Political and Cultural Studies

Background: March 2011 marked the 50th anniversary of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. This legal instrument, the bedrock of the current United Nations based global drug control regime, is often viewed as merely a consolidating treaty bringing together the multilateral drug control agreements that preceded it; an erroneous position that does little to provide historical context for contemporary discussions surrounding revision of the international treaty system. Method: This article applies both historical and international relations perspectives to revisit the development of the Convention. Framing discussion within the context of regime theory, a critique of the foundational pre-1961 treaties is followed by detailed content analysis of the official records of the United Nations conference for the adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and, mindful of later treaties, an examination of the treaty's status as a 'single' convention. Results: The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs represents a significant break with the regulative focus of the preceding multilateral treaties; a shift towards a more prohibitive outlook that within international relations terms can be regarded as a change of regime rather than the straightforward codification of earlier instruments. In this respect, the article highlights the abolition of drug use that for centuries had been embedded in the social, cultural and religious traditions of many non-Western states. Further, although often-overlooked, the Convention has failed in its aim of being the 'single' instrument within international drug control. The supplementing treaties developed in later years and under different socio-economic and political circumstances have resulted in significant inconsistencies within the control regime. Conclusion: Having established that a shift in normative focus has taken place in the past, the article concludes that it is timely for the international community to revisit the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs with a view to correcting past errors and inconsistencies within the regime, particularly those relating to Scheduling and traditional drug use.

The employment of private military and security companies (PMSCs) to carry out government policies has grown exponentially over the past two decades.  Conventional explanations for this rise, such as cost-saving and down-sizing, do not appear convincing, given the evidence.  Instead, it seems national governments are paying a premium to enjoy two major benefits of outsourcing: secrecy and a lack of accountability.  Aerial fumigation of illicit crops in Colombia, backed financially, diplomatically and logistically by Washington, is a case in point.  The ineffective policy is of dubious legality, causes damage to people and the environment, and would, if carried out by US military forces, imply the direct involvement of the US in Colombia’s civil war, thereby triggering the application of international law as it applies to armed conflict.  Moreover, there is substantial evidence suggesting that fumigation, while failing in its officially declared goals, does achieve strategic objectives for Washington and Bogota through the displacement of the rural population from areas of insurgent influence.  For Colombia, the presence of foreign contractors has implied a significant undermining of national sovereignty. In addition, it has removed any viable recourse for citizens subject to human rights violations by contractors - whether during the course of fumigation operations or otherwise.

ABSTRACT Faced with a complex range of drug related problems, a growing number of nations are exploring the development of nationally appropriate policies that shift away from the prohibition-oriented approach that has long dominated the field but is losing more and more legitimacy. In so doing, such countries must pay close attention to the UN based global drug control framework of which practically all nations are a part.This briefing paper outlines the international legal drug control obligations, the room for manoeuvre the regime leaves open to national policy makers and the clear limits of latitude that cannot be crossed without violating the treaties. It also covers the vast grey area lying between the latitude and limitations, including the legal ambiguities that are subject to judicial interpretation and political contestation.The paper applies the traffic light analogy to drug law reform in order to divide ongoing policy changes and emerging proposals into three categories regarding their legal tenability: red - stop or challenge the conventions; orange - proceed with caution; and green - please proceed.The present system of worldwide drug control is based upon three international conventions. These are the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.While the substance of the drug control conventions is complex, their function is simple. They provide the legal structure for an international system of drug control by defining control measures to be maintained within each state party to these conventions and by prescribing rules to be obeyed by these Parties in their relations with each other. These rules can be categorized by two principal methods of achieving drug control. These are commodity control (the definition and regulation of the licit production, supply and consumption of drugs) and penal control (the suppression through criminal law of illicit production, supply and consumption.)The conventions therefore operate with the intention of creating an appropriate balance between penal sanctions, the degree of real and/or potential harm associated with specific drugs and their therapeutic usefulness.The overarching concern for the ‘health and welfare of mankind’ expressed within the conventions’ preambles, required a dual goal: reducing the availability of drugs to prevent abuse and addiction that ‘constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind’, while at the same time ensuring adequate availability because their medical use is ‘indispensable for the relief of pain and suffering’.The global control system, established with that twin purpose, effectively ended the large-scale diversion of narcotic drugs like cocaine and heroin from pharmaceutical sources to illicit channels. However, it was unable to prevent the resulting rapid expansion of illicit production that began supplying the non-medical market instead.The tensions resulting from the inherent duality exacerbated as the system evolved based on the implicit principle that reducing availability for illicit purposes could only be achieved through the penal enforcement of predominantly prohibition oriented supply-side measures.The tightening of drug laws, escalation of law enforcement efforts and an actual ‘war on drugs’ against the illicit market, over time distorted the balance at the expense of the other side of the coin.Key Points: Decriminalization of possession, purchase and cultivation for personal use operates reasonably comfortably inside the confines of the UN drug control conventions; Harm reduction services, including drug consumption rooms, can operate lawfully under the drug control treaty system; There is greater scope to provide health care or social support instead of punishment for people caught up in minor offences related to personal use or socio-economic necessity; All controlled drugs can be used for medical purposes, including heroin prescription and ‘medical marijuana’; what constitutes medical use is left to the discretion of the parties; The INCB often increases tensions around interpretations instead of resolving them, though the Board should be guided ‘by a spirit of co-operation rather than by a narrow view of the letter of the law’; There are limits of latitude; a legal regulated market for non-medical use of cannabis or any other scheduled drug is not permissible within the treaty framework; Legal tensions exist with other international legal obligations such as those stemming from human rights or indigenous rights; Growing doubts and inherent inconsistencies and ambiguities provide legitimate ground for demanding more space for experimentation with alternative control models than the current systems allows.

The cannabis plant has been used for spiritual, medicinal and recreational purposes since the early days of civilization. In this report the Transnational Institute and the Global Drug Policy Observatory describe in detail the history of international control and how cannabis was included in the current UN drug control system. An increasing number of countries have shown discomfort with the treaty regime’s strictures through soft defections, stretching its legal flexibility to sometimes questionable limits. Today’s political reality of regulated cannabis markets in Uruguay, Washington and Colorado operating at odds with the UN conventions puts the discussion about options for reform of the global drug control regime on the table.

While often viewed as an obscure technical issue, the problem of scheduling lies at the core of the functioning of the international drug control system. Scheduling – the classification of a substance within a graded system of controls and restrictions, or 'schedules' – must take place in order for a substance to be included in the international control framework, and determines the type and intensity of controls to be applied. For this reason, the topic is of central importance.

La clasificación de las sustancias tiende a dar prioridad al enfoque represivo, ello a pesar de que hoy el debate sobre las drogas destaca cada vez más la necesidad de darle más peso al principio de la salud. La UNGASS de 2016 sobre drogas ofrece una oportunidad para replantear esta cuestión. Aunque suele considerarse una oscura cuestión técnica, el problema de la clasificación de las sustancias es uno de los puntos clave del funcionamiento del sistema de fiscalización internacional de drogas.

As jurisdictions enact reforms creating legal access to cannabis for purposes other than exclusively “medical and scientific,” tensions surrounding the existing UN drug treaties and evolving law and practice in Member States continue to grow. These treaty tensions have become the “elephant in the room” in key high-level forums, including the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs — obviously present, but studiously ignored.

How can the outcomes of international drug control policy be measured? Currently, the UN drug control system lacks appropriate metrics to do so. However, the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) offers a chance to find new – and potentially better – answers to this question.

Legal tensions are growing within the international drug control regime as increasing numbers of member states move towards or seriously consider legal regulation of the cannabis market for non-medical purposes. Amongst reform options not requiring consensus, inter se modification appears to be the most ‘elegant’ approach and one that provides a useful safety valve for collective action to adjust a treaty regime arguably frozen in time.