Phenotypic Theory

American Anthropologist, 1998

Race is generally used as a synonym for subspecies, which traditionally is a geographically circumscribed, genetically differentiated population. Sometimes traits show independent patterns of geographical variation such that some combination will distinguish most populations from all others. To avoid making "race" the equivalent of a local population, minimal thresholds of differentiation are imposed. Human "races" are below the thresholds used in other species, so valid traditional subspecies do not exist in humans. A "subspecies" can also be defined as a distinct evolutionary lineage within a species. Genetic surveys and the analyses of DN A haplotype trees show that human "races" are not distinct lineages, and that this is not due to recent admixture; human "races" are not and never were "pure." Instead, human evolution has been and is characterized by many locally differentiated populations coexisting at any given time, but with sufficient genetic contact to make all of humanity a single lineage sharing a common evolutionary fate, [race, subspecies, lineage, haplotype tree, genetic differentiation}

Current Genomics, 2005

Abstract: The idea that all humans naturally belong to one of a few biological types or races that evolved in isolation was unchallenged for centuries, but large-scale modern studies failed to associate racial labels with recognizable genetic clus-ters. Recently, the conclusions of ...

Anatomical Record (New Anat), 2004

The matter of biological differentiation among human beings has been a perennial concern of physical anthropologists, whose profession grew out of the monogenist/polygenist debates of the eighteenth century, and who periodically feel impelled to issue sonorous pronouncements on the subject. In spite of – and perhaps because of – the extensive and difficult cultural ramifications of the race issue, such pronouncements have usually presented race as a matter that requires extensive bioanthropological exegesis. In reality, however, race is the most banal of biological issues. Within any species, including Homo sapiens, two biological processes are possible: physical differentiation, as routinely occurs in small population isolates; and reintegration, should the resulting differentiated populations come together in the absence of any barrier to mating. The history of Homo sapiens reflects both of these processes: initial differentiation among small, scattered populations in the later part of the Pleistocene; and subsequent reintegration as the human species expanded in number and such populations came together once more. It is for this reason that, while certain modal physical types can be recognized on any urban street today (differentiation), it is impossible to recognize any clear boundaries between them (reintegration). All of this is perfectly unremarkable in evolutionary terms, and requires no special explanation. The complexities of the race issue are real, of course, and it is important that we come to terms with them. But they will not be resolved by biologists.

American Anthropologist, 1998

There are hereditary differences among human beings. Some of these differences have geographical correlates. Some genetic variants that produce physical or behavioral deficits occur significantly more often in some areas, or in some ethnic groups, than in others. However, none of these facts provides any intellectual support for the race concept, for racial classifications, or for social hierarchies based on ethnic-group membership. The geographical element of the race concept is important in theory but is widely ignored in practice since it does not conform well to the facts of current human phenotype distribution. Much of the literature on supposed racial differences involves such geographically meaningless exercises as studying differences among "races" by subdividing a sample of North Americans. If races are defined as geographically delimited conspecific populations characterized by distinctive regional phenotypes, then human races do not exist now and have not existed for centuries, [race, human variation, intelligence]

Routledge eBooks, 2019

Race and Human Diversity is an introduction to the study of human diversity in both its biological and cultural dimensions and the various meanings of race. Robert L. Anemone examines the biological basis of human difference and how humans have biologically and culturally adapted to life in different environments. The book discusses the history of the race concept, evolutionary theory, human genetics, and the connections between racial classifications and racism. It invites students to question the existence of race as biology, but to recognize race as a social construction with significant implications for the lived experience of individuals and populations. This second edition has been thoroughly revised, with new material on human genetic diversity, developmental plasticity, and epigenetics. There is additional coverage of the history of eugenics; race in US history, citizenship, and migration; affirmative action; and white privilege and the burden of race. Fully accessible for undergraduate students with no prior knowledge of genetics or statistics, this is a key text for any student taking an introductory class on race or human diversity.

Recently, sociologists have argued in high-profile journals that racial categories are linked to genetically distinct clusters within the human population. They propose theorizing race as a socially constructed categorization system that is related to biological groupings within our species. This work overlooks, however, the extent to which statistically inferred genetic clusters are themselves socially constructed, making it impossible to juxtapose ‘subjective’ social categories with ‘objective’ biological ones. This editorial urges social scientists to take a critical look at claims about the genetic underpinnings of race, and to contribute their insights to ongoing debates about the nature of race.

Human biology, 2014

2009

The use of 'race' as a variable in biomedical research is facilitated by embedding ordinary concepts of race in particular scientific domains. The dissertation articulates a process for how this can happen. The process has two parts: 1. Finding and 2. Founding a concept in a scientific context. The results of this process are called "found science" by analogy to found art. Chapter 1 TOOLS draws distinctions between different race concepts following those of Michael Hardimon and Sally Haslanger. These distinctions are used to analyze a selection of the critical discourse on the use of race variables in biomedicine. Chapter 2 SYMPTOMS asks a 'dummy' question: "Should race be used to approximate medically interesting human genetic variation?" Answers to this question offered by Michael Root, Abdallah Daar and Peter Singer and Ian Hacking are analyzed. The analysis demonstrates that a. understandings of "race" vary, b. responses to normative questions vary in relation to these understandings and c. there is a pattern regarding what type of race concept is used in what context to argue for what normative claims. This suggests an underlying process at work. How can context-specific normative demands be met by one and the same race concept? They cannot. xvi Rather there is a process whereby an ordinary concept-even one as tainted as 'race'-may come to fit a context of science. This process is defined by analogy to how common objects get to be art in Chapter 3 DIAGNOSIS. The case of "race"-usage in biomedical genetics is then analyzed as a case of "found science". I apply the frame in two genetics studies (Rosenberg et al 2002 and Tang et al 2005) to show that 'race' as used in the context of these studies is a founded concept: it is an ordinary race concept founded in a genetics context and found to behave as a concept of 'genetic ancestry' would. Appendices to the dissertation include A1 Background genetics knowledge, A2 Analysis of discussion articles in the biomedical literature, A3 OMB race/ethnicity categories as founded concepts in the context of demography and A4 a RECIPE for Found Science. 12 An account of all four of Hardimon's notions is in "On the Ontology of Race", Hardimon (ms1), though Hardimon (2003) focuses on "The Ordinary Concept of Race" and Hardimon (ms2) on "The Idea of a Scientific Concept of Race". The distinction between a concept and conceptions of the concept is discussed in Hardimon (2003) following Tyler Burge and others. The same concept can be multiply articulated and these different articulations are referred to as particular conceptions of the concept. Here Hardimon proposed different concepts of race. Others may disagree as to his particular articulation of say, the ordinary, racialist, biological concepts and so would propose different conceptions for these concepts.