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Outline

Title
Abstract
Introduction
Brief Overview of Iranian Cyber Organizations
Conclusion
References
All Topics
Political Science

Punching Above Their Digital Weight

Profile image of Ralph P Martins Jr.Ralph P Martins Jr.

2020, IGI Global eBooks

https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-2466-4.CH054
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15 pages

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Abstract

This article describes how in recent years, Iran has joined the top ranks of the world powers in cyberspaceandhasdemonstratedtheabilitytoleveragecyberwarfareasasignificanttoolinitsarsenal forpursuingitsnationalsecuritygoals.Whilethisincreaseincyberpowerisrelativelyrecent,some oftheincidentsandeventsthatserveasthecatalystforthesuddendigitalsurgegobackdecades.The reasonsfortheseincreasedcapabilitiesrevolvearoundhistoricmeansofpowerprojection,defense andpreservationoftheprinciplesoftheIranianRevolution,responsetoWesternaggressionand Iraniannationalism.Thisarticleexplorestheseideologicaldriversandeventstoprovidecontextfor theirtrajectoryandanalysisoftheirlikelyimplications.

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Doç. Dr. Ali Burak DARICILI

2nd İSTANBUL BOSPHORUS INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBERPOLITICS AND CEYBERSECURITY, MAY 11-14 2018, Dragos - İstanbul, PROCEEDINGS BOOKLET, 2018

Cyber space-centered technological developments has been beginning to be seen as a new opportunity by states to develop their military capacities. In this context, the states have made considerable efforts to develop their cyber security strategies for defense and offensive purposes especially after the 2000s. The cyber space that we can call as a human-made digital area is dominated by the United States (USA), the Russian Federation (RF) and the People's Republic of China (PRC), which are the dominant forces in the international system, together with the plans, strategies and technologies they have developed so far. Within this systemic structure, which I generally and abstractly convey, Iran, like many other regional power states, efforts to develop her cyber security capacity, especially in the direction of attack. It is also clear that Iran is stepping up her efforts after the 2010 Stuxnet Attack, which is allegedly prepared by the USA and Israel, and which targets her nuclear power development program. From a theoretical point of view, the claim that the attack is superior to the defense in cyberspace has been on the agenda for a long time in cyber security studies. In this respect, it should also be considered in this agenda that the USA, which has a highly developed cyber defense and attack capacity, points out Iran, which is a weak cyber force compared to the US, with official security documents as a serious cyber threat. Despite the absence of dominant actors in the international system such as the US, RF or PRC, Iran has been seriously developing her capacity for especialyy cyber attacks with measures taken after 2010. In this respect, despite the relatively low economic efficiency and the decline in technology production relative to the dominant actors, Iran is an important regional cyber force in the international system, and as such can be considered as a practical example of the claim that attack is superior to defense in cyber space. In this context, the study will first evaluate the theoretical claim that the attack is superior to the defense in cyber space. Following the theoretical framework, the Iranian cyber security strategy will be analyzed, especially with a focus on the Keywords: Iran, Cyber Security, Cyber Space. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ÖZET Siber uzay merkezli teknolojik gelişmeler günümüzde devletler tarafından askeri kapasitelerini geliştirme noktasında yeni bir fırsat olarak görülmeye başlanmıştır. Bu kapsamda devletler özellikle 2000’li yıllar sonrasında siber güvenlik stratejilerini savunma ve saldırı amaçlı olarak geliştirmek adına ciddi gayret içerisinde olmuşlardır. İnsan eliyle yapılmış dijital bir alan olarak adlandırılabileceğimiz siber uzayı, uluslararası sistemin başat güçleri konumunda olan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD), Rusya Federasyonu (RF) ve Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti (ÇHC)’nin ortaya koydukları planlamalar ve stratejiler ile birlikte geliştirdikleri teknolojilerle domine ettikleri ileri sürülebilecektir. Genel ve soyut olarak aktardığımı bu sistemik yapı içerisinde diğer pek çok bölgesel güç konumunda ki devlet gibi İran da siber güvenlik kapasitesini özellikle saldırı yönünde geliştirmeye gayret etmektedir. İran’ın bahse konu gayretlerinin ise ABD ve İsrail tarafından hazırlandığı iddia edilen ve nük| 53 leer güç geliştirme programını hedef alan 2010 tarihli Stuxnet Saldırısı sonrasında hızlandığı da açıktır. Teorik açıdan bakıldığında ise saldırının siber uzayda savunmaya karşı üstün olduğu şeklindeki iddia, siber güvenlik çalışmalarında öteden beri gündemde bulunmaktadır. Bu itibarla ABD gibi siber savunma ve saldırı kapasitesi son derece gelişmiş olan bir devletin kendisine kıyasla zayıf bir siber güç olan İran’ı açıkça ciddi bir siber tehdit olarak resmi güvenlik belgelerinde işaret etmesi de bu gündem kapsamında ele alınmalıdır. Bu çerçevede ABD, RF veya ÇHC gibi uluslararası sistemde başat bir aktör olmamasına rağmen İran’ın 2010 yılından sonra aldığı tedbirler ile siber saldırı kapasitesini ciddi olarak artırdığı ortadadır. Bu itibarla da söz konusu başat aktörlere göre göreli düşük ekonomik etkinliği ve teknoloji üretiminde ki geriliğine rağmen İran, uluslararası sistemde önemli bir bölgesel siber güç konumundadır ve bu haliyle de siber uzayda saldırının savunmaya karşı üstünlüğü iddiasının pratik bir örneği olarak ele alınabilir. Bu bağlamda çalışmada öncelikle siber uzayda saldırının savunmaya karşı üstün olduğu şeklindeki teorik iddia irdelenecektir. Teorik çerçevenin ardından ABD’nin İran’a yönelik siber tehdit algılamaları ele alınarak İran’ın siber güvenlik stratejisi özellikle 2010 Stuxnet Saldırı sonrası döneme odaklanmak suretiyle analiz edilecektir. Anahtar Kelimeler: İran, Siber Güvenlik, Siber Uzay.

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The Evolution of Iranian Cyber Warfare
Jonathan Disegi

Paper on evolution of Iran's cyber warfare capabilities, institutions; key attacks on the United States and allies; security implications for the US. Written for Dynamics of Cyber Conflict course at Columbia SIPA

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ANALYSIS OF IRAN'S CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY WITH REGARD TO THE ATTACK AND THE DEFENSE CAPACITY
Doç. Dr. Ali Burak DARICILI

Turkish Studies Social Sciences, 2019

The Stuxnet Virus was released in June 2010 and has affected Iran's nuclear facilities in Bushehr and Natanz. It was claimed that the United States of America (USA) and Israel secret services together have a role in the planning of this cyber-attack. Following this cover activity, also known as Operation Olympic Games in the literature, Iran considered the need to take serious measures in the field of cyber security and aimed to reach an effective cyber security capacity in cyber space with the investments made in 2010. As it is seen, Iran's plans to develop a cyber security strategy were realized within the scope of an action-reaction relation through a retaliation reflex after the mentioned attack to the nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, Iran's efforts to improve its cyber security capacity, which began with a motivation for retaliation in the first place, turned into a goal to make Iran a strong actor in cyberspace with the measures taken in the following periods. On the other hand, Iran has serious efforts to improve its cyber security strategy especially in terms of attack. One of the most important reasons for this is that Iran has a low level of technology development and use. More precisely, the fact that a significant part of critical infrastructure is still controlled by mechanical technologies provides Iran a natural advantage in terms of cyber defense. Iran, which has started to invest in the cyber-attack capacity instead of defense after 2010 with this advantage, has achieved its effective position in cyberspace today. As a result, it can be argued that Iran has introduced more serious plans in the field of cyber security than in the past after Stuxnet Attack. Keywords: Iran, Stuxnet Virus, Cyber Space, Cyber Attack, Cyber Defense ------------------------------------------ ÖZ Stuxnet Virüsü, Haziran 2010 yılında açığa çıkmış ve İran'ın Buşehr ve Natanz'daki nükleer tesislerini etkilemiştir. Bu siber saldırının planlanmasında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ve İsrail gizli servislerinin birlikte rol oynadıkları iddia edilmiştir. Literatürde Olimpiyat Oyunları Operasyonu (Operation Olympic Games) olarak da bilinen bu örtülü faaliyet akabinde İran, siber güvenlik alanında ciddi tedbirler alması gerektiğini anlayarak, 2010 yılı sonrası yaptığı yatırımlar ile birlikte siber uzayda etkili bir siber güvenlik kapasitesine ulaşmayı hedeflemiştir. Görüldüğü üzere İran’ın siber güvenlik stratejisini geliştirmeye yönelik planlamaları, nükleer tesislerine yönelik söz konusu saldırı sonrasında bir etki-tepki ilişkisi kapsamında misilleme refleksi ile gerçekleşmiştir. Bununla birlikte ilk etapta bir misilleme motivasyonu ile başlayan İran’ın siber güvenlik kapasitesini geliştirmeye yönelik gayretleri, ilerleyen dönemlerde alınan tedbirlerle İran’ı siber uzayda güçlü bir aktör haline getirme hedefine dönüşmüştür. Öte yandan İran siber güvenlik stratejisini özellikle saldırı yönünden geliştirme noktasında ciddi gayret sarf etmektedir. Bunun en önemli nedenlerinden biri İran’ın teknoloji geliştirme ve bunu kullanma noktasında düşük seviyede olmasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Daha net bir ifadeyle kritik altyapılarının önemli bir kısmının hala mekanik teknolojiler ile kontrol ediliyor olması, İran’a siber savunma yönünden doğal bir avantaj sağlamaktadır. Bu avantajı ile birlikte savunmadan ziyade siber saldırı kapasitesine 2010 yılı sonrasında yatırım yapmaya başlayan İran, siber uzayda günümüzdeki etkili konumuna ulaşmıştır. Sonuç olarak, Stuxnet Atağı akabinde İran’ın siber güvenlik alanında geçmişe kıyasla daha ciddi planlamalar ortaya koyduğu iddia edilebilir. Bu iddia kapsamda makalemizde Stuxnet Atağı sonrasında atılan adımlar ile birlikte özellikle siber saldırı kapasitesi hızla gelişen İran’ın siber güvenlik stratejisi ve bu stratejide rol oynayan kurumsal yapılanmaları analiz edilecek, ayrıca İran tarafından gerçekleştirildiği iddia edilen siber ataklar irdelenecektir. Anahtar Kelimeler: İran, Stuxnet Virüsü, Siber Uzay, Siber Saldırı, Siber Savunma

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