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Title
Abstract
Language and Mental Life: The Case of Inner Speech
Conclusion and Directions of Research
References
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Psychology
Cognitive Science

Linguistic tools for embodied minds

Profile image of Felice CimattiFelice Cimatti

2012, Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio

https://doi.org/10.4396/20120704
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16 pages

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Abstract

In this paper, we outline the embodied perspective of language comprehension indicating some of its limitations. We claim that the notions of language as a tool , might be useful to overcome a view focused only on referential aspects of language. Words, in quality of tools, can: a. facilitate communication among speakers; b. influence categorization; c. have a different impact on concrete and abstract words; d. allow us to construct an inner speech. Finally, we discuss how thinking about language as tool can help inform future research on thought, language and body.

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Marc Slors

Frontiers in Psychology

Two recurrent concerns in discussions on an embodied view of cognition are the “necessity question” (i.e., is activation in modality-specific brain areas necessary for language comprehension?) and the “simulation constraint” (i.e., how do we understand language for which we lack the relevant experiences?). In the present paper we argue that the criticisms encountered by the embodied approach hinge on a cognitivist interpretation of embodiment. We argue that the data relating sensorimotor activation to language comprehension can best be interpreted as supporting a non-representationalist, enactivist model of language comprehension, according to which language comprehension can be described as procedural knowledge – knowledge how, not knowledge that – that enables us to interact with others in a shared physical world. The enactivist view implies that the activation of modality-specific brain areas during language processing reflects the employment of sensorimotor skills and that language comprehension is a context-bound phenomenon. Importantly, an enactivist view provides an embodied approach of language, while avoiding the problems encountered by a cognitivist interpretation of embodiment.

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  • Computer Science
  • Embodied Cognition
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