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Tudor Baetu

Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, Philosophie et arts, Faculty Member

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I am working on conceptual issues in the Philosophy of Biology, Medicine and Psychology, and their ramifications in Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Cognitive Science and Health Care Policy. These include the nature of pain experience, the epistemology of multidisciplinary research and biopsychosocial approaches in science and medicine, the epistemology and metaphysics of causal-mechanistic explanations, the explanatory role of mathematical models and computer simulations, patterns of reasoning in experimental science, extrapolation and generalization in the life sciences, concepts of the gene, and species concepts.

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Papers by Tudor Baetu

Informational Models of the Phenomenon of Consciousness and the Mechanistic Project in Neuroscience

Erkenntnis, Mar 8, 2024

I argue that informational models of consciousness, including those proposed by the Integrated In... more I argue that informational models of consciousness, including those proposed by the Integrated Information Theory, don&#39;t presuppose or entail any particular view about the physical or metaphysical nature of consciousness. Such models only tell us how certain properties of consciousness can be mathematically described, thus providing a quantitative characterization of the phenomenon of consciousness that may contribute to the development of new methods of assessment and guide the explanatory project by supplying additional constraints on theoretical proposals. While informational models are in principle compatible with multiple physical interpretations, a preliminary argument in favour of the continuity between informational approaches and the mechanistic project in neuroscience can be made based on historical precedents.

Applying EBM epistemology and the GRADE system to address practitioners' disagreements in medical malpractice allegations during COVID‐19 pandemic

Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, Oct 10, 2023

Rationale: The GRADE system of clinical recommendations has deontic implications and can discrimi... more Rationale: The GRADE system of clinical recommendations has deontic implications and can discriminate between mandatory, prohibited, and merely permitted medical decisions. Aims and Objectives: The recommendation categories of the GRADE framework map onto deontological imperatives that can lead to a better understanding and management of allegations of imprudence and appropriateness of treatments. Allegations made during the worst phase of COVID-19 pandemic are used as a case study for exploring the deontic implications of GRADE.

Applying EBM epistemology and the GRADE system to address practitioners' disagreements in medical malpractice allegations during COVID-19 pandemic

Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 2023

Rationale: The GRADE system of clinical recommendations has deontic implications and can discrimi... more Rationale: The GRADE system of clinical recommendations has deontic implications and can discriminate between mandatory, prohibited, and merely permitted medical decisions. Aims and Objectives: The recommendation categories of the GRADE framework map onto deontological imperatives that can lead to a better understanding and management of allegations of imprudence and appropriateness of treatments. Allegations made during the worst phase of COVID-19 pandemic are used as a case study for exploring the deontic implications of GRADE.

Informational Models of the Phenomenon of Consciousness and the Mechanistic Project in Neuroscience

Erkenntnis, 2024

I argue that informational models of consciousness, including those proposed by the Integrated In... more I argue that informational models of consciousness, including those proposed by the Integrated Information Theory, don't presuppose or entail any particular view about the physical or metaphysical nature of consciousness. Such models only tell us how certain properties of consciousness can be mathematically described, thus providing a quantitative characterization of the phenomenon of consciousness that may contribute to the development of new methods of assessment and guide the explanatory project by supplying additional constraints on theoretical proposals. While informational models are in principle compatible with multiple physical interpretations, a preliminary argument in favour of the continuity between informational approaches and the mechanistic project in neuroscience can be made based on historical precedents.

Disruption of NF-κB Signaling Reveals a Novel Role for NF-κB in the Regulation of TNF-Related Apoptosis-Inducing Ligand Expression

Journal of Immunology, Sep 15, 2001

Activation and transdominant suppression of MHC class II and HLA-DMB promoters by a series of C-t... more

The Problem of Hard and Easy Problems

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

David Chalmers advocates the view that the phenomenon of consciousness is fundamentally different... more David Chalmers advocates the view that the phenomenon of consciousness is fundamentally different from all other phenomena studied in the life sciences, positing a uniquely hard problem that precludes the possibility of a mechanistic explanation. In this paper, I evaluate three demarcation criteria for dividing phenomena into hard and easy problems: functional definability, the puzzle of the accompanying phenomenon, and the first-person data of subjective experience. I argue that none of the proposed criteria can accurately discriminate between the phenomenon of consciousness and mechanistically explainable phenomena.

Disruption of NF-κB Signalling Reveals a Novel Role for NF-κB in the Regulation of TNF-Related Apoptosis-Inducing Ligand Expression

The Problem of Hard and Easy Problems

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2023

David Chalmers advocates the view that the phenomenon of consciousness is fundamentally different... more David Chalmers advocates the view that the phenomenon of consciousness is fundamentally different from all other phenomena studied in the life sciences, positing a uniquely hard problem that precludes the possibility of a mechanistic explanation. In this paper, I evaluate three demarcation criteria for dividing phenomena into hard and easy problems: functional definability, the puzzle of the accompanying phenomenon, and the first-person data of subjective experience. I argue that none of the proposed criteria can accurately discriminate between the phenomenon of consciousness and mechanistically explainable phenomena.

A mechanistic guide to reductive physicalism

European Journal for Philosophy of Science

In Defence of an Inferential Account of Extrapolation

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2021

According to the hypothesis-generator account, valid extrapolations from a source to a target sys... more According to the hypothesis-generator account, valid extrapolations from a source to a target sys-tem are circular, since they rely on knowledge of relevant similarities and differences that can only be obtained by investigating the target, thus removing the need to extrapolate; hence, ex-trapolative reasoning can only be useful as a method for generating hypotheses. I reject this view in favour of an inferential account, focused on extrapolations underpinning the aggregation of experimental results, and explore two lines of argumentation supporting the conclusion that these extrapolations can be validated in a noncircular manner. The first argument relies on formal proofs of inferential validity demonstrating that it is possible to reason from prior knowledge of causal structures in order to determine whether a claim can be extrapolated. The second argument builds on the fact that the hypothesis-generator account overlooks key inferential and experi-mental practices resulting in progressively better-informed extrapolations.

Do Biopsychosocial Causal Models Rule Out Physicalism?

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2022

Donald Price and James Barrell, two eminent pain researchers, argue that every time an experiment... more Donald Price and James Barrell, two eminent pain researchers, argue that every time an experiment demonstrates that a biological variable is causally relevant to a psychological outcome, we are entitled to further rule out a possible mind–brain identity or supervenience relationship. As experimental evidence for two-way causal links between biological and psychological variables accumulates, more and more identity and supervenience relationships are ruled out, suggesting that psychophysicalism is empirically better supported than physicalism. I raise an objection to this line of argumentation by pointing out that, in the studies in question, causation is established within an operationalized framework; that is, irrespective of whether one knows what exactly is being manipulated and measured and how the intervention and measurement techniques work. By itself, evidence for causal relevance doesn't demonstrate that to each manipulated variable corresponds an ontologically distinct ...

Extrapolation in Biomedical Research: A Multi-Model Perspective

Inferential Pluralism in Causal Reasoning from Randomized Experiments

Acta Biotheoretica, 2022

Causal pluralism can be defended not only in respect to causal concepts and methodological guidel... more Causal pluralism can be defended not only in respect to causal concepts and methodological guidelines, but also at the finer-grained level of causal inference from a particular source of evidence for causation. An argument for this last variety of pluralism is made based on an analysis of causal inference from randomized experiments (RCTs). Here, the causal interpretation of a statistically significant association can be established via multiple paths of reasoning, each relying on different assumptions and providing distinct elements of information in favour of a causal interpretation.

Pain in Psychology, Biology and Medicine: Some Implications for Pain Eliminativism

Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2020

An analysis of arguments for pain eliminativism reveals two significant points of divergence betw... more An analysis of arguments for pain eliminativism reveals two significant points of divergence between assumptions underlying biomedical research on pain and assumptions typically endorsed by eliminativist accounts. The first concerns the status of the term 'pain,' which is a description of a phenomenon, rather than an explanatory construct. The second concerns reductive explanation: pain is explained causally, in terms of mechanisms or factors that produce or determine it, rather than by identifying it with a physical structure, process or mechanism. These discrepancies undermine several arguments for pain eliminativism.

Do biopsychosocial causal models rule out physicalism

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2022

Donald Price and James Barrell, two eminent pain researchers, argue that every time an experiment... more Donald Price and James Barrell, two eminent pain researchers, argue that every time an experiment demonstrates that a biological variable is causally relevant to a psychological outcome, we are entitled to further rule out a possible mind-brain identity or supervenience relationship. As experimental evidence for two-way causal links between biological and

Inferential Pluralism in Causal Reasoning from Randomized Experiments

Acta Biotheoretica, 2022

Causal pluralism can be defended not only in respect to causal concepts and methodological guidel... more Causal pluralism can be defended not only in respect to causal concepts and methodological guidelines, but also at the finer-grained level of causal inference from a particular source of evidence for causation. An argument for this last variety of pluralism is made based on an analysis of causal inference from randomized experiments (RCTs). Here, the causal interpretation of a statistically significant association can be established via multiple paths of reasoning, each relying on different assumptions and providing distinct elements of information in favour of a causal interpretation.

In Defence of an Inferential Account of Extrapolation

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2021

According to the hypothesis-generator account, valid extrapolations from a source to a target sys... more According to the hypothesis-generator account, valid extrapolations from a source to a target sys-tem are circular, since they rely on knowledge of relevant similarities and differences that can only be obtained by investigating the target, thus removing the need to extrapolate; hence, ex-trapolative reasoning can only be useful as a method for generating hypotheses. I reject this view in favour of an inferential account, focused on extrapolations underpinning the aggregation of experimental results, and explore two lines of argumentation supporting the conclusion that these extrapolations can be validated in a noncircular manner. The first argument relies on formal proofs of inferential validity demonstrating that it is possible to reason from prior knowledge of causal structures in order to determine whether a claim can be extrapolated. The second argument builds on the fact that the hypothesis-generator account overlooks key inferential and experi-mental practices resulting in progressively better-informed extrapolations.

The Virtues and Limitations of Randomized Experiments

Acta Analytica, 2021

Despite the consensus promoted by the Evidence Based Medicine framework, many authors con-tinue t... more Despite the consensus promoted by the Evidence Based Medicine framework, many authors con-tinue to express doubts about the superiority of Randomized Controlled Trials. This paper evalu-ates four objections targeting the legitimacy, feasibility, and extrapolation problems linked to the experimental practice of random allocation. I argue that random allocation is a methodologically sound and feasible practice contributing to the internal validity of controlled experiments dealing with heterogeneous populations. I emphasize, however, that random allocation is solely designed to ensure the validity of causal inferences at the level of groups. By itself, random allocation can-not enhance test precision, doesn’t contribute to external validity, and limits the applicability of causal claims to individuals.

Causal inference in biomedical research

Biology & Philosophy, 2020

Causation can be inferred by two distinct patterns of reasoning, each requiring a distinct experi... more Causation can be inferred by two distinct patterns of reasoning, each requiring a distinct experimental design. Common, non-statistical causal inference is associated with controlled experiments in basic biomedical research. Statistical inference is associated with Randomized Controlled Trials in clinical research. The main difference between the two patterns of inference hinges on the satisfaction of a comparability requirement, which is in turn dictated by the nature of the objects of study, namely homogeneous vs. heterogeneous populations of biological systems. This distinction entails that the objection according to which randomized experiments fail to provide better evidence for causation because randomization cannot guarantee comparability is mistaken. As far as the validity of the statistical inference is concerned, randomization is not required in order to ensure comparability, but rather to prevent systematic bias which may compromise the accuracy of the intervention.

Pain in psychology, biology and medicine: Some implications for pain eliminativism

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2020

An analysis of arguments for pain eliminativism reveals two significant points of divergence betw... more An analysis of arguments for pain eliminativism reveals two significant points of divergence between assumptions underlying biomedical research on pain and assumptions typically endorsed by eliminativist accounts. The first concerns the status of the term 'pain,' which is a description of a phenomenon, rather than an explanatory construct. The second concerns reductive explanation: pain is explained causally, in terms of mechanisms or factors that produce or determine it, rather than by identifying it with a physical structure, process or mechanism. These discrepancies undermine several arguments for pain eliminativism. challenge the assumption that biomedical research assumes an identity model of explanation. Instead, I argue, scientific inquiry aims to explain the phenomenon of pain by elucidating its causal mechanisms. If mechanism and pain stand in a relationship of cause and effect, then it is not clear how pain could be identified with or replaced by its causal mechanisms. Section 5 covers arguments from conceptual inconsistencies of pain concepts and definitions. I argue that these inconsistencies can be resolved if the concepts and definitions in question are