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Selene Arfini

University of Pavia, Department of Humanities, Philosophy Section, Adjunct

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I’m a Postdoctoral Fellow (Assegnista di ricerca) in Philosophy of Science, Adjunct professor of Cognitive Philosophy, and a member of the Computational Philosophy Laboratory at the Department of Humanities – Philosophy Section of the University of Pavia.
Phone: 3294078894
Address: University of Pavia, Humanities Department - Philosophy Section -Computational Philosophy Laboratory, Piazza Botta, 6 – 27100 - Pavia, Italy

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Papers by Selene Arfini

The Diffusion of Ignorance in Online Communities

Information Diffusion Management and Knowledge Sharing: Breakthrough in Research and Practice, IGI-Global: USA, 2020

This paper aims to investigate how information-sharing mechanisms in online communities favor act... more This paper aims to investigate how information-sharing mechanisms in online communities favor activities of ignorance distribution on their platforms, such as fake data, biased beliefs, and inaccurate statements. In brief, the authors claim that online communities provide more ways to connect the users to one another rather than to control the quality of the data they share and receive. This, in turn, diminishes the value of fact-checking mechanisms in online news-consumption. The authors contend that while digital environments can stimulate the interest of groups of students and amateurs in scientific and political topics, the diffusion of false, poor, and un-validated data through digital media contributes to the formation of bubbles of shallow understanding in the digitally informed public. In brief, the present study is a philosophical research, embedded in the theoretical framework of the epistemologies of ignorance, that applies the virtual niche construction theory to the cognitive behavior of internet users, as it is described by the current psychological, sociological, and anthropological literature.

Introduction: Knowing the Unknown Philosophical Perspectives on Ignorance

Synthese, 2020

Ignorance is a spooky word in philosophy. At first, it appears vague, almost too broad. On second... more Ignorance is a spooky word in philosophy. At first, it appears vague, almost too broad. On second thought, it suggests more concrete and familiar notions, such as false belief (Hogrefe et al. 1986), error (Woods 2013), absence of knowledge (Le Morvan 2010), lack of true beliefs (Peels 2011), doubt (Shepherd et al. 2007), and misinformation (Bessi et al. 2014). The list might go on for quite some time, since, notwithstanding its spookiness, ignorance is a concept that is acquiring a growing importance in the philosophical literature (Sullivan and Tuana 2007; Peels 2017; Arfini 2019). Indeed, recently, some authors have tried to come up with a specific description for it,Footnote1 or to list a well defined taxonomy of its instantiations,Footnote2 but, so far, no concluding verdict has been reached. For now, ignorance remains an umbrella term, which refers to different kinds of cognitive and epistemological phenomena. Given its comprehensive nature, ignorance still represents a rich concept in philosophy, logic and cognitive science, which gives reason to pursue a deeper and more focused analysis of it.

The Palgrave Encyclopedia of the Possible, 2020

Ignorance is an inherently broad and comprehensive notion, which, ironically, can refer to both t... more Ignorance is an inherently broad and comprehensive notion, which, ironically, can refer to both the worst enemy of science and knowledge-related efforts and, in its Socratic form, their best ally. Indeed, by understanding the concept of ignorance, one can discuss a variety of topics, such as error, falsity, and prejudice but also surprise, wonder, and creativity. Unsurprisingly, so, the current research about ignorance is varied and interconnected. Thus, this chapter will be divided into two main sections: the first will be dedicated to a brief presentation of the different research areas that shape current ignorance studies; in the second section, a few questions will be asked: What can we do about our ignorance? How can ignorance be exploited and become useful? How can ignorance define the limits of our possibilities? Even if the answers presented in this chapter will not provide an exhaustive picture of how ignorance interacts with human chances, they will hopefully offer suggestions for further steps in its analysis and investigation.

Distributed Cognition in Aid of Interdisciplinary Collaborations

Cognition in 3E – Extended, Embodied, Emergent, Springer: Cham, 2019

What does it take to perform collaborative interdisciplinarity with good epistemic and academic r... more What does it take to perform collaborative interdisciplinarity with good epistemic and academic results? This pragmatical question, slightly rephrased, has been one of the few key issues of the philosophical studies on interdisciplinarity since the Seventies. In this paper I aim at addressing that question adopting a conceptual framework weirdly not yet used for this purpose: distributed cognition theories. In particular I will focus on the embodied , emerging, and extended nature of cognitive activities at the core of successful examples of collaborative interdisciplinarity. In the first section of this paper I will briefly review the literature on interdisciplinary collaborations. In the second section I will present the perspective from which I aim at addressing their recurrent problems: a broadly conceived distributed cog-nition theory, which incorporates insights from the extended mind approach, and from the theories on emerging and embodied cognition. In the third section of the paper I will analyze some of the usual emerging problems of collaborative interdisciplinarity by referring to some well-documented case studies. Then, I will propose some ways to face those problems in the organization and development of a collaborative interdisciplinary project, referring to it as a complex system of distributed cognitive activities.

Online Identity Crisis Identity Issues in Online Communities

by Selene Arfini, Camilla Gazzaniga, and ALESSANDRO TACCHINO

Minds and Machines, 2020

How have online communities affected the ways their users construct , view, and define their iden... more How have online communities affected the ways their users construct , view, and define their identity? In this paper, we will approach this issue by considering two philosophical set of problems related to personal identity: the "Characterization Question" and the "Self-Other Relations Question." Since these queries have traditionally brought out different problems around the concept of identity, here we aim at rethinking them in the framework of online communities. To do so, we will adopt an externalist and cognitive point of view on online communities, describing them as virtual cognitive niches. We will evaluate and agree with the Attachment Theory of Identity, arguing that there is continuity between offline and online identity and that usually the latter contributes to the alteration of the former. Finally, we will discuss ways users can enact self-reflection on online frameworks, considering the impact of the Filter Bubble and the condition of Bad Faith.

The Antinomies of Serendipity How to Cognitively Frame Serendipity for Scientific Discoveries

Topoi, 2020

During the second half of the last century, the importance of serendipitous events in scientific ... more During the second half of the last century, the importance of serendipitous events in scientific frameworks has been progressively recognized, fueling hard debates about their role, nature, and structure in philosophy and sociology of science. Alas, while discussing the relevance of the topic for the comprehension of the nature of scientific discovery, the philosophical literature has hardly paid attention to the cognitive significance of serendipity, accepting rather than examining some of its most specific features, such as its game-changing effect, the unexpectedness of its occurrence, and its affinity with the concept of "luck". Thus, in this paper we aim at analyzing these characteristics in the light of their cognitive implications in the recognition, performance, and possible stimulation of serendipitous events in relation to scientific discoveries.

Ignorance-Preserving Mental Models Thought Experiments as Abductive Metaphors

Foundations of Science, 2019

Who can satisfy themselves with mere cognition through experience in all the cosmological questio... more Who can satisfy themselves with mere cognition through experience in all the cosmological questions, of the duration and size of the world, of freedom or natural necessity, since, wherever we may begin, any answer given according to principles of experience always begets a new question which also requires an answer, and for that reason clearly proves the insufficiency of all physical modes of explanation for the satisfaction of reason? Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Abstract In this paper, we aim at explaining the relevance of thought experiments (TEs) in philosophy and the history of science by describing them as particular instances of two categories of creative thinking: metaphorical reasoning and abductive cognition. As a result of this definition, we will claim that TEs hold an ignorance-preserving trait that is evidenced in both TEs inferential structure and in the process of scenario creation they presuppose. Elaborating this thesis will allow us to explain the wonder that philosophers of science have consistently shown for TEs, as well as the high functionality of TEs in the creative aspects of scientific and philosophical praxis.

Cyber-Bullies as Cyborg-Bullies

The Changing Scope of Technoethics in Contemporary Society, 2016

This paper advocates a re-introduction of the notion of cyborg in order to acquire a new perspect... more This paper advocates a re-introduction of the notion of cyborg in order to acquire a new perspective on studies concerning the development of human cognition in highly technological environments. In particular, we will show how the notion of cyborg properly engages cognitive issues that have a powerful resonance especially as far as social cognition is concerned, and may consequently provide a new tool for tackling the emergent safety issues concerning sociality mediated by the Internet, and the moral panic occasionally surrounding it.

Of Cyborgs and Brutes: Technology-Inherited Violence and Ignorance

Philosophies, 2017

The broad aim of this paper is to question the ambiguous relationship between technology 1 and in... more The broad aim of this paper is to question the ambiguous relationship between technology 1 and intelligence. More specifically, it addresses the reasons why the ever-increasing reliance on 2 smart technologies and wide repositories of data does not necessarily increase the display of "smart" 3 or even "intelligent" behaviors, but rather increases new instances of "brutality" as mix of ignorance 4 and violence. We claim that the answer can be found in the cyborg theory, and more specifically in 5 the possibility to blend (not always for the best) different kinds of intentionality. 6

An Argument for Ignorance-Based Chance Discovery

International Journal of Advanced Intelligence Paradigms, 2016

The human part of chance-discovery is usually analysed as an effect of the agent's knowledge of h... more The human part of chance-discovery is usually analysed as an effect of the agent's knowledge of herself and of her environment. In this paper, setting off from the importance of "understanding the meaning of an impending phenomenon as a chance," we will analyse how chance-discovery activities are affected and driven by the agent's ignorance, and the relationship she entertains with the latter. More specifically, we will spell out two kinds of ignorance that are relevant for chance-discovery, also considering which abductive chance-discovery processes they can be related to.

Bolle epistemiche, scienza e credenza

Introduzione alla New Logic. Logica, filosofia, cognizione, Genova: Il Melangolo, 2013

Nel gioco di carte Machiavelli o Ramino machiavellico, il cui nome deriva dal noto filosofo, ogni... more Nel gioco di carte Machiavelli o Ramino machiavellico, il cui nome deriva dal noto filosofo, ogni giocatore ha inizialmente in mano 10 o 13 carte francesi nascoste agli altri giocatori, può pescare ad ogni turno una carta da un mazzo coperto, non può scartare ed il suo scopo è quello di depositare tutte le carte che ha in mano sul tavolo da gioco seguendo validi schemi combinatori. Inquadrando una tale situazione all'interno della logica agent-based, il giocatore è un agente cognitivo circoscritto in un determinato contesto, il gioco, nel quale possiede un target, l'obiettivo di vincere il gioco, e un determinato numero di risorse cognitive composte dalle informazioni a sua disposizione e dalle euristiche in grado di applicare per meglio gestire questi dati. A ben vedere, Machiavelli (e un qualsiasi gioco di carte, in verità) è un esempio paradigmatico di una situazione in cui l'agente è in una condizione di economia cognitiva. Non solo non possiede la totalità delle informazioni (non conosce quali carte hanno in mano gli altri giocatori, l'ordine delle carte all'interno del mazzo e la distribuzione delle carte tra giocatori e mazzo), non ha risorse cognitive in grado di ovviare a questa mancanza (anche barando o continuando a pescare dal mazzo non avrebbe alcuna chance di raggiungere il totale controllo delle carte sul tavolo e nelle mani dei suoi avversari). Infine, ha a disposizione un tempo limitato per agire, scandito dai turni di gioco e dalla celerità delle azioni degli altri partecipanti. Appare lampante in questo caso la differenza, spesso sottolineata da Gabbay e Woods (2001), tra scantness (scarsità) e scarcity (povertà) delle risorse cognitive a disposizione di un agente: 1 è vero, infatti, che il giocatore ha poche informazioni, è costretto ad agire in un tempo limitato e non ha i mezzi per modificare questa situazione ma, per vincere il gioco e conseguire quindi l'obiettivo prefissato, non ha bisogno di più tempo o maggiori informazioni ma solo di elaborare ed applicare strategie cognitive in grado di eludere le difficoltà poste dal gioco stesso. Le risorse che possiede sono scarse, ma non paralizzanti, e sono il presupposto del concetto di homo heuristicus, introdotto nel dibattito negli ultimi decenni del secolo scorso (Gingerenzer e Brighton, 2009). 1 La scarsità delle risorse è, infatti, una qualità comparativa: non implica necessariamente la povertà o l'assenza delle risorse, ma solo una loro minore quantità rispetto a quelle che normalmente possiede un agente istituzionale (intorno a questo concetto cfr. capitolo precedente). A questo si aggiunge anche il fatto che l'agente pratico si pone, generalmente, obiettivi modesti, commisurati alla quantità di risorse cognitive a sua disposizione. In questo senso un individuo potrebbe, nonostante la scarsità degli strumenti disponibili, avere lo stesso tutti i mezzi per conseguire il suo scopo (Gabbay e Woods, 2001).

Self-Knowledge and Self-Ignorance Further Cognitive Implications of Epistemic and Other Bubbles

Natural Arguments. A Tribute to John Woods, 2019

The Epistemic Bubble, taken as a cognitive concept, was first conceived by John Woods as a form o... more The Epistemic Bubble, taken as a cognitive concept, was first conceived by John Woods as a form of knowledge-immunization that inhibits the agent from clearly distinguishing what she knows from what she believes she knows. In recent years, the notion of the Epistemic Bubble has been referred to and rethought by different authors to discuss other concepts that emerge as conflictual in the third- person perspective and that are indistinguishable in the first-person perspective of the practical agent, i.e. ignorance, violence, and religious dogmas. All the reconfigurations of the original bubble maintain the same background assumption: the practical agent in first-person perspective is limited in obtaining self-knowledge regarding her cognitive possibilities. Intuitively, the bubbles also draw the extension of the agent’s self-ignorance, if we can label as such the intrinsic limits and blindspots of her self-knowledge. Are the bubbles equal in providing limitations and possibilities to the agent’s metacognitive capacities? Can the No Escape Thesis – which says that when we correct a detected error we place ourselves in a new epistemic bubble – be applied also to the other kinds of bubbles? In this paper we will address these questions, by advancing a review of the bubbles so far presented in the logical and epistemological literature and discussing their further cognitive implications.

Situated Ignorance The Distribution and Extension of Ignorance in Cognitive Niches

Synthese Topical Collection: Knowing the Unknown: Philosophical Perspectives on Ignorance, 2019

Ignorance is easily representable as a cognitive property of more than just individual subjects: ... more Ignorance is easily representable as a cognitive property of more than just individual subjects: groups, crowds, and even populations can share the same ignorance regarding particular concepts and ideas. Nevertheless, according to some theories that refers to the extension, distribution, and situatedness of human cognition, ignorance is hardly a state that can be extended, distributed, and situated in the same way in which knowledge is in our eco-cognitive environment. In order to understand how these contradictory takes can come across in a coherent description of ignorance, in this paper I aim at analyzing the impact of the agent's ignorance in her ecological and cognitive environment, as well as the effect that the surrounding context has on the agent's epistemological successes and downfalls. To this end I will adopt the cognitive and empirically sensitive perspectives of the distributed cognition, the extended mind and cognitive niches construction theories, which will help me address and answer three topical questions: a) adopting the theories about the extended mind, the distributed cognition, and the cognitive significance of affordances can we describe ignorance as extended and distributed in spaces, artifacts, and other people? b) extending or distributing ignorance in one's eco-cognitive environment has the same cognitive and ecological impact of extending or distributing knowledge? c) can we recognize instantiations of externalized or distributed ignorance? So, I will argue that acknowledging the extended, distributed, and situated dimension of ignorance in cog-nitive niches will help us recognize the impact that our ignorance and uncertainty has on how we manipulate and organize our environment and also how our eco-cognitive frameworks affects the perception of our epistemological states.

The Expert You Are (Not) Citizens, Experts and the Limits of Science Communication

by Selene Arfini and Tommaso W . Bertolotti

Science and Democracy Controversies and conflicts, 2018

Considering any democratic government, it goes without saying that the more knowledgeable the cit... more Considering any democratic government, it goes without saying that the more knowledgeable the citizens are, the better the democratic process will work. Therefore, leveraging scientific information among laypeople is intuitively linked to the growth of an educated population; some factors, though, taint this positivist account. Amateurization as an explicit stance on the one hand, " edutainment " matched with the ever-growing complexity of scientific matters on the other. In this paper we argue that while encouraging the diffusion of a general " love for science " should inspire an appetite for more robust scientific knowledge, it also foster the emergence of problematic cognitive situations, as the propagation of the so-called epistemic bubbles or the progressive belittlement of the role of experts in society.

The Diffusion of Ignorance in Online Communities

by Selene Arfini and Tommaso W . Bertolotti

International Journal of Technoethics (IJT), 2018

This paper aims to investigate how information-sharing mechanisms in online communities favor act... more This paper aims to investigate how information-sharing mechanisms in online communities favor activities of ignorance distribution on their platforms, such as fake data, biased beliefs, and inaccurate statements. In brief, the authors claim that online communities provide more ways to connect the users to one another rather than to control the quality of the data they share and receive. This, in turn, diminishes the value of fact-checking mechanisms in online news-consumption. The authors contend that while digital environments can stimulate the interest of groups of students and amateurs in scientific and political topics, the diffusion of false, poor, and un-validated data through digital media contributes to the formation of bubbles of shallow understanding in the digitally informed public. In brief, the present study is a philosophical research, embedded in the theoretical framework of the epistemologies of ignorance, that applies the virtual niche construction theory to the cognitive behavior of internet users, as it is described by the current psychological, sociological, and anthropological literature.

Online Communities as Virtual Cognitive Niches

Synthese, 2019

In this paper we aim at discussing cognitive and epistemic features of online communities, by the... more In this paper we aim at discussing cognitive and epistemic features of online communities, by the use of cognitive niche constructions theories, presenting them as virtual cognitive niches. Virtual cognitive niches can be considered as digitally-encoded collaborative distributions of diverse types of information into an environment performed by agents to aid thinking and reasoning about some target domain. Discussing this definition, we will also consider how online communities, as networks displaying a social bias, can both foster civic awareness and promote problematic group-led behaviors in the virtually aggregated crowds. To support this affirmation, we will take into account the use of online communication networks during crises and we will argue that it can lead to ethically dubious consequences.

S. Arfini and L. Magnani, Cognitive Autoimmunity Knowledge, Ignorance and Self-Deception

by Selene Arfini and Lorenzo Magnani

In logic and epistemology the concept of autoimmunity refers to the partial incapability of the h... more In logic and epistemology the concept of autoimmunity refers to the partial incapability of the human agent to distinguish between her knowledge and her ignorance, due to an involuntary mechanism which underlies the fixation and revision of beliefs. The idea originated within the project initiated by Dov Gabbay and John Woods of a Naturalization of Logic, which aims at informing elaborated notions of logic and epistemology with well established results of cognitive science. The term autoimmunity follows from the consideration that the cognitive states of belief, doubt, knowledge, and ignorance affect the epistemic status of the agent who experiences them in ways she cannot anticipate nor control. Thus, we contend that the concept of autoimmunity could be usefully employed beyond the epistemologi-cal and logical fieldwork, in order to describe the cognitive mechanism supporting what the philosophical literature calls " epistemic feelings " , explaining some problematic occurrences of them related to the incorrect analysis of the agent' own cog-nition (tip-of-the-tongue experience, misplaced feeling-of-knowing, etc).

Thought Experiments as Model-Based Abductions

In this paper we address the classical but still pending question regarding Thought Experiments: ... more In this paper we address the classical but still pending question regarding Thought Experiments: how can an imagined scenario bring new information or insight about the actual world? Our claim is that this general problem actually embraces two distinct questions: a) how can the creation of a just imagined scenario become functional to either a scientific or a philosophical research?, b) how can Thought Experiments hold a strong inferential power if their structures " do not seem to translate easily into standard forms of deduction or induction " ? [Bishop, 1999]. We contend that, in order to answer both questions, we should consider the relation between the creation of the imagined scenario and the inferential power of Thought Experiments. Specifically, we will analyze Thought Experiments from an eco-cognitive point of view as goal-oriented objects, explaining their inferen-tial power considering their generation as the results of abductive cognition and the construction of an imagined scenario as a process of scientific modeling. This will lead us to consider the creation of a Thought Experiment as a case of sophisticated model-based abduction.

T, Bertolotti, S. Arfini and L. Magnani, Abduction: from the Ignorance Problem to the Ignorance Virtue

by Tommaso W . Bertolotti, Lorenzo Magnani, and Selene Arfini

The ignorance issue afflicting abduction is usually intended as to what extent it can be seen as ... more The ignorance issue afflicting abduction is usually intended as to what extent it can be seen as an " ignorance-preserving " (or " ignorance-mitigating ") inference, and what this exactly means. In this paper, we will approach the issue of abduction and ignorance by leveraging the interplay of logical, episte-mological and cognitive views on the matter. In detail, after introducing the ambiguous relationship between ignorance and achievement, we will deal with the presence of the ignorance element in the traditional logical formalizations of abduction, which configures the ignorance problem. Then, we will reframe the situation in an epistemological and cognitive perspective, making room for the view of ignorance as a virtue enabling the emergence of successful creative abductions.

An Eco-Cognitive Model of Ignorance Immunization

by Selene Arfini and Lorenzo Magnani

In 2005, Woods described the epistemic bubble as an immunized state of human cognition that compr... more In 2005, Woods described the epistemic bubble as an immunized state of human cognition that compromises the awareness of the agent about her beliefs and knowledge. The idea of an immunized knower swung with the proposal advanced by Gabbay and Woods of constructing a practical logic and epistemology, which can actually define itself as agent-centered, goal-oriented, and resource-bound. In order to carry out this project, in this paper we will introduce a symmetrical view on the agent immunization, focused on the agent’s missing awareness of her ignorance, also highlighting the importance of considering the actual agent as cogently igno- rant, too. Eventually, we will formulate an idea of ignorance that can be fruitfully studied in the newborn field of naturalized epistemology and logic.