Papers by Andrea Zeppi
Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1418). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society., 2017
It is often assumed that the socio-cultural context positively
influences mindreading performance... more It is often assumed that the socio-cultural context positively
influences mindreading performances. Among the available
theories, mindshaping is proposed to consist of cultural
mechanisms that make the social domain homogeneous and,
hence, easier to interpret. Proponents of the mindshaping
hypothesis claim that homogeneity is responsible for the
computational tractability of mindreading, which is otherwise
intractable. In this paper, we examine this core claim of
mindshaping and investigate how homogeneity influences
mindreading tractability. By taking action understanding as a
case-study for mindreading, we formally operationalize
mindshaping homogeneity in different ways with the goal of
bridging the gap between informal claims and formal
(in)tractability results. The analysis shows that only specific
combinations of homogeneity may lead to tractable
mindreading, whilst others do not. Additionally, the analysis
reveals the possibility of a yet undiscovered mindshaping
mechanism.
In philosophy of mind and computation an age old question still stands: what makes a physical obj... more In philosophy of mind and computation an age old question still stands: what makes a physical object sufficiently complex [1] to implement compu-tation? Having an answer is even more important now that we have a mecha-nistic proposal [2] and the necessity of explaining concrete computation is felt as more urgent. In order to reach a satisfactory answer we sure need an adequate notion of computation [3], but it can be argued that is also important to possess an explanatory adequate and rigorous notion of complexity. Looking at how cognitive science came to terms with the bounded nature of the human cognitive systems will be of use in reconstructing this complexity notion. Here we take a look at proposals like "the bounded brain hypothe-sis" [4] and "the tractable cognition thesis"[5]. The first grounds the bounded nature of the human cognitive system in quantitative neuroanatomy. The TCT employs instead both a rigorous notion of complexity and the computational framework. This complexity notion, borrowed from computational complexity theory, is utilized for demarcating between possible and plausible cognition. However, the complexity of a computational problem is usually considered insensitive to differences in computational models and their implementations [5]. This complexity notion, therefore, makes the TCT clash with the intuitions that grounds the BBH, that is: the capacities of a cognitive systems, much like those of an artificial computer, must be somehow constrained also by the performance of the concrete computational machinery. The TCT acknowledges the boundaries that the neuronal machinery poses on computational cognition only implicitly, but it mainly focuses on
In this talk we will consider problem that, despite having very clear evidence of our proficiency... more In this talk we will consider problem that, despite having very clear evidence of our proficiency at reading intentions, mindreading seems to be computationally intractable. It will be argued that our habit to mentalize not only environments, but also agents, may be one of the cognitive strategies devised in order to deal with intractability. After first considering how holist arguments can prove mindreading intractable, we will proceed arguing for the necessity of a tractable explanation of mindreading. Then will be shown that example of excessive attribution of intentions are common in human mindreading and that this may point some of the strategies leading to mindreading tractability. Furthermore we will propose that the human disposition toward an innate dualist interpretation of the world may also be of help for our capacity of "placing" minds in the environment.
Two ways into complexity
Language in complexity - The emergence of meaning, May 23, 2016
The Dynamic Hypothesis (DH) about cognition has often been presented as an alternative to the wid... more The Dynamic Hypothesis (DH) about cognition has often been presented as an alternative to the widely popular Computational Hypothesis (CH) in cognitive science. While the theoretical distance that separates these two approaches may seem to be significant, there are rea-sons, we argue, to reconsider the relationship between the dynamical and computational ways of understanding cognition. Here we'll claim that CH and DH, rather than being competitors, are complementary framework in the explanation of cognition. This, we suggest, becomes evident when we consider that the two different notion of complexity that these hypothesis about cognition can be related to are very different indeed, but not contradictory. DH, we re-cognize, uses a notion of complexity derived from dynamical systems theory that seems to points toward psychological plausibility. On the other hand, CH may appeals to a computational notion of complexity that introduces elements of cognitive plausibility in the theoretical framework of cognitive science. In the following paragraphs, in order to test this last hypothe-sis, we will proceed as follows:
First we will consider how the debate between dynamicists and computationalists, started in the first place and what are the main features of DH and of its notion of complexity;
Then we'll see how CH evolved and consider how complexity can be recognized inside the CH framework;
Then we will see how computational complexity applies to cognition by linking computa-tional tractability with cognitive plausibility;
In the end we will argue that if we take the two different notions of complexity by compari-son there are elements to consider them not adversary on the same ground, but as complemen-tary model of explanation.
In questo intervento si prende in analisi il principio di semplicità e di come questo debba trova... more In questo intervento si prende in analisi il principio di semplicità e di come questo debba trovare una nuova definizione quando applicato all interno di un approccio filosofico cognitivo naturalista [1]. In particolare si vuole sostenere che, se un principio di semplicità può essere applicato alla spiegazione del funzionamento dei sistemi cognitivi, allora si deve integrare tale principio in modo tale che a essere privilegiata non sia la più semplice delle soluzioni possibili a un problema, ma piuttosto la più semplice fra le soluzioni plausibili.
Hypnotizability and Performance on a Prism Adaptation Test
The susceptibility to hypnosis, which can be measured by scales, is not merely a cognitive trait... more The susceptibility to hypnosis, which can be measured by scales, is not merely a cognitive trait. In fact, it is associated with a number of physiological correlates in the ordinary state of consciousness and in the absence of suggestions. The hypnotizability-related differences observed in sensorimotor integration suggested a major role of the cerebellum in the peculiar performance of healthy subjects with high scores of hypnotic susceptibility (highs). In order to provide behavioral evidence of this hypothesis, we submitted 20 highs and 21 low hypnotizable participants (lows) to the classical cerebellar Prism Adaptation Test (PAT). We found that the highs' performance was significantly less accurate and more variable than the lows' one, even though the two groups shared the same characteristics of adaptation to prismatic lenses. Although further studies are required to interpret these findings, they could account for earlier reports of hypnotizability-related differences in postural control and blink rate, as they indicate that hypnotizability influences the cerebellar control of sensorimotor integration.
The problem that this paper examines is the specification of the intentional content in the attri... more The problem that this paper examines is the specification of the intentional content in the attribution of psychological states. It will be argued that such a specification cannot be complete, both in the case of interpreting the minds of human beings, and in that of other animals. The incompleteness of the specification of the intentional content belongs to the physiology of mindreading, not to its pathology. In favor of this thesis are put forward both epistemological and computational arguments. From the epistemological point of view, it will be suggested that the complete specification of the intentional content makes the psychological attribution impossible. From the computational point of view, it will be argued that the completeness would also make the problem computationally intractable.
Body sway modulation by hypnotizability and gender during low and high demanding postural conditions.
Body sway modulation by hypnotizability and gender during low and high demanding postural conditions., Sep 1, 2013
The cognitive trait of hypnotizability, associated with the proneness to accept suggestions, exhi... more The cognitive trait of hypnotizability, associated with the proneness to accept suggestions, exhibits several physiological correlates including the modulation of sensorimotor integration and, in particular, of postural control. In this respect, we have shown that, at eyes closure, healthy subjects with high hypnotizability scores (highs) having their feet 2 cm apart show larger and faster body sway with respect to low hypnotizable individuals (lows). The aim of the present study was to investigate whether hypnotizability modulates body sway during slightly more demanding and very difficult postural conditions such as feet together bipedal posture and one legged stance, respectively. The Center of Pressure (CoP) Area, mean Velocity, the CoP mean position (Xmean, Ymean) and its variability (SDx, SDy) in the frontal and sagittal planes were acquired in 18 highs (9 females) and 18 lows (9 females). Results showed that the previously observed lows' smaller and slower body sway was not present any longer. Nonetheless, hypnotizability interacted with gender in the modulation of the variability of the CoP movement in the frontal plane during both the bipedal feet together posture and one legged stance, as significant gender differences were observed only among lows. In conclusion, results confirm a role of hypnotizability in sensorimotor integration and support the relevance of hypnotic assessment in clinical settings, as hypnotizability may be responsible for part of the postural variability.
Books by Andrea Zeppi
Nel maggio del 2011 studiosi italiani e stranieri appartenenti a varie aree disciplinari – filoso... more Nel maggio del 2011 studiosi italiani e stranieri appartenenti a varie aree disciplinari – filosofi, scienziati cognitivi, fisici, informatici e neuroscienziati – si sono ritrovati a Siena per discutere sulla naturalizzabilità della mente. Questo volume è il frutto di quelle discussioni. Un vivo ringraziamento a tutti coloro che vi parteciparono ed un ringraziamento doppio a coloro che hanno deciso poi di trasformare le loro rispettive relazioni al convegno senese “Can the mind be naturalized?” nei saggi qui pubblicati.
Conference Presentations by Andrea Zeppi
It is often assumed that the socio-cultural context positively influences mindreading performance... more It is often assumed that the socio-cultural context positively influences mindreading performances. Among the available theories, mindshaping is proposed to consist of cultura l mechanisms that make the social domain homogeneous and, hence, easier to interpret. Proponents of the mindshaping hypothesis claim that homogeneity is responsible for the computational tractability of mindreading, which is otherwise intractable. In this paper, we examine this core claim of mindshaping and investigate how homogeneity influences mindreading tractability. By taking action understanding as a case-study for mindreading, we formally operationalize mindshaping homogeneity in different ways with the goal of br idg ing the gap betwee n infor ma l c la ims a nd forma l (in)tractability results. The analysis shows that only specific combinations of homogeneity may lead to tractable mindreading, whilst others do not. Additionally, the analysis reveals the possibility of a yet undiscovered mindshaping mechanism.
In philosophy of mind and computation an age old question still stands: what makes a physical obj... more In philosophy of mind and computation an age old question still stands: what makes a physical object sufficiently complex to implement compu- tation? Having an answer is even more important now that we have a mecha- nistic proposal and the necessity of explaining concrete computation is felt as more urgent. In order to reach a satisfactory answer we sure need an adequate notion of computation, but it can be argued that is also important to possess an explanatory adequate and rigorous notion of complexity.
Nel corso del presente intervento prenderemo in considerazione la nozione di semplicità. In part... more Nel corso del presente intervento prenderemo in considerazione la nozione di semplicità. In particolare, se ne considererà la validità rispetto ai problemi e gli interrogativi tipici delle scienze cognitive. Si sosterrà dunque, che se una nozione di semplicità può essere coerentemente e fruttuosamente impiegata all'interno delle spiegazioni cognitivistiche del mentale, allora tale nozione deve essere ridefinita in modo tale da meglio accordarsi con l'obiettivo prediletto delle scienze della mente, lo studio della mente/cervello. Si vuol quindi andare a analizzare l'ipotesi secondo cui gli individui (in quanto sistemi cognitivi) adottano criteri metodologici basati su di un principio di semplicità nella determinazione delle azioni che compongono il proprio comportamento.
In this talk we will consider problem that, despite having very clear evi-dence of our proficienc... more In this talk we will consider problem that, despite having very clear evi-dence of our proficiency at reading intentions, mindreading seems to be com-putationally intractable. It will be argued that our habit to mentalize not only environments, but also agents, may be one of the cognitive strategies devised in order to deal with intractability. After first considering how holist argu-ments can prove mindreading intractable, we will proceed arguing for the necessity of a tractable explanation of mindreading. Then will be shown that example of excessive attribution of intentions are common in human min-dreading and that this may point some of the strategies leading to mindread-ing tractability. Furthermore we will propose that the human disposition to-ward an innate dualist interpretation of the world may also be of help for our capacity of "placing" minds in the environment.
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Papers by Andrea Zeppi
influences mindreading performances. Among the available
theories, mindshaping is proposed to consist of cultural
mechanisms that make the social domain homogeneous and,
hence, easier to interpret. Proponents of the mindshaping
hypothesis claim that homogeneity is responsible for the
computational tractability of mindreading, which is otherwise
intractable. In this paper, we examine this core claim of
mindshaping and investigate how homogeneity influences
mindreading tractability. By taking action understanding as a
case-study for mindreading, we formally operationalize
mindshaping homogeneity in different ways with the goal of
bridging the gap between informal claims and formal
(in)tractability results. The analysis shows that only specific
combinations of homogeneity may lead to tractable
mindreading, whilst others do not. Additionally, the analysis
reveals the possibility of a yet undiscovered mindshaping
mechanism.
First we will consider how the debate between dynamicists and computationalists, started in the first place and what are the main features of DH and of its notion of complexity;
Then we'll see how CH evolved and consider how complexity can be recognized inside the CH framework;
Then we will see how computational complexity applies to cognition by linking computa-tional tractability with cognitive plausibility;
In the end we will argue that if we take the two different notions of complexity by compari-son there are elements to consider them not adversary on the same ground, but as complemen-tary model of explanation.
Books by Andrea Zeppi
Conference Presentations by Andrea Zeppi