Papers by Alison Springle
Synthese, Feb 19, 2024
According to 'orthodox' representationalism, perceptual states possess constitutive veridicality ... more According to 'orthodox' representationalism, perceptual states possess constitutive veridicality (truth, accuracy, or satisfaction) conditions. Typically, philosophers who deny orthodox representationalism endorse some variety of anti-representationalism. But we argue that these haven't always been, and needn't continue to be, the only options. Philosophers including Descartes, Malebranche and Helmholtz appear to have rejected orthodox representationalism while nonetheless endorsing perceptual representations of a fundamentally practical kind not captured by orthodox representationalism. Moreover, we argue that the perceptual science called on by contemporary philosophers to defend orthodox representationalism instead motivates a return to this older view, and we suggest that contemporary philosophers may conceptualize fundamentally practical perceptual representations as 'de agendo' representations, a species of representation that has constitutive appropriateness rather than veridicality conditions.
The Method of Cases in Context
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Aug 8, 2019
metaphysical necessities. In particular, some ethicists and political philosophers have explicitl... more metaphysical necessities. In particular, some ethicists and political philosophers have explicitly rejected the need to identify principles that would determine, e.g. the permissible or the mandatory in every possible situation; instead they settle for principles applying to choices and situations occurring in the actual world . . . Such philosophical projects, which do not require knowing metaphysical necessities, are not the target of the present argument.’ (189). 5. Note that this is slightly different from the dogmatic thesis mentioned earlier – the condition of appropriate dogmatism here is knowledge rather than correctness.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2018
The goal of this paper is to illuminate the connections between agency, perception, subjectivity,... more The goal of this paper is to illuminate the connections between agency, perception, subjectivity, space and the body. Such connections have been the subject matter of much philosophical work. For example, the importance of the body and bodily action on perception is a growth area in philosophy of mind. Nevertheless, there are some key relations that, as will become clear, have not been adequately explored. We start by examining the relation between embodiment and agency, especially the dependence of agency on perception and the dependence of perception on agency. We also consider the nature of subjectivity itself: In virtue of what do humans and animals but not rocks and pencils have genuine perceptual and agentive intentional contents? We sketch a hylomorphic account of subjects and subjectivity, which highlights connections between the conclusions argued for in the previous sections and some basic principles of teleosemantics.
Philosophy of Science
Court cases involving sexual assault and police violence rely heavily on victim testimony. We con... more Court cases involving sexual assault and police violence rely heavily on victim testimony. We consider what we call the Traumatic Untrustworthiness Argument (TUA) according to which we should be skeptical about victim testimony because people are particularly liable to misremember traumatic events. The TUA is not obviously based in mere distrust of women, people of color, disabled people, poor people, and so forth. Rather, it seeks to justify skepticism on epistemic and empirical grounds. We consider how the TUA might appeal to the psychology and neuroscience of memory for empirical support. However, we argue that neither support the TUA.
Phenomenology: What’s AI got to do with it?
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Philosophy of Science, 2019
According to orthodox representationalism, perceptual states have constitutive veridicality or ac... more According to orthodox representationalism, perceptual states have constitutive veridicality or accuracy conditions. In defense of this view, several philosophers—most notably Tyler Burge—employ a realist strategy that turns on the purported explanatory ineliminability of representational posits in perceptual science. I argue that Burge’s version of the realist strategy fails as a defense of orthodox representationalism. However, it may vindicate a different kind of representationalism.
Philosophical Psychology, 2019
The acquisition of a skill, or knowledge-how, on the one hand, and the acquisition of a piece of ... more The acquisition of a skill, or knowledge-how, on the one hand, and the acquisition of a piece of propositional knowledge on the other, appear to be different sorts of epistemic achievements. Does this difference lie in the nature of the knowledge involved, marking a joint between knowledge-how and propositional knowledge? Intellectualists say no: All knowledge is propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists say yes: Knowledge-how and propositional knowledge are different in kind. What resources or methods may we legitimately and fruitfully employ to adjudicate this debate? What is (or are) the right way(s) to show the nature of the knowledge knowers know? Here too there is disagreement. I defend the legitimacy of the anti-intellectualist appeal to cognitive neuroscientific findings against a recent claim that anti-intellectualists conflate the scientific categories of procedural and declarative knowledge with the mental kinds of skill (knowledge-how) and propositional knowledge, respectively. I identify two kinds of arguments for this claim and argue that neither succeeds.
Inductive neutrality and scientific representation
Synthese
Synthese, 2021
Intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, and consequently that th... more Intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, and consequently that the knowledge involved in skill is propositional. In support of this view, the intentional action argument holds that since skills manifest in intentional action and since intentional action necessarily depends on propositional knowledge, skills necessarily depend on propositional knowledge. We challenge this argument, and suggest that instructive representations, as opposed to propositional attitudes, can better account for an agent’s reasons for action. While a propositional-causal theory of action, according to which intentional action must be causally produced “in the right way” by an agent’s proposition-involving reasons, has long held sway, we draw on Elizabeth Anscombe’s insights offer a path toward an alternative theory of action. In so doing, we reject the implicitly Cartesian conception of knowledge at the core of the intentional action argument, while hanging on to the idea that...
Philosophy as the Foundation of Knownledge Action Ethos, 2016
According to the tradition of most empiricists, perception is the basis for all our knowledge (at... more According to the tradition of most empiricists, perception is the basis for all our knowledge (at least of the world). The tradition also assumes that perception by humans is a passive activity resulting in some static states pertaining perception and belief, which are then, in some versions, modified by the mind before being passed onto memory and knowledge. Following the work of J. J. Gibson, we argue that perceiving involves many activities and actions. This is true of both visual as well as olfactory-taste perception. The main moral of this paper is that perceiving and knowing are best thought of not as involving static states, but rather as ongoing temporal activities involving change. This presumably means giving up a frozen ontology of states and moving towards something like a dynamic ontology as a basis.
Discussion of Susanna Siegel's “Can perceptual experiences be rational?”
Analytic Philosophy
A critical discussion of Susanna Siegel's "Can perceptual experiences be rationa... more A critical discussion of Susanna Siegel's "Can perceptual experiences be rational?", with her response. Co-authored with M. Chirimuuta, R. Rosenhagen, S. Siegel, D. Smithies and A. Springle.
Discussion of John McDowell's “Perceptual Experience and Empirical Rationality”
Analytic Philosophy
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Papers by Alison Springle