Israeli Democracy and Identity under Attack

The publication of these two volumes within the same year-and they were not alone-is evidence of the growing field of Israel studies. Both of the volumes are collections of original essays by prominent social scientists and historians, and both volumes focus on the increasing cleavages, stresses and strains in Israeli society. The volume by Kemp, Newman, Ram, and Yiftachel has a distinct conflict perspective, while that by Dowty cannot be pidgeon-holed into any single theoretical or ideological framework. The volume by Dowty seeks to reconcile universalist and Jewish traditions in Israeli life; the volume by Kemp et al. has an underlying universalistic perspective, and many of the essays display little appreciation of Jewish tradition. Space and time limitations render it unfeasible to discuss the 15 essays in the former and the 11 in the latter. Indeed, there is food for thought in each. Israelis in Conflict has a definite post-Zionist cast to it, in both the subject matter of the majority of its essays and, even more clearly, in the language and perspective in which these and the larger society are described and analyzed. The authors of the articles, most of whom are social scientists at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, argue that the notion of an Israeli corporate social identity is a creation of the dominant element in Israeli society whose objective is to silence the marginalized groups, such as Bedouins, Palestinians, new immigrants, Palestinian women, and black African workers, among others. In the main, these groups, then, are the subjects of the articles. The concluding article, by Uri Ram, places the growing divisions, conflicts, and challenges in theoretical perspective, and he proposes a "glocal" model-the term and concept emerged during the 1990s, and points to the significance of both global and local elements-to analyze the developments which have reshaped Israeli society since the 1970s. For the first several decades of Israeli statehood, Ram avers, the "rhetoric of nation-building and state-formation in Israel incorporated a self-image of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state." From the onset, according to him, this was actually "a pretension" and one that, by the 1970s, became increasingly difficult to maintain because of increasing intra-Jewish conflicts between adherents of secular liberal law and Halakhah, as well as international struggles between Israeli Jews and Arabs on issues of basic civil rights. Since the 1970s, Israeli nationalism has been pulled, changed and shaped by two diametrically opposite trends, neo-Zionism and post-Zionism. The former emerged in the 1970s and has, as its core, the settlers and their supporters among the right-wing nationalists. It is, Ram asserts, "exclusionary, nationalist and even racist and

Journal of Peace Research, 2010

This study focuses on the relationship between national identity and intractable conflict. Abdelal's definition of collective identity that refers to the level of agreement regarding the purposes, practices, relational comparisons with other entities, and narratives that define collective identity was adapted to national identity during intractable conflict and was later applied to Israel's national identity. A review of the Israeli 1969-2006 election platforms shows that in the 1980s and 1990s significant changes occurred in Israel's national identity. The most significant changes included: changes regarding the territorial purpose of Israeli identity; changes in practices on who may become an Israeli citizen; changes of perception of the relationship between Israel and the Arabs; and a growing Israeli acceptance of Palestinian identity. Since 2000, following the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, some components of Israeli national identity have reverted to their original form. The study indicates that the Arab-Israeli conflict triggered changes in Israel's national identity, but the conflict also seemed affected by changes in that identity. The article connects the changes in Israeli national identity to specific mechanisms and conditions of conflict resolution and reconciliation.

Ethnicities Journal , 2013

This article seeks to demonstrate how discriminatory laws, passed in Israel since the eruption of the second intifada, are part of an ongoing securitization process of the Palestinian minority in Israel. These discriminatory laws serve as part of a security practice, employed by political elites that seek to represent threats to the hegemony of the Jewish identity as existential to national security. In doing so, the Israeli authorities advance a national security policy which perpetuates the perceived threat posed to the state by the Palestinian minority. The analysis focuses on discriminatory legislation passed between 2000 and 2012 by the Israeli Knesset and the political attitudes of the Israeli public before and after the second intifada to uncover the ways in which political actors and audiences negotiate the meaning of security in Israel. Securitization theory helps explain why desecuritization of the minority is highly unlikely even in the event that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be resolved.

I.Con , 2024

The Israeli government’s controversial initiative to instigate sweeping judicial reforms, conceived in early 2023, gave rise to an unprecedented opposition movement. So intense was the public pushback that the initiative sharpened existing conflicts, bringing old and new schisms to the surface. One primary stakeholder in the judicial reform initiative, had it proved even partially successful, was the Palestinian-Arab minority. However, this minority was virtually absent from the protests and the deliberations that took place to work out a compromise between the two camps. Referencing the theory and practice of “democratic deficit,” this article explains this striking absence by drawing attention to the fact that the “democratic deficit” that so concerns the Palestinian-Arabs is endemic in the constitutional order that the pro-reform camp wanted to see strengthened, and one that the anti-reform camp would have settled for maintaining. Being against the proposed reforms but simultaneously unwilling to join forces with the public anti-reform pushback, the Palestinian-Arabs thus constituted a “third camp” in Israel’s constitutional upheaval. The article traces the consolidation of this “third camp” and highlights why its positioning as such has constituted the Palestinian-Arab minority as a distinct group that, in contexts predating the constitutional upheaval of 2023, has mounted, and continues to mount, unique challenges to Israel’s constitutional order.

This growing delegitimization, characterized by a profound, fundamental hostility to Israel, could exacerbate Israel’s standing in the international arena, negatively affect its political and military freedom of action, and perhaps even damage its economy. Therefore, the topic is relevant to the country’s national security and requires a systemic response. The delegitimization phenomenon relies on a conceptual infrastructure and a network of groups and activists located in many countries around the world. It is marked by sweeping criticism of Israel’s policies as well as political, cultural, and economic activism against Israel. The boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement has succeeded in disseminating an idea that is multidimensional (academic, economic, legal, cultural, diplomatic, and media-related) to political and public spheres in the West.