Papers by Manuel Rebuschi
Cogito Ergo Es
Bilan du projet PsyPhINe: Cogito Ergo Es (Projet PEPS Mirabelle 2015) La cognition regroupe un en... more Bilan du projet PsyPhINe: Cogito Ergo Es (Projet PEPS Mirabelle 2015) La cognition regroupe un ensemble de processus qu'il est difficile d'unifier au sein d'une définition générale. Le projet vise à explorer la gradation des attributions d’intelligence ou d’intentionnalité, quand on passe, par exemple, d’une mouche à un chat, en faisant l'hypothèse que l'intersubjectivité ainsi que notre tendance naturelle à l'anthropomorphisme jouent des rôles centraux : nous projetons dans l'autre énormémen..
Langage, logique et rationalités
Presses universitaires de Paris Nanterre eBooks, 2019
Pour un (pseudo)dualisme du virtuel
HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), 2022
Des robots, des doudous et du sacré
HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), Dec 6, 2021
Que se passe-t-il lorsque nous interagissons avec des robots dits sociaux ? Il semble que nous so... more Que se passe-t-il lorsque nous interagissons avec des robots dits sociaux ? Il semble que nous soyons enclins à y projeter de l'intelligence, des intentions voire des émotions, dans une attitude similaire à celle d'un enfant vis-à-vis de son doudou. À partir de travaux d'anthropologues sur l'animisme et les fé- tiches, on s'écartera d'une interprétation initiale qui transpose directement l'attitude animiste aux inte- ractions humain-robot. L'article mobilise le cadre théorique de Walton sur la fiction et le <em>faire-semblant </em>et celui de Wollheim sur la perception des représentations picturales, pour analyser ces interactions en termes de <em>voir-double </em>et d'<em>agir-double</em>. Que nous soyons généralement contraints à projeter un alter ego dans de tels objets paraît <em>in fine </em>devoir être conçu comme quelque chose qui en fait véritablement de « drôles d'objets ».
Pensée singulière et sémantique des fictions
HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), 2018
Action verbs, intensionality and cross-world (quasi)relations
9th European Congress of Analytic Philosophy (ECAP 9), Aug 21, 2017
About Context, Fiction, and Schizophrenia
The Frontiers Collection
Questions d'attitudes. Essai de philosophie formelle sur l'intentionnalité
HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), Apr 1, 2017
Intentionality inside? Towards an intensional account of action verbs
HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), Oct 27, 2016
Table ronde Opportunités et défis de la diffusion ouverte : témoignage de responsables de revues
Qu'est-ce que la signification?
Interdisciplinary Works in Logic, Epistemology, Psychology and Linguistics
Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, 2014
Le titre de ce livre est quelque peu provocateur. Comme l'auteur l'explique des l'int... more Le titre de ce livre est quelque peu provocateur. Comme l'auteur l'explique des l'introduction, les Principes des mathematiques revisites sont directement inspires des Principles of Mathematics de Russell 1903. Pour autant, il ne s'agit pas d'une lecture de l'illustre philosophe et logicien. Il s'agit plutot de la reouverture d'un chantier generalement delaisse apres le premier tiers du vingtieme siecle : la construction de fondements logiques et en fait logicistes pour les mathematiques.
Le problème de l’analyse des troubles de la pensée dans le discours avec la personne schizophrène : proposition méthodologique
L'Évolution Psychiatrique
The proceedings of this fourth edition comprise two invited contributions, by Alain Lecomte (emer... more The proceedings of this fourth edition comprise two invited contributions, by Alain Lecomte (emeritus professor of Université Paris 8), and Ellen Breitholtz and Christine Howes (University of Gothenburg). We received 12 submissions and the scientific committee has chosen 6 contributed papers. Each paper received three reviews, provided by the Program Committee, listed herein. We would like to thank all those who submitted papers for consideration at (In)Co2017, the two invited speakers, and all conference participants. We want to thank our international team of reviewers. We very much hope that all these comments will be of use to those who submitted papers for their future research.
L'hypothèse des troubles du langage et de la pensée au risque de la formalisation sémantique du discours
When Epistemic Logic Meets Skepticism
The purpose of this talk is to reassert the philosophical significance that the DEL notion of an ... more The purpose of this talk is to reassert the philosophical significance that the DEL notion of an announcement may have, by (1) drawing an epistemologically motivated double distinction a. between "assertions" and "announcements" on the one hand, b. "public" and "private announcements" on the other hand, by (2) bringing it to bear on two "Moorean Puzzles" - Moore's Paradox and Moore's Proof - that we propose to revisit, thereby (3) contributing to grounding the logic of announcements in the philosophy of knowledge.
In embodied conversation, non-linguistic events can make important contributions to the semantic ... more In embodied conversation, non-linguistic events can make important contributions to the semantic content of the discourse. This talk explores a rich array of semantic dependencies between non-linguistic events and linguistically specified contents and shows that these dependencies are a critical part of the content of the interaction. Inferring these dependencies, inferring the rhetorical role of non-linguistic events, and conceptualizing non-linguistic events-i.e., associating them with a suitable description-are logically co-dependent tasks. Extending Segmented Discourse Representation Theory, I present an analysis of semantic dependencies between linguistic and non-linguistic units in embodied discourse, and explore how these dependencies affect discourse structure and constraints on developing such structure, such as the Right Frontier Constraint. Empirical evidence for the analysis is supported by a detailed corpus study, which I introduce in the talk.
Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, 2014
In this paper we lay out the conceptual and technical foundations of a general framework that wil... more In this paper we lay out the conceptual and technical foundations of a general framework that will allow us to talk and reason about the connections between knowledge and context. Based on the notion of "contextual models", its static part will make it possible to capture formally, by means of the same language and the same semantics, a number of epistemological positions among the most prominent in the recent philosophical literature on knowledge, and to investigate the logical properties and connections they end up attaching to their respective notions of knowledge and context. This "static" component is augmented with a "dynamic" formalization of context based on a simplified version of Discourse Representation Theory, that will allow us to account for the contribution of epistemic statements to the evolution of the "score" of a conversation about knowledge. 2 Highlights of Informal Epistemology In this section we briefly describe and illustrate four prominent positions on the problem of skepticism which, through the discussions they have given rise to in the recent philosophical literature on knowledge, have significantly contributed to making context an issue of prime epistemological importance. Anti-Skeptical Invariantism The first position, anti-skeptical invarantism as we will call it, which can also be found in the literature under the name "moderate invariantism" or "radical anti-skepticism", has it that many and perhaps most of our ordinary knowledge claims are literally true. It is endorsed by the ordinary language philosopher Austin [3], 1 who observes that the epistemic standards that the skeptic has in mind and which require from us the ability to exclude absolutely all possibilities of error, including the most far-fetched ones, is very different from those which govern our everyday knowledge claims and which do not have such stringent requirements. In everyday life, the standards in place are such that as long as we have no reason to think, say, that we might be brains in vats, we are not required to rule out this possibility to properly count as knowing, say, that we have hands. Now, according to Austin, the only standards that can be legitimate are those that match our ordinary practices of knowledge ascription. This is the case with those in place in everyday life: we-ordinarily competent speakersjudge many and perhaps most of our everyday knowledge claims to be correct. Not so with the skeptic's standards which would make it merely impossible to ever use "know" correctly. So, on this view, we do know a lot.
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Papers by Manuel Rebuschi