Papers by Benjamin Huppert
Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie, 2016
Zusammenfassung: Leistungssportlerinnen, die in populären Sportarten erfolgreich sind, kommen in ... more Zusammenfassung: Leistungssportlerinnen, die in populären Sportarten erfolgreich sind, kommen in den Genuss hoher Einkommen und großen sozialen Ansehens. Gleichzeitig ist ihr Erfolg von Voraussetzungen abhängig, die zu einem signifikanten Teil von ihrem Genotyp bestimmt werden. Diesen Sportlern werden also durch gesellschaftliche Prozesse substantielle Vorteile aufgrund von Eigenschaften zuteil, auf deren Vorhandensein sie keinen Einfluss haben. Wir untersuchen, wie wir vor dem Hintergrund verschiedener Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen mit diesem Phänomen umgehen sollten. Wir argumentieren, dass die konsistente Berücksichtigung von Intuitionen zur gerechten Güterverteilung an Wettkämpferinnen eine deutliche Ausweitung des Einsatzes von Wettkampfklassen erfordert. Die bestehenden Ungleichverteilungen lassen sich nicht allein mit Verweis auf ein Recht auf Selbsteigentum rechtfertigen. Sie verursachen auch keine Verbesserungen der Lage von besonders schlecht gestellten Individuen im Wirkungsbereich des Leistungssports, auf die zugunsten ihres Weiterbestehens verwiesen werden könnte. Trotz des erheblichen Aufwandes und der deutlichen Veränderungen im Charakter des Leistungssports, die mit der vorgeschlagenen Differenzierung von Wettkampfklassen einhergingen, ist diese Maßnahme geboten.
Recent experiments indicate that moral judgment is influenced by emotions and intuitions and at t... more Recent experiments indicate that moral judgment is influenced by emotions and intuitions and at times insensitive to argument. To the extent that such factors are morally irrelevant, day-to-day moral judgments are under the suspicion of being inadequate, all the more if there are evolutionary explanations for the factors’ efficacy. Yet, though influences on judgment are quickly pronounced irrelevant, it is rarely asked where impressions of moral relevance come from. Cultural and evolutionary psychology might provide answers. Evolved emotional psychological processes mark matters of fundamental moral concern, and the perceived relation between an object of judgment and these concerns affects moral judgments and judgments of moral relevance alike. Since evolutionary influences are omnipresent, they do not render moral judgments inadequate. Rather, psychological remoteness from evolved moral concerns could explain why some determinants of moral judgments appear morally irrelevant. In particular, the vocabulary of evolutionary explanations might regularly engender impressions of irrelevance.
Thesis Chapters by Benjamin Huppert
This dissertation examines the psychology of moral judgment and its implications for normative et... more This dissertation examines the psychology of moral judgment and its implications for normative ethics and metaethics. Recent empirical findings in moral psychology, such as the impact of emotions, intuitions, and situational factors on moral judgments, have sparked a debate about whether ordinary moral judgments are systematically error-prone. Some philosophers, such as Peter Singer and Joshua Greene, argue that these findings challenge the reliability of moral intuitions and support more "reasoned", consequentialist approaches over deontological ones. The first part of the dissertation reviews these provocative findings and the philosophical reactions to them, which often invoke the notion of 'moral relevance' - the idea that some factors shaping moral judgments are morally irrelevant. The second part develops a psychological account of moral relevance, drawing on theories of the moral domain, the role of emotions, and models of moral cognition. This account reveals the complex interplay of intuitive and reasoned processes in generating impressions of moral relevance. The final part reevaluates the philosophical discussions in light of this psychological understanding. It contends that the evolutionary background of moral intuitions does not necessarily render them inadequate, and that both deontological and consequentialist judgments likely depend on evolved intuitions to a significant degree. Furthermore, the tendency to dismiss certain influences on moral judgment as irrelevant can itself be explained psychologically. Considering the psychological account presented, mind-independent accounts of morality become less plausible. The dissertation concludes that while empirical moral psychology reveals important constraints on normative theorizing, it does not decisively favor consequentialism over deontology. To assess the significance of empirical-scientific findings for ethics, a nuanced understanding of the origins of moral judgments is nevertheless indispensable.
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Papers by Benjamin Huppert
Thesis Chapters by Benjamin Huppert