Contabilidad

Regional inequalities, fiscal decentralization and government quality. Regional Studies. There are theoretical arguments supporting the view that regional income inequalities, the degree of fiscal decentralization and the quality of government are simultaneously determined. This article argues that existing empirical work has failed to deal adequately with this possibility. In light of this, it applies a simultaneous equation model, which accounts for the joint determination of these three variables, to a panel of 23 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. The empirical evidence that emerges from the analysis suggests that a process of fiscal decentralization, accompanied by measures to improve the quality of government, would be an effective strategy for reducing regional inequalities.

This paper analyses the impact of different instruments of fiscal policy on economic growth as well as on income inequality, using an unbalanced panel of 43 upper-middle and high income countries for the period 1972-2006. We consider and estimate two individual equations explaining growth and inequality in order to assess the incidence of different fiscal policies. Firstly, our approach considers imposing orthogonal assumptions between growth and inequality in both equations, and secondly, it allows growth to be included in the inequality equation, and inequality to be included in the growth equation. The empirical results suggest that an increase in the size of government measured through current expenditures and direct taxes diminishes economic growth while reducing inequality, , being public investment the only fiscal policy that may break this trade-off between efficiency and equity, since increases in this item reduces inequality without harming output. Therefore, the results reflect that the trade-off between efficiency and equity that governments often confront when designing their fiscal policies may be avoided.

This paper analyses the relationship between income inequality and economic growth through fiscal policy. To this end, we present and estimate two systems of structural equations with error components through which gross income inequality determines different fiscal policy outcomes, which subsequently affects the evolution of economic growth and net income inequality. The empirical results, obtained using an unbalanced panel data of 21 high-income OCDE countries during the period 1972-2006, suggest that gross income inequality is a significant determinant of fiscal policy outcomes. Additionally, the results show that distributive expenditures and direct taxes produce significant reductions in GDP growth and net income inequality reflecting the standard efficiency-equity trade-off associated to certain fiscal policy measures.

The construction sector, whether privately or publically financed, is characterized by potentially large rents and government intervention. Not surprisingly then, both casestudy and survey evidence has been provided highlighting the problem of corruption in this sector. In this article, we test the proposition that a bigger construction sector is likely to be inimical to clean government based on a panel of 42 countries over the period 1995 to 2011. We control for a range of potentially counfounding variables and the expectation that corrupt public officials may favor the development of this sector because it increases the volume of rents available to them. Our empirical evidence shows that a larger construction sector will tend to worsen perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain.

This article analyses the redistributive efficiency of public spending and taxation in a panel of both advanced and developing economies during the last three decades (1984-2012). In order to explore how redistribution is achieved through fiscal policies, a two-stage approach is applied. First, we evaluate the redistributive efficiency of public spending and taxes by using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and obtain considerable variation in redistributive efficiency scores across countries. Second, we use panel truncated and OLS regression analysis to identify the determinants of these differences and reveal the crucial role of economic development, government quality and demographic factors.

En Uruguay, al igual que en todo el mundo ha aumentado sistemáticamente la tasa de nacimientos por cesáreas, llegando a ser en Montevideo en el año 2003 un 23% de los nacimientos en los hospitales públicos y un 42% en los privados. Utilizando los nacimientos registrados en el año 2003 (23.474) por el Sistema Informático Perinatal en Montevideo (Uruguay), se estima la probabilidad de tener una cesárea controlando por los principales factores de riesgo y por la endogeneidad en la elección del hospital donde se atienden. Los hospitales públicos montevideanos básicamente pagan por salario fijo y los privados por acto médico. Según predice la teoría en los primeros no hay ningún efecto del ingreso sobre la inducción y esta es cero, mientras que en los segundos es positiva, a la vez que se reduce para mujeres de menor riesgo médico. Por lo anterior, diferencias en las probabilidades irían en el sentido de confirmar la hipótesis de inducción de demanda en este acto médico en particular. Las estimaciones permiten afirmar que una mujer tiene 20% de probabilidad de tener una cesárea en un hospital público y un 39% en uno privado. A su vez, las diferencias entre los dos tipos de hospitales son mayores para mujeres de menor riesgo. Por ejemplo, aquellas mujeres que no presentaron ninguno de los riesgos médicos considerados en este estudio tienen un 11% de probabilidad de tener una cesárea en un hospital público y 25% si se atienden en un hospital privado-más del doble- .