Papers by Ingrid Malm Lindberg
Metaphilosophy, 2024
Michael T. Stuart (2021 and 2022) has proposed imagination as an intellectual dual-process virtue... more Michael T. Stuart (2021 and 2022) has proposed imagination as an intellectual dual-process virtue, consisting of imagination1 (underwritten by cognitive Type 1 processing) and imagination2 (supported by Type 2
processing). This paper investigates the consequences of taking such an account seriously. It proposes that the dual-process view of imagination allows us to incorporate recent insights from virtue epistemology,
providing a fresh perspective on how imagination can be epistemically reliable. The argument centers on the distinction between General Reliability (GR) and Functional System Reliability (FSR), for example in relation to Kengo Miyazono and Uko Tooming's (2023) argument for epistemic generativity. Furthermore, the paper claims that the dual-process virtue account enables us to integrate a wide range of findings from the literature on epistemology and imagination. Moreover, it suggests a novel way to distinguish the virtues of creativity and imagination and presents a case for viewing imagination as a virtue rather than a skill.
The Revival of Alchemy: The Cumulative Creation of a Tradition
Beyond Babel: Religion and Linguistic Pluralism (Ed. A. Vestrucci) Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, vol 43. Springer, Cham., 2023
This chapter examines the tradition of alchemy as an example of a cumulative creation of past and... more This chapter examines the tradition of alchemy as an example of a cumulative creation of past and present. As an illustration, the text discusses the British revival of alchemy that occurred in the nineteenth- and beginning of the twentieth century. During this period, all branches of science saw major developments and expansions. In response to the crisis of faith that naturalistic science had brought about, alchemical practice became one of the ways in which subjects scientifically and spiritually rethought and repackaged the world. However, this wasn’t so much a static repetition of a fixed set of beliefs and practices as it was a creative reinvention of the tradition itself. By approaching the revival from a hermeneutic perspective, the article argues that this process entailed linguistic-historical contextualism, a fusion of horizons, as well as a continuous dialectic between a scientific and a spiritual conception of alchemy.
God and The Meanings of Life : What God Could and Couldn’t Do to Make Our Lives More Meaningful, 2016
Ingrid Malm Lindberg, 2021
Authors such as Ludwig Feuerbach (1841/1969) and Sigmund Freud (1907) have formulated critical vi... more Authors such as Ludwig Feuerbach (1841/1969) and Sigmund Freud (1907) have formulated critical views that stressed the connection between religion, imagination, illusion, and human wish fulfilment. However, on my account, the acknowledgment of imaginative elements in religion doesn't necessarily mean that religion is nothing but a product of our own consciousness. On the contrary, it is more or less a general understanding among contemporary scholars of religion that a significant degree of imagination is required when subjects form representations of a transcendent and sacred realm of reality (independently of whether or not they consider that realm to be metaphysically real). Among philosophers of religion, a common way of talking about religious imagination is to compare the propositional attitudes of belief and imagination. However, if we are to give a fair treatment of the phenomenon of religion, it is necessary that we-besides propositional imaginings-also consider how sensory, experiential, and creative imagination contributes to a religious way of making the world intelligible (Malm Lindberg 2021). Nonetheless, in this post I will limit my discussion to include only the categories of mental imagery (sensory imagination) and propositional imaginings. Visionary experiences and visualizations One interesting question concerns in what way (if any) that mental imagery is involved in the phenomena that we typically refer to as religious visionary experiences and visualizations. Although both of them involve a "seeing" of an invisible realm of reality, they do so in distinct ways. Generally, a vision is said to be spontaneous and unintended. Visualization, on the other hand, is described as a voluntary and active creation in the mind's eye. I argue, nonetheless, that in many cases of visionary experiences, it is more accurate to talk about an interaction between visualization and vision.
Religions, 2019
In this article, I examine the possible thought experimenting qualities of Søren Kierkegaard's no... more In this article, I examine the possible thought experimenting qualities of Søren Kierkegaard's novel Fear and Trembling and in which way (if any) it can be explanatory. Kierkegaard's preference for pseudonyms, indirect communication, Socratic interrogation, and performativity are identified as features that provide the narrative with its thought experimenting quality. It is also proposed that this literary fiction functions as a Socratic-theological thought experiment due to its influences from both philosophy and theology. In addition, I suggest three functional levels of the fictional narrative that, in different ways, influence its possible explanatory force. As a theoretical background for the investigation, two accounts of literary cognitivism are explored: Noël Carroll's Argument Account and Catherine Elgin's Exemplification Account. In relation to Carroll's proposal, I conclude that Fear and Trembling develops a philosophical argumentation that is dependent on the reader's own existential contribution. In relation to Elgin's thought, the relation between truth and explanatory force is acknowledged. At the end of the article, I argue that it is more accurate to see the explanatory force of Fear and Trembling in relation to its exploratory function.
Books by Ingrid Malm Lindberg
The mutifacteted role of imagination in science and religion. A critical examination of its epistemic, creative and meaning-making functions, 2021
The main purpose of this dissertation is to examine critically and discuss the role of imaginatio... more The main purpose of this dissertation is to examine critically and discuss the role of imaginationin science and religion, with particular emphasis on its possible epistemic, creative, and meaning-making functions. In order to answer my research questions, I apply theories and
concepts from contemporary philosophy of mind on scientific and religious practices. This framework allows me to explore the mental state of imagination, not as an isolated phenomenon but, rather, as one of many mental states that co-exist and interplay in our cognitive architecture.
Based on the philosophical discourse of philosophy of mind, four types of imagination are indentified and conceptualized: sensory, propositional, experiential, and creative imagination.
These categories are then employed on five phenomena that can be found in scientific and religious environments: metaphors, models, thought experiments, aspect perception, and - in the religious case - rituals.
In relation to the concept of religious "seeing" I consider how imaginings may influence visionary experiences and visualization, and compare these phenomena with cases of scientific visualization and eureka experiences. In regard to scientific and religious models, a distinction
is made between, on the one hand, two notions of truth and, on the other hand, truth-independent meaning-making. In light of these categories, I differentiate between, and critically discuss, the use of imagination in doxastic, non-doxastic and fictionalist accounts. In light of this investigation, I formulate and defend the position of interactivism, which acknowledges a constant interplay between different attitudes and mental states. In my examination of rituals and scientific and religious thought experiments, special attention is given to the mental capacity
to recreate the experiences that are entailed in an imagined scenario.
At the end of the investigation, I consider the possible impact that my study might have onhow we view science and religion as well as the dialogue bewteen these two fields.
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Papers by Ingrid Malm Lindberg
processing). This paper investigates the consequences of taking such an account seriously. It proposes that the dual-process view of imagination allows us to incorporate recent insights from virtue epistemology,
providing a fresh perspective on how imagination can be epistemically reliable. The argument centers on the distinction between General Reliability (GR) and Functional System Reliability (FSR), for example in relation to Kengo Miyazono and Uko Tooming's (2023) argument for epistemic generativity. Furthermore, the paper claims that the dual-process virtue account enables us to integrate a wide range of findings from the literature on epistemology and imagination. Moreover, it suggests a novel way to distinguish the virtues of creativity and imagination and presents a case for viewing imagination as a virtue rather than a skill.
Books by Ingrid Malm Lindberg
concepts from contemporary philosophy of mind on scientific and religious practices. This framework allows me to explore the mental state of imagination, not as an isolated phenomenon but, rather, as one of many mental states that co-exist and interplay in our cognitive architecture.
Based on the philosophical discourse of philosophy of mind, four types of imagination are indentified and conceptualized: sensory, propositional, experiential, and creative imagination.
These categories are then employed on five phenomena that can be found in scientific and religious environments: metaphors, models, thought experiments, aspect perception, and - in the religious case - rituals.
In relation to the concept of religious "seeing" I consider how imaginings may influence visionary experiences and visualization, and compare these phenomena with cases of scientific visualization and eureka experiences. In regard to scientific and religious models, a distinction
is made between, on the one hand, two notions of truth and, on the other hand, truth-independent meaning-making. In light of these categories, I differentiate between, and critically discuss, the use of imagination in doxastic, non-doxastic and fictionalist accounts. In light of this investigation, I formulate and defend the position of interactivism, which acknowledges a constant interplay between different attitudes and mental states. In my examination of rituals and scientific and religious thought experiments, special attention is given to the mental capacity
to recreate the experiences that are entailed in an imagined scenario.
At the end of the investigation, I consider the possible impact that my study might have onhow we view science and religion as well as the dialogue bewteen these two fields.