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Marcel Weber

Université de Genève, Département de philosophie, Faculty Member

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I am professor of philosophy of science at the Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva and Associate Editor of Biology & Philosophy. My research interests include the philosophy of biology and general philosophy of science. Since 2012, I am a member of the German National Academy of Science Leopoldina.

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Papers by Marcel Weber

Thought Experiments in Biology

Philosophie der Lebenswissenschaften: Entwicklungen und Tendenzen

Information Philosophie, 2013

The Nature of Scientific Evidence: Statistical, Philosophical, and Empirical Considerations (review)

Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 2006

In the history of science, the addition of statistics to assess the evidential import of data is ... more In the history of science, the addition of statistics to assess the evidential import of data is a recent one. It was not until the 1940s that statistics became a regular part of publications in medicine. Today, every well-designed study is expected to contain some kind of statistical analysis. But the increasing importance of statistics for almost all scientific fields did not necessarily improve the quality of the actual applications of statistical methods in published articles. In medicine, peer review research found for the years 1951 to 1995 an almost constant rate of 60 -70 % of published articles with statistical shortcomings, despite the introduction of statistical review in the major journals. This said, any book addressing general statistical issues for a broad audience such as The Nature of Scientific Evidence edited by Mark L. Taper and Subhash R. Lele is highly welcome. The editors promise to combine "statistical, philosophical and empirical considerations" (subtitle) on evidence as "a summarization of data in the light of a model". For this purpose they gathered authors from ecology, statistics and philosophy and grouped their contributions into five parts: "Scientific Process", "Logics of Evidence", "Realities of Nature", "Science, Opinion, and Evidence", and "Models, Realities, and Evidence". The chapters are followed by one or two

What You Can Do for Evolutionary Developmental Linguistics

European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2024

A growing number of linguistic attempts to explain how languages change use cultural-evolutionary... more A growing number of linguistic attempts to explain how languages change use cultural-evolutionary models involving selection or drift. Developmental constraints and biases, which take center stage in evolutionary developmental biology or evo-devo, seem to be absent within this framework, even though linguistics is home to numerous notions of constraint. In this paper, we show how these evo-devo concepts could be applied to linguistic change and why they should. This requires some conceptual groundwork, due to important differences between linguistic and biotic evolution. In biological evolution, development generates the organism's variable traits on which selection and drift act. In linguistic evolution by analogy, we say development generates the linguistic variants on which selection and drift can act. “Linguistic development” then picks out how individual speakers produce and comprehend language. It involves much more than just learning. Using this broad notion of development, we distinguish between different types of bias that could operate in the processes of linguistic innovation and transmission, which correspond to genetic mutation and biological reproduction, respectively.
Having thus sharpened our conceptual toolbox, we then reanalyze two well-documented cases of linguistic change and show that, in both these cases, linguists have only considered Neo-Darwinian evolutionary explanations, falsely deploying an exclusive disjunction of selection and drift. We show that there is at least a third relevant alternative in these examples, namely developmental constraint or bias in the sense we explicate here.

Modeling the Biologically Possible: Evolvability as a Modal Concept

Modeling the Possible. Perspectives from Philosophy of Science, 2025

Biological modalities, i.e., biologically possible, impossible, or necessary states of affairs ha... more Biological modalities, i.e., biologically possible, impossible, or necessary states of affairs have not received much attention from philosophers. Yet, it is widely agreed that there are biological constraints on physically possible states of affairs, such that not everything that is physically possible is also biologically possible, even if everything that is biologically possible is also physically possible. Furthermore, biologists use concepts that appear to be modal in nature, such as the concept of evolvability in evolutionary developmental biology, or "evo-devo." The present chapter investigates what kind of modality underlies the concept of evolvability. This concept tries to capture the capacity of an organism or a lineage to sustain genetic changes that enable it to evolve or to evolve adaptively. The basic idea of the proposed approach is to construe evolvability as a kind of accessibility in a modal space. The difficult part is to specify this modal space and the relevant accessibility relation. While there may not be a general way of defining such a relation, there exist model systems for which it is possible, e.g., evolving small RNAs. The modal space in such cases turns out to be quite distinct from those constructed 2 by philosophers, e.g., David Lewis's similarity metric for possible worlds. Even though the biological case examined here is quite special, attending to the way in which biological possibilities are modeled in this case harbors some general lessons about biological modalities, in particular their dependence on the explanatory goals of the models modeling modality.

Coherent Causal Control: A New Distinction within Causation

European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2022

The recent literature on causality has seen the introduction of several distinctions within causa... more The recent literature on causality has seen the introduction of several distinctions within causality, which are thought to be important for understanding the widespread scientific practice of focusing causal explanations on a subset of the factors that are causally relevant for a phenomenon. Concepts used to draw such distinctions include, among others, stability, specificity, proportionality, or actual-difference making. In this contribution, I propose a new distinction that picks out an explanatorily salient class of causes in biological systems. Some select causes in complex biological systems, I argue, have the property of enabling coherent causal control of these systems. Examples of such control variables include hormones and other signaling molecules, e.g., TOR (target of rapamycin), morphogens or the products of homeotic selector genes in embryonic pattern formation. I propose an analysis of this notion based on concepts borrowed from causal graph theory.

Philosophy of Developmental Biology

Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Biology, 2022

The history of developmental biology is interwoven with debates as to whether mechanistic explana... more The history of developmental biology is interwoven with debates as to whether mechanistic explanations of development are possible or whether alternative explanatory principles or even vital forces need to be assumed. In particular, the demonstrated ability of embryonic cells to tune their developmental fate precisely to their relative position and the overall size of the embryo was once thought to be inexplicable in mechanistic terms. Taking a causal perspective, this Element examines to what extent and how developmental biology, having turned molecular about four decades ago, has been able to meet the vitalist challenge. It focuses not only on the nature of explanations but also on the usefulness of causal knowledge – including the knowledge of classical experimental embryology – for further scientific discovery. It also shows how this causal perspective allows us to understand the nature and significance of some key concepts, including organizer, signal and morphogen. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Darwinism as a Theory for Finite Beings

Darwinism and Philosophy, 2005

Darwin famoulsy held that his use of the term "chance" in evolutionary theory merely "serves to a... more Darwin famoulsy held that his use of the term "chance" in evolutionary theory merely "serves to acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the causes of each particular variation". Is this a tenable view today? Or should we revise our thinking about chance in evolution in light of the more advanced, quantitative models of Neo-Darwinian theory, which make substantial
use of statistical reasoning and the concept of probability? Is determinism still a viable metaphysical doctrine about biological reality after the quantum revolution in physics, or do we have to abandon it in favor of an objective indeterminism? In light of such reflections, what is the relevant interpretation of probability in evolutionary theory? Do biologists use the
concept of probability because they are finite cognitive agents or because the evolutionary process is fundamentally probabilistic? In this paper, I will show that we do not yet fully understand the nature of chance in evolution.

The Reduction of Classical Experimental Embryology to Molecular Developmental Biology: A Tale of Three Sciences

I attempt to characterize the relationship of classical experimental embryology (CEE) and molecul... more I attempt to characterize the relationship of classical experimental embryology (CEE) and molecular developmental biology and compare it to the much-discussed case of classical genetics. I first show that CEE had some causal knowledge and hence was able to answer specific why?-questions. A paradigm was provided by the case of eye induction, perhaps CEE’s greatest success. The case of the famous Spemann organizer is more difficult. I argue that before the advent of molecular biology, knowledge of its causal role in development was very limited. As a result, there was no functional definition of the concept of organizer. I argue that, like the classical gene concept, it is best view as an operational concept. This means that an account of reduction such as Kim’s functional reduction cannot work in these cases. Nonetheless, again like in the classical gene case, the operational concepts of CEE played an important heuristic role in the discovery of molecules involved in morphogenesis and cell differentiation. This was made possible by what I call inter-level investigative practices. These are practices that combine experimental manipulations from two (or more) different levels. I conclude that the two sciences are more closely related via their experimental practices than by any inter-level explanatory relations.

Causal Specificity, Biological Possibility and Non-parity about Genetic Causes

Several authors have used the notion of causal specificity in order to defend non-parity about ge... more Several authors have used the notion of causal specificity in order to defend non-parity about genetic causes (Waters 2007, Woodward 2010, Weber 2017, forthcoming). Non-parity in this context is the idea that DNA and some other biomolecules that are often described as information-bearers by biologists play a unique role in life processes, an idea that has been challenged by Developmental Systems Theory (e.g., Oyama 2000). Indeed, it has proven to be quite difficult to state clearly what the alleged special role of genetic causes consists in. In this paper, I show that the set of biomolecules that are normally considered to be information-bearers (DNA, mRNA) can be shown to be the most specific causes of protein primary structure, provided that causal specificity is measured over a relevant space of biological possibilities, disregarding physical as well as logically possible states of the causal variables.

How Objective Are Biological Functions?

John Searle has argued that functions owe their existence to the value that we put into life and ... more John Searle has argued that functions owe their existence to the value that we put into life and survival. In this paper, I will provide a critique of Searle's argument concerning the ontology of functions. I rely on a standard analysis of functional predicates as relating not only a biological entity (e.g., the heart), an activity that constitutes the function of this entity (e.g., pumping blood) and a type of system but also a goal state (e.g., survival or evolutionary fitness). A functional attribution without specification of such a goal state has no truth-value. But if completed with a goal state, functional attributions understood as four-place relations attain a truth-value. The truth conditions of all attributions of function involve a dependence claim of the goal state on the function bearer's activity. The nature of this dependence may differ; I consider five different possibilities: causality, mechanistic constitution, mereology, supervenience and metaphysical grounding. If these dependency relations are objective, Searle's central ontological thesis fails. What he ought to have said is that our valuing survival or other goal states may be the reason why biology seeks functional knowledge, but this has nothing to do with ontology. I will show further that Searle also raised an interesting challenge concerning the relationship of functional and causal truths, but it does not threaten the objectivity of functions either. At best, it could show that functional vocabulary is eliminable. However, I will show that functional vocabulary is not so eliminable.

Discussion Note: Which Kind of Causal Specificity Matters Biologically?

Griffiths et al. (2015) have proposed a quantitative measure of causal specificity and used it to... more Griffiths et al. (2015) have proposed a quantitative measure of causal specificity and used it to assess various attempts to single out genetic causes as being causally more specific than other cellular mechanisms, for example, alternative splicing. Focusing in particular on developmental processes, they have identified a number of important challenges for this project. In this discussion note, I would like to show how these challenges can be met.

On the Incompatibility of Dynamical Biological Mechanisms and Causal Graphs

I examine the adequacy of the structural causal modeling approach for representing biological mec... more I examine the adequacy of the structural causal modeling approach for representing biological mechanisms. I focus in particular on mechanisms with complex dynamics such as the PER biological clock mechanism in Drosophila. I show that a quantitative model of this mechanism that uses coupled differential equations – the well-known Goldbeter equations – cannot be adequately represented in the standard structural causal modeling framework, even though this framework does permit causal cycles. While an iterative model exists that provides an approximate solution for the Goldbeter equations and that qualifies as a structural causal model, the differential model itself is not causally equivalent to this iterative model. The reason is that the variables in the differential model cannot be subject to ideal interventions and do not satisfy the condition of modularity.

Thought Experiments in Biology

The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments, edited by Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige and James Robert Brown

Qu'est-ce qu'une vache ?

Aristote chez les Helvètes. Douze essais de métaphysique helvétique. Sous la direction d'Olivier Massin et Anne Meylan. Montreuil : Ithaque, Oct 13, 2014

Le problème : Comme l’a découvert Charles Darwin, les espèces ont une origine définie dans l’espa... more Le problème : Comme l’a découvert Charles Darwin, les espèces ont une origine définie dans l’espace-temps. Après leur naissance, elles subissent des changements évolutifs et périssent un jour. Ces caractéristiques ne s’accordent pas avec le caractère universel et abstrait de l’espèce conçue comme une essence immuable.
Solution proposée : Il faut considérer les espèces biologiques comme des entités concrètes qui ressemblent à des individus plutôt qu’à des essences.

Experimental Modeling in Biology: In Vivo Representation and Stand-ins As Modeling Strategies

Philosophy of Science 81: 756-769, Dec 1, 2014

Experimental modeling in biology involves the use of living organisms (not necessarily so- called... more Experimental modeling in biology involves the use of living organisms (not necessarily so- called model organisms) in order to model or simulate biological processes. I argue here that experimental modeling is a bona fide form of scientific modeling that plays an epi- stemic role that is distinct from that of ordinary biological experiments. What distinguishes them from ordinary experiments is that they use what I call “in vivo representations,” where one kind of causal process is used to stand in for a physically different kind of process. I discuss the advantages of this approach in the context of evolutionary biology.

Causal Selection versus Causal Parity in Biology: Relevant Counterfactuals and Biologically Normal Interventions

Forthcoming in: C. Kenneth Waters and James Woodward (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Causal Reasoning in Biology. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. XXI. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013

Causal selection is the task of picking out, from a field of known causally relevant factors, som... more Causal selection is the task of picking out, from a field of known causally relevant factors, some factors as elements of an explanation. The Causal Parity Thesis in the philosophy of biology challenges the usual ways of making such selections among different causes operating in a developing organism. The main target of this thesis is usually gene centrism, the doctrine that genes play some special role in ontogeny, which is often described in terms of information-bearing or programming. This paper is concerned with the attempt of confronting the challenge coming from the Causal Parity Thesis by offering principles of causal selection that are spelled out in terms of an explicit philosophical account of causation, namely an interventionist account. I show that two such accounts that have been developed, although they contain important insights about causation in biology, nonetheless fail to provide an adequate reply to the Causal Parity challenge: Ken Waters's account of actual-difference making and Jim Woodward's account of causal specificity. A combination of the two also doesn't do the trick, nor does Laura Franklin-Hall's account of explanation (in this volume). We need additional conceptual resources. I argue that the resources we need consist in a special class of counterfactual conditionals, namely counterfactuals the antecedents of which describe biologically normal interventions.

Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds

Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel, ed. by Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio and Anne Meylan, Jan 17, 2014

This paper examines causal theories of reference with respect to how plausible an account they g... more This paper examines causal theories of reference with respect to how plausible an account they give of non-physical natural kind terms such as ‘gene’ as well as of the truth of the associated theoretical claims. I first show that reference fixism for ‘gene’ fails. By this, I mean the claim that the reference of ‘gene’ was stable over longer historical periods, for example, since the classical period of transmission genetics. Second, I show that the theory of partial reference does not do justice to some widely held realist intuitions about classical genetics. This result is at loggerheads with the explicit goals usually associated with partial theories of reference, which is to defend a realist semantics for scientific terms. Thirdly, I show that, contrary to received wisdom and perhaps contrary to physics and chemistry, neither reference fixism nor partial reference are necessary in order to hold on to scientific realism about biology. I pinpoint the reasons for this in the nature of biological kinds, which do not even remotely resemble natural kinds (i.e., Lockean real essences) as traditionally conceived

Experiment in Biology (2018 update)

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2018

Experimentation versus Theory Choice: A Social-Epistemological Approach

Collective Epistemology, edited by Hans Bernhard Schmid, Daniel Sirtes and Marcel Weber, 2011