Basic Operations of Model Building in Literary Studies

HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies, 1991

The key characteristic of a model... is that it is, before all else, a speculative instrument. It may take the form of a descriptive outline, or it may be an inductive-even a deductive-generalization. But whatever it is, it is first and foremost a framework of reference, consciously used as such, to enable us to cope with complex data ... Each model presents an alternative view of reality. Indeed, the whole purpose of employing a model may be to check whether the novel view of reality which it provides adds to our understanding of that reality. (Carney 1975:9) 4.1 Orientation While due note has been taken of the utilization of social-scientific concepts and models by New Testament scholars (cf chapter 2 above), the point of departure of the present study is taken from, and the design of an appropriate model is based on, primary sources from the field of the social sciences. The social sciences developed the concept of the model as their characteristic instrument for procuring and processing research data. Elliott (1986:3), however, warns that the undifferentiated use of words such as 'metaphor', 'example', 'analogy', 'illustration', 'symbol', or even 'paradigm', as synonyms for 'model', results in terminological confusion. This has the effect of compromising the social-scientific study of the New Testament. It is therefore important not only to heed Elliott's warning, but also to support his effort at the clarification of the concept of 'model'. While this study professes itself to be a social-scientific one, an explication of what the concept 'model' entails is indispensable. In the next section we shall apply our attention to that end. Chapter 4 will be devoted to a discussion of the research process as explicated by Riley (1963) and Miller (1964), to the construction of a model 152 HTS Supplementum 4 (1991)

Springer eBooks, 2017

Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, 2021

Roman Frigg and James Nguyen present a detailed statement and defense of the fiction view of scientific models, according to which they are akin to the characters and places of literary fiction. They argue that while some of the criticisms this view has attracted raise legitimate points, others are myths. In this chapter, they first identify and then rebut the following seven myths: (1) that the fiction view regards products of science as falsehoods; (2) that the fiction view holds that models are data-free; (3) that the fiction view is antithetical to representation; (4) that the fiction view trivializes epistemology; (5) that the fiction view cannot account for the use of mathematics in the modeling; (6) that the fiction view misconstrues the function of models in the scientific process; and (7) that the fiction view stands on the wrong side of politics. As a result, they conclude that the fiction view of models, suitably understood (as an account of the ontology of models, rather than their function), remains a viable position.

Phenomenology and Mind, 2018

The method of building simplified formal models of phenomena under study is widespread in contemporary natural and social science; much scientific progress consists in the provision of better models. A model-building methodology has also been used with success in analytic philosophy, for example by Carnap in his development of intensional semantics. Arguably, philosophers have overlooked how much progress their discipline has made through their failure to conceive it in model-building terms. By using the method more extensively, they can overcome the fragility to error inherent in the naive falsificationist methodology on which many analytic philosophers rely.

The Monist, 2016

In this paper we explore the constraints that our preferred account of scientific representation places on the ontology of scientific models. Pace the Direct Representation view associated with Arnon Levy and Adam Toon we argue that scientific models should be thought of as imagined systems, and clarify the relationship between imagination and representation.

year: 2004, 2004

In an ongoing effort to better understand the process of creating models (in particular formal ones), we present a fundamental view of the process of modelling. We base this view on the idea that participants in such a process are involved in a deliberate and goal-driven effort to share and reconcile representations of their personal conceptions of (parts of) the world. This effort takes the shape of a modelling dialogue, involving the use of controlled language. We thus take a fundamental approach to subjective aspects of modelling, as ...

British Journal of Aesthetics

What do the following social practices have in common: children playing with dolls houses or Lego bricks and scientists building and using models to examine how the world works? More than one might think, according to a fascinating new book by Adam Toon. Scientists spend a lot of time building, using and revising models of di erent parts of the world, from subatomic particles to the solar system, world history or the international system (if you count social scientists such as this reviewer). So what models are, and how they represent the world, is in many ways an important question. Adam Toon in Models as Make-Believe o ers a lucid and stimulating argument that deserves to be read widely, inside as well as outside philosophy. Although he concentrates on models in the natural sciences, his argument potentially pertains to knowledge production aimed at global challenges such as climate change and managing the world economy, where modelling is central. The following presents this reviewers' understanding of the key argument and suggests some implications for how we should view and treat models.

The Monist, 2016

Thinking of models in science as fictions is said to be helpful, not merely because models are known or assumed to be false, but because work on the nature of fiction helps us understand what models are and how they work. I am unpersuaded. For example, instead of trying to assimilate truth-in-a model to truth-in-fiction we do better to see both as special and separate cases of the more general notion truth-according-to-a-corpus. Does enlightenment go the other way? Do we better understand fiction's capacity to generate knowledge by thinking of it as a kind of modelling? If we see, as we should, fictions and models are parts of larger patterns of cognitive activity that include institutional frameworks, the best answer is no.

Synthese, 2017

This paper presents an artifactual approach to models that also addresses their fictional features. It discusses first the imaginary accounts of models and fiction that set model descriptions apart from imagined-objects, concentrating on the latter :251–268, 2010; Frigg and Nguyen in The Monist 99:225–242, 2016; Godfrey-Smith in Biol Philos 21:725–740, 2006; Philos Stud 143:101–116, 2009). While the imaginary approaches accommodate surrogative reasoning as an important characteristic of scientific modeling, they simultaneously raise difficult questions concerning how the imagined entities are related to actual representational tools, and coordinated among different scientists, and with real-world phenomena. The artifactual account focuses, in contrast, on the culturally established external representational tools that enable, embody, and extend scientific imagination and reasoning. While there are commonalities between models and fictions, it is argued that the focus should be on the fictional uses of models rather than considering models as fictions.

This international conference of the DFG-funded research network "Model Aesthetics: Between Literary and Economic Knowledge" takes place at the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies, Freie Universität Berlin (July 04-06, 2024). Organized by James Dorson (dorson@zedat.fu-berlin.de). https://model-aesthetics.com/model-imaginaries/