Towards Decision Support in Reciprocation

Network Science, 2013

A wide variety of networked systems in human societies are composed of repeated communications between actors. A dyadic relationship made up of repeated interactions may be reciprocal (both actors have the same probability of directing a communication attempt to the other) or non-reciprocal (one actor has a higher probability of initiating a communication attempt than the other). In this paper we propose a theoretically motivated index of reciprocity appropriate for networks formed from repeated interactions based on these probabilities. We go on to examine the distribution of reciprocity in a large-scale social network built from trace-logs of over a billion cell-phone communication events across millions of actors in a large industrialized country. We find that while most relationships tend toward reciprocity, a substantial minority of relationships exhibit large levels of non-reciprocity. This is puzzling because behavioral theories in social science predict that persons will sel...

2009

Evolution, 2012

lack the information or cognitive skills needed for other types of reciprocity. Yet, generalized reciprocity is anonymous and thus defenseless against exploitation by defectors. Recognizing that animals hardly ever interact randomly, we investigate whether social network structure can mitigate this vulnerability. Our results show that heterogeneous interaction patterns strongly support the evolution of generalized reciprocity. The future probability of being rewarded for an altruistic act is inversely proportional to the average connectivity of the social network when cooperators are rare. Accordingly, sparse networks are conducive to the invasion of reciprocal altruism. Moreover, the evolutionary stability of cooperation is enhanced by a modular network structure. Communities of reciprocal altruists are protected against exploitation, because modularity increases the mean access time, that is, the average number of steps that it takes for a random walk on the network to reach a defector. Sparseness and community structure are characteristic properties of vertebrate social interaction patterns, as illustrated by network data from natural populations ranging from fish to primates.

International Journal of Modern Physics C, 2006

Research in network science has shown that many naturally occurring and technologically constructed networks are scale free, that means a power law degree distribution emerges from a growth model in which each new node attaches to the existing network with a probability proportional to its number of links (=degree). Little is known about whether the same principles of local attachment and global properties apply to societies as well. Empirical evidence from six ethnographic case studies shows that complex social networks have significantly lower scaling exponents γ ∼ 1 than have been assumed in the past. Apparently humans do not only look for the most prominent players to play with. Moreover cooperation in humans is characterized through reciprocity, the tendency to give to those from whom one has received in the past. Both variables -reciprocity and the scaling exponent -are negatively correlated (r = −0.767, sig = 0.075). If we include this effect in simulations of growing networks, degree distributions emerge that are much closer to those empirically observed. While the proportion of nodes with small degrees decreases drastically as we introduce reciprocity, the scaling exponent is more robust and changes only when a relatively large proportion of attachment decisions follow this rule. If social networks are less scale free than previously assumed this has far reaching implications for policy makers, public health programs and marketing alike.

Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining, 2013

Understanding the dynamics of reciprocation is of great interest in sociology and computational social science. The recent growth of Massively Multi-player Online Games (MMOGs) has provided unprecedented access to large-scale data which enables us to study such complex human behavior in a more systematic manner. In this paper, we consider three different networks in the EverQuest2 game: chat, trade, and trust. The chat network has the highest level of reciprocation (33%) because there are essentially no barriers to it. The trade network has a lower rate of reciprocation (27%) because it has the obvious barrier of requiring goods or money for exchange; morever, there is no clear benefit to returning a trade link except in terms of social connections. The trust network has the lowest reciprocation (14%) because this equates to sharing certain within-game assets such as weapons, and so there is a high barrier for such connections In general, we observe that reciprocation rate is inversely related to the barrier level in these networks. We also note that reciprocation has connections across the heterogeneous networks. Our experiments indicate that players make use of the medium-barrier reciprocations to strengthen a relationship. We hypothesize that lower-barrier interactions are an important component to predicting higherbarrier ones. We verify our hypothesis using predictive models for trust reciprocations with features from trade interactions. Incorporating the number of trades (both before and after the initial trust link) boosts our ability to predict if the trust will be reciprocated up to 11% with respect to the AUC. More generally, we see strong correlations across the different networks and emphasize that network dynamics, such as reciprocation, cannot be studied in isolation on just a single type of connection.

Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 2015

Reciprocation and interchange of grooming and support may emerge as a consequence of the socio-spatial structure of the group through which individuals interact with certain partners more frequently than with others. This is shown in a computational model of grouping, fighting, and grooming, called Groofiworld. In this case, no specific mechanism of exchange is needed, such as described in calculated reciprocity or emotional bookkeeping. One of the drawbacks of this model, GroofiWorld, however, is that it lacks social bonding, a factor that may play an important role in real societies of primates. To investigate the effect of social bonding on exchange relations, in the present study, we add 'social bonding' to the model 'GrooFiWorld.' In the new model, called 'FriendsWorld,' social bonds or 'friends' are defined as the top 25 % grooming partners and individuals are given a tendency to follow their friends. Note that they do not intend to reciprocate or interchange social services with friends. Results show that this mechanism of 'follow-your-friends,' not only increases social interactions among top grooming partners, but also strengthens the patterns of reciprocation and interchange. Our findings suggest that, in real primates, reciprocation and interchange may emerge as a side-effect of the social-spatial structure of the group and subsequently be strengthened by social bonding as represented in FriendsWorld. We give predictions that distinguish between the mechanism of 'follow-your-friends' and emotional bookkeeping.

Theory and Decision, 2006

Reciprocity is a decisive behavioural rule resulting in successful co-operation or deterrence. In this paper, a dynamic model is proposed, where reciprocity is described by changes in altruistic (or malevolent) ties. Multiple steady states may exist in one of which there may be general cooperation (solidarity) and the other being one of universal malice (war of each individual against all

Physical Review E, 2014

Reciprocity is firmly established as an important mechanism that promotes cooperation. An efficient information exchange is likewise important, especially on structured populations, where interactions between players are limited. Motivated by these two facts, we explore the role of facilitators in social dilemmas on networks. Facilitators are here mirrors to their neighbors -they cooperate with cooperators and defect with defectorsbut they do not participate in the exchange of strategies. As such, in addition to introducing direct reciprocity, they also obstruct information exchange. In well-mixed populations, facilitators favor the replacement and invasion of defection by cooperation as long as their number exceeds a critical value. In structured populations, on the other hand, there exists a delicate balance between the benefits of reciprocity and the deterioration of information exchange. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations of social dilemmas on various interaction networks reveal that there exists an optimal interplay between reciprocity and information exchange, which sets in only when a small number of facilitators occupies the main hubs of the scale-free network. The drawbacks of missing cooperative hubs are more than compensated by reciprocity and, at the same time, the compromised information exchange is routed via the auxiliary hubs with only marginal losses in effectivity. These results indicate that it is not always optimal for the main hubs to become "leaders of the masses", but rather to exploit their highly connected state to promote tit-for-tat-like behavior.

Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009

We conduct online field experiments in large real-world social networks in order to decompose prosocial giving into three components: (1) baseline altruism toward randomly selected strangers, (2) directed altruism that favors friends over random strangers, and (3) giving motivated by the prospect of future interaction. Directed altruism increases giving to friends by 52 percent relative to random strangers, while future interaction effects increase giving by an additional 24 percent when giving is socially efficient. This finding suggests that future interaction affects giving through a repeated game mechanism where agents can be rewarded for granting efficiencyenhancing favors. We also find that subjects with higher baseline altruism have friends with higher baseline altruism.

Games and Economic Behavior, 2004

Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin (1993) develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His model, however, does not fare well when applied to situations with an interesting dynamic structure (like many experimental games), because it is developed for normal form games in which information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation is suppressed.