscious complexes.

PHIL 721 - Pelton - Briefing notes for presentation on Bayne, "On the Axiomatic Foundations of the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness", 2018

My notes / outline for a presentation I did on Tim Bayne's 2018 article, "On the Axiomatic Foundations of the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness." The presentation was for an advanced graduate seminar on the science of consciousness. PHIL 721: Advanced Seminar in Philosophy: The Science of Consciousness. Fall 2018. Professor Andrew H. Peterson. Course information: https://philosophy.gmu.edu/courses/phil721/course_sections/37704 Professor bio: https://philosophy.gmu.edu/people/apeter31 COURSE DESCRIPTION: This seminar explores the philosophical foundations of the science of consciousness. The seminar will engage such questions as: What evidence is sufficient for the ascription of consciousness to an entity? What are the various scientifically informed theories of consciousness on offer? And what ethical issues arise in the scientific study of consciousness? Students will explore these questions in both the philosophical and scientific literatures. The seminar is recommended for students interested in the scientific study of consciousness, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of neuroscience, and neuroethics. ABSTRACT (quoted directly from Bayne's article): Bayne, Tim. "On the Axiomatic Foundations of the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness." Neuroscience of Consciousness, vol. 2018, no. 1, 2018. "The integrated information theory (IIT) is one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. It functions as a guiding framework for a great deal of research into the neural basis of consciousness and for attempts to develop a consciousness meter. In light of these developments, it is important to examine whether its foundations are secure. This article does just that by examining the axiomatic method that the architects of IIT appeal to. I begin by asking what exactly the axiomatic method involves, arguing that it is open to multiple interpretations. I then examine the five axioms of IIT, asking: what each axiom means, whether it is indeed axiomatic and whether it could constrain a theory of consciousness. I argue that none of the five alleged axioms is able to play the role that is required of it, either because it fails to qualify as axiomatic or because it fails to impose a substantive constraint on a theory of consciousness. The article concludes by briefly sketching an alternative methodology for the science of consciousness: the natural kind approach" (Bayne 1). How should the study of consciousness proceed?

This is an attempt at linking consciousness, information, meaning and understanding. My purpose is to build bridges between the way the natural sciences and mathematics have dealt with the problem of consciousness and information, on the one hand, and the way in which the social sciences and the humanities deal with the problem of meaning. It is based upon Penrose's theory of consciousness as non-computable decision making.

Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Reasearch, 2024

Starting with previously introduced definition of information as a vector of concepts we extend it to a matrix. The diagonal elements of the matrix are identical to the original concepts of the vector and represent pure reactions, while the off-diagonal elements are correlators of concepts and represent associations. While transformation of information within a particular nervous system occurs due to numerous internal (biological, psychological, behavioral, individual history, and etc.) factors we nevertheless can consider all these factors as a combined force acting on information and causing its change. Thus we define consciousness as a matrix operator acting on matrix of information. Under adiabatic approximation we derive a Schrodinger-type equation governing dynamics of consciousness and information. In equilibrium (calm, normal) state all new information falls into expected range. When deviation from equilibrium state exceeds some critical value the system becomes unstable (alert, concerned) and resolves the instability by creating a new concept, which is a phase transition. We also suggest that feelings correspond to a partial loss of consciousness and mathematically represented by off-equilibrium values of correlators of concepts.

Cognitive neuroscience provides us with both clues and paradoxes about the neural substrate of consciousness. For example, we know that certain corticothalamic circuits are essential for conscious experience, whereas cerebellar circuits are not, despite their huge numbers. We also know that consciousness wanes during slow-wave sleep and generalized seizures, despite levels of neural activity that are comparable to wakefulness. To understand why this is so, empirical observations must be related to a theory that says, in a principled manner, what consciousness is and how it can be generated. This chapter introduces the integrated information theory. Starting from phenomenology and making a critical use of thought experiments, the theory claims that consciousness is integrated information. Specifically, (1) the quantity of consciousness is given by the amount of integrated information generated by a complex of elements, and (2) the quality of experience, such as the “redness” of red, is given by the set of informational relationships within that complex. Integrated information (symbol, Φ) is defined as the amount of information generated by causal interactions within a complex of elements, above and beyond the information generated independently by its parts. Qualia space (symbol, Q) is a space where each axis represents a possible state of the complex, each point is a probability distribution of its states, and arrows between points represent the informational relationships generated by causal interactions among its elements. Together, the set of informational relationships within a complex specifies a shape in Q that in turn specifies a particular experience. Several observations concerning the neural substrate of consciousness fall naturally into place within the integrated information framework.

2023

This paper aims to assess whether the recently proposed "inner screen model" of consciousness that follows from the free-energy principle (FEP) can be regarded as a minimal unifying model (MUM) of consciousness, thereby providing a common foundational model for consciousness studies, and integrating approaches to consciousness based on the FEP. We first present the inner screen model, which follows from applying the quantum information theoretic version of the FEP to the known sparse (nested and hierarchical) neuroanatomy of the brain. We then review models of consciousness that are premised on the FEP. Specifically, we review Bayesian versions of the global workspace and attention schema theories, theories premised on world-models and self-models, and models formalizing the computational structure and properties of time-consciousness. We then discuss how extant FEP-theoretic models of consciousness can be situated with respect to the candidate MUM.

MA dissertation