Papers by Dominique Cappelletti
Language and intergroup discrimination. Evidence from an experiment
Language is one of the most salient dimensions of ethnocultural identity and clearly marks who is... more Language is one of the most salient dimensions of ethnocultural identity and clearly marks who is and who is not a member of the group. We conduct an experiment to investigate the role of language in intergroup discrimination in the creation of social capital, here operationalised as a measure encompassing trust, trustworthiness, cooperation, and coordination. We observe the behaviour of the members of a minority language community when they receive the instructions written in their own idiomatic language and when they receive them written in the surrounding language. We find a language effect on behaviour, but this effect is gender specific. When deciding in the surrounding language, participants do not treat ingroup and outgroup members differently. When deciding in their own idiomatic language, females show intergroup discrimination and treat ingroup members more favourably compared to how they treat them when deciding in the surrounding language. We also observe that the behavio...
The Impact of Emotions on Probabilistic Decision Making A Research Proposal
SOME PERSONALITY CORRELATES OF USING eBAY
Psychological Reports, 2006
Being of two minds: Ultimatum offers under cognitive constraints
Journal of Economic Psychology, 2011
Are default contributions sticky? An experimental analysis of defaults in public goods provision
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014
Unravelling conditional cooperation
Jena Economic Research Papers, Sep 1, 2011
Zusammenfassung: Extensive research on human cooperation in social dilemmas has shown that indivi... more Zusammenfassung: Extensive research on human cooperation in social dilemmas has shown that individuals condition their behaviour upon the behaviour of others. However, few attempts have been made to disentangle the motivations backing conditional cooperation. We try to assess the relative importance of three motives-namely reciprocity, inequity aversion, and anchoring-in a non-linear voluntary contribution experiment. We find that, for those conditionally cooperating, both reciprocity and inequity aversion represent relevant ...
Are default contributions sticky? An experimental analysis of defaults in public goods provision
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014
Unravelling conditional cooperation - Reciprocity, inequity aversion, and anchoring in public goods provision
Deliberative and Non-Deliberative Processes in Strategic Interaction
SOME PERSONALITY CORRELATES OF USING eBAY
Psychological Reports, 2006
The use of eBay by 102 American undergraduate students was not associated with competitiveness, l... more The use of eBay by 102 American undergraduate students was not associated with competitiveness, locus of control scores, or money attitude scores.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014
Previous research provides compelling evidence that defaults affect individual behaviour in sever... more Previous research provides compelling evidence that defaults affect individual behaviour in several domains. However, evidence of their influence in strategic interaction is scant. We experimentally investigate the effect of defaults on contributions to a public good and attempt to shed light on potential channels through which they operate. Our main experimental findings show that defaults influence contribution behaviour: preference for a suggested contribution significantly increases when it is presented as the default. However, this effect seems not to operate primarily through information conveyance or expectations about others' behaviour. Default contributions, thus, appear to have an attractive power that goes beyond recommendation signals and expectation influences.
Jena Economic Research Papers, Sep 1, 2011
Zusammenfassung: Extensive research on human cooperation in social dilemmas has shown that indivi... more Zusammenfassung: Extensive research on human cooperation in social dilemmas has shown that individuals condition their behaviour upon the behaviour of others. However, few attempts have been made to disentangle the motivations backing conditional cooperation. We try to assess the relative importance of three motives-namely reciprocity, inequity aversion, and anchoring-in a non-linear voluntary contribution experiment. We find that, for those conditionally cooperating, both reciprocity and inequity aversion represent relevant ...
Jena Economic Research Papers, May 1, 2008
Zusammenfassung: We experimentally investigate how affective processes influence proposers' ... more Zusammenfassung: We experimentally investigate how affective processes influence proposers' and responders' behaviour in the Ultimatum Game. Using a dualsystem approach, we tax cognitive resources through time pressure and cognitive load to enhance the influence of affective processes on behaviour. We find that proposers offer more under time pressure and this seems to be due to strategic considerations rather than to other-regarding concerns. We also find that responders are more likely to reject under time ...
Being of two minds: Ultimatum offers under cognitive constraints
Journal of Economic Psychology, 2011
We experimentally investigate how proposers in the Ultimatum Game behave when their cognitive res... more We experimentally investigate how proposers in the Ultimatum Game behave when their cognitive resources are constrained by time pressure and cognitive load. In a dual-system perspective, when proposers are cognitively constrained and thus their deliberative capacity is reduced, their offers are more likely to be influenced by spontaneous affective reactions. We find that under time pressure proposers make higher offers. This increase appears not to be explained by more reliance on an equality heuristic. Analysing the behaviour of the same individual in both roles leads us to favour the strategic over the other-regarding explanation for the observed increase in offers. In contrast, proposers who are under cognitive load do not behave differently from proposers who are not.► We examine proposer offers in the Ultimatum Game under cognitive constraints. ► Cognitive capacity is constrained by time pressure and cognitive load. ► Time pressure leads proposers to make higher offers. ► Cognitive load does not impact on offers.
Does the provision of a default option aect cooperation?
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Papers by Dominique Cappelletti