Perception, Representation, Realism, and Function

This paper discusses and compares Tyler Burge and Christopher Peacocke's accounts of representational contents of perception. (Content word count: 8319)

Fiorenza Toccafondi, ed. Filosofia e scienza. Punti d'incontro passati e presenti (Firenze, Le Lettere, 2012)

After a brief presentation of what I believe to be the main features of the modelling demarche in science, I will focus on the basic following question: how can an abstract entity – a model – possibly represent an existing observable entity, which is phenomenally accessible to us, but which is not abstract? This is what Bas van Fraassen calls “the loss of reality objection.” Instead of proposing a pragmatic dissolution of this objection as van Fraassen does, I will argue that scientific representing necessarily involves a homomorphism between structures and thus that, in a strict technical sense of representation, phenomena are not represented by our models but only as having some specific properties belonging to the domains of our representing structures. Yet, our contact with phenomenal entities is secured by propositions that are true in a correspondence sense. The truth of these – ontic – propositions which state that that phenomenal entities possess some precise properties are the soil on which the informative content of our successful representations rest.

Iyyun, 2013

The case of blurry vision has been cited by many as a counterexample to representationalism in the theory of perception. Specifically, it is claimed that the phenomenon of blurry vision is incompatible with the supervenience thesis which is at the root of representationalism. Michael Tye, a leading representationalist, has responded to such objections by giving an account of blurry vision in a way that, allegedly, renders it compatible with representationalism. In this paper I argue that Tye’s account of blurry vision, though blocking one line of objection, cannot save representationalism. I then assimilate cases of blurry vision as well as similar cases to the more general category of indeterminate experiences.

1 We focus on the visual case, leaving it to the reader to consider how the discussion generalizes to other modalities. 2 concerned how the transition from introspective beliefs to external--world beliefs could be rational. 2 In this entry, we assume without argument these positions are mistaken. We begin from the assumption that experiences (such as the one you have when you see the mustard) can justify external world beliefs about the things you see, such as beliefs that the mustard jar is in the fridge, and that the justification experience provides does not have to rely on justification for introspective beliefs. From now on, we often let it remain implicit that we are talking about external world beliefs, when we talk about the kind of beliefs that experiences justify. 3 Our main question is this: what features of experiences explain how they justify external world beliefs? The grammar of the question might suggest that experiences suffice all by themselves to provide justification for external world beliefs. But don't read this into the grammar of the phrase "experiences justify beliefs". We can distinguish between the claim that an experience can justify a belief that P, and the claim that an experience can justify a belief that P without help from other features it only contingently has. We clarify our question further in Part I, where we explain why we have chosen this point of departure, and highlight a range of theses about the role of experience in providing different types of justification. In Parts II and III, we consider the role of features of experience falling into two broad categories: constitutive features of experience, including its phenomenal character, its contents, its status as attentive or inattentive (sections 3--7); and causal features of experience such as its reliability, and the impact of other mental states on its formation (sections 8--10). Along the way, we discuss the relationships between visual experience and seeing (sections 1 and 8), and we contrast perceptual justification and perceptual knowledge (section 9).

Synthese, 2014

In Origins of Objectivity Burge advances a theory of perception according to which perceptions are, themselves, objective representations. The possession of veridicality conditions by perceptual states-roughly, non-propositional analogues of truth-conditions-is central to Burge's account of how perceptual states differ, empirically and metaphysically, from sensory states. Despite an impressive examination of the relevant empirical literatures, I argue here that Burge has not succeeded in securing a distinction between perception and "mere" sensation.

2012

Pe rc e P t i o n, r e a l i s m, a n d t h e P ro b l e m o f r e f e r e n c e one of the perennial themes in philosophy is the problem of our access to the world around us: do our perceptual systems bring us into contact with the world as it is, or does perception depend upon our individual conceptual frameworks? This volume of new essays examines reference as it relates to perception, action, and realism, and the questions which arise if there is no neutral perspective or independent way to know the world. The essays discuss the nature of referring, concentrating on the way perceptual reference links us with the observable world, and go on to examine the implications of theories of perceptual reference for realism, and the way in which scientific theories refer and thus connect us with the world. They will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of psychology, cognitive science, and action theory. www.cambridge.org

There seems to be some confusion in contemporary philosophy regarding the philosophy of perception, so here I elaborate on ideas that I see as entailed by science.