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The Self-Pattern and Buddhist Psychology

Profile image of Shaun GallagherShaun Gallagher

Mindfulness

https://doi.org/10.1007/S12671-023-02118-3
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Abstract

In this paper, we address core insights from Buddhist psychology about mind-body phenomena and the self, and we relate such insights to the notion of the self-pattern developed in the pattern theory of self. We emphasize the dynamic, temporal and enactive characteristics of the self-pattern, consistent with the core Buddhist notion of non-self. Although there is no one-to-one mapping of Buddhist psychological concepts onto the pattern theory of self, there are important similarities among such concepts and the various processes and dynamical relations that constitute a pragmatic self-pattern that can explain both experiences of self and non-self. Buddhist psychology and the notion of the self-pattern offer mutual insight into the processes, the dynamics, and the implications for questions about well-being and a flexibility that avoids anxiety and reduces attachment, craving, and suffering.

FAQs

sparkles

AI

How is the self-pattern defined in contrast to Western views of self?add

The study defines the self-pattern as a dynamic integration of ecological, interpersonal, and narrative factors. This contrasts with Western views that typically treat the self as a concrete substance.

What are the five aggregates and how do they relate to the self-pattern?add

The five aggregates are bodily, feeling, recognition, mental formations, and consciousness processes. They correspond to aspects of the self-pattern, showing interdependent contributions to self-experience.

How do the notions of non-self and self-pattern diminish attachment in Buddhist psychology?add

Buddhist psychology posits that clinging to transient aspects of the self-pattern reinforces suffering. Understanding non-self helps practitioners reduce attachment and enhance mental well-being through meditation.

What role does mindfulness play in modifying self-narrative according to the research?add

Mindfulness practices encourage flexibility in self-reference, allowing individuals to shift between narrative and experiential modes. This enhances awareness and can reduce negative self-perceptions.

In what way do the concepts of self-pattern and co-dependent origination converge?add

Both concepts emphasize dynamic interdependencies among mind-body processes, indicating a lack of a fixed self. This reflects the cyclic causality that sustains self-consciousness and identity.

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