Highlights by Danilo Fraga Dantas
Logos & Episteme, 2023
Bayesian epistemologists support the norms of probabilism and conditionalization using Dutch book... more Bayesian epistemologists support the norms of probabilism and conditionalization using Dutch book and accuracy arguments. These arguments assume that rationality requires agents to maximize practical or epistemic value in every doxastic state, which is evaluated from a subjective point of view (e.g., the agent’s expectancy of value). The accuracy arguments also presuppose that agents are opinionated. The goal of this paper is to discuss the assumptions of these arguments, including the measure of epistemic value. I have designed AI agents based on the Bayesian model and a nonmonotonic framework and tested how they achieve practical and epistemic value in conditions in which an alternative set of assumptions holds. In one of the tested conditions, the nonmonotonic agent, which is not opinionated and fulfills neither probabilism nor conditionalization, outperforms the Bayesian in the measure of epistemic value that I argue for in the paper (α-value). I discuss the consequences of these results for the epistemology of rationality.
Episteme, 2022
I propose the notion of 'epistemic sanity', a property of parsimony between the holding of true b... more I propose the notion of 'epistemic sanity', a property of parsimony between the holding of true but not false beliefs and the consideration of our cognitive limitations. Where 'alethic value' is the epistemic value of holding true but not false beliefs, the 'alethic potential' of an agent is the amount of extra alethic value that she is expected to achieve given her current environment, beliefs, and reasoning skills. Epistemic sanity would be related to the holding of (true or false) beliefs that increase the agent's alethic potential (relevant beliefs) but not of beliefs that decrease it (this is related to cognitive parsimony). Suspension of judgment, forgetting, and clutter avoidance are the main contributors to an agent's epistemic sanity, where this paper focuses on suspension. I argue that rational suspension favors the holding of true and relevant beliefs (only), which is not the case for the extremes of opinionation (no suspension) and skepticism (general suspension). In the absence of evidence for propositions in their agenda, opinionated agents are forced to rely on principles such as the principle of indifference, but indifference is dominated by suspension in terms of alethic value in some conditions. A rational agent would only find it beneficial to adopt skepticism if she considers herself to be an anti-expert about her whole agenda, but then 'flipping' beliefs maximizes expected alethic value in relation to skepticism. The study of epistemic sanity results in an 'impure' veritism, which can deal with limitations of veritism (e.g. explaining the existence of false but relevant beliefs).
Erkenntnis, 2021
I investigate two limitations of common approaches to the alethic aspect of epistemic rationality... more I investigate two limitations of common approaches to the alethic aspect of epistemic rationality. These approaches are either normative (what a reasoner ought to/may
believe?) or evaluative (how rational is a reasoner?), where evaluative approaches are often comparative (one reasoner is evaluated compared to another). The fact is that most of them fail in describing a standard of rationality satisfiable (i) on the face of blindspots and (ii) by finite reasoners (reasoners with limited cognitive resources). I propose a non-comparative evaluative function α, which accepts a set of beliefs as input and returns a numerical evaluation, and use this function to define a standard of rationality satisfiable on the face of blindspots and by finite reasoners. Function α also generates norms and evaluation methods (comparative and non-comparative) that can be used to investigate the rationality of finite reasoners and do not exhibit problems with blindspots. It is a result of this investigation that the project of providing alethic norms for finite reasoners is defective. In addition, the use of function α sheds light on important epistemological issues, such as the paradoxes of lottery and preface and the principles of clutter avoidance and reflection.
Disputatio, 2020
The causal and the simulation theories are often presented as two radically different views about... more The causal and the simulation theories are often presented as two radically different views about declarative memory. The causal theory states that remembering requires having an accurate representation standing in a causal connection with an earlier experience (the causal condition). The simulation theory states that remembering requires having an accurate representation generated by a reliable memory process, with no causal condition. In this paper, I argue that suitable versions of these theories are closely related. I start by investigating how these theories categorize memory errors (DRM, "lost in the mall", and memory-conjunction error) as misremembering or confabulation. These are problem-cases for a strong version of the causal, but not for the simulation theory because of too strong accuracy and causal conditions. I show how to fix the causal theory for these cases. The resulting causal and the simulation theories are closely related when implemented in information theory, differing only on how memory transmits information about the past. The implementation provides insights about the distinction between confabulatory and non-
confabulatory memory, where memory-conjunction errors has a privileged position.
Unisinos Journal of Philosophy - Philosophy South, 2018
All reasoners described in the most widespread models of a rational reasoner exhibit
logical omn... more All reasoners described in the most widespread models of a rational reasoner exhibit
logical omniscience, what is impossible for finite reasoners (real reasoners). The most common strategy for dealing with the problem of logical omniscience is to interpret the models using a notion of beliefs different from explicit beliefs. For example, the model could be interpreted as describing the beliefs that the reasoner would hold if the reasoner were able reason indefinitely (stable beliefs). Then the model would describe maximum rationality, what a finite reasoner can only approach in the limit of a reasoning sequence. This strategy has important consequences to epistemology. If a finite reasoner can only approach maximum rationality in the limit of a reasoning sequence, then the efficiency of reasoning is epistemically (and not only pragmatically) relevant. In section 1, I present
an argument to this conclusion. In section 2, I discuss the consequences of this conclusion, as, for example, the vindication of the principle 'no rationality through brute-force'.
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Highlights by Danilo Fraga Dantas
believe?) or evaluative (how rational is a reasoner?), where evaluative approaches are often comparative (one reasoner is evaluated compared to another). The fact is that most of them fail in describing a standard of rationality satisfiable (i) on the face of blindspots and (ii) by finite reasoners (reasoners with limited cognitive resources). I propose a non-comparative evaluative function α, which accepts a set of beliefs as input and returns a numerical evaluation, and use this function to define a standard of rationality satisfiable on the face of blindspots and by finite reasoners. Function α also generates norms and evaluation methods (comparative and non-comparative) that can be used to investigate the rationality of finite reasoners and do not exhibit problems with blindspots. It is a result of this investigation that the project of providing alethic norms for finite reasoners is defective. In addition, the use of function α sheds light on important epistemological issues, such as the paradoxes of lottery and preface and the principles of clutter avoidance and reflection.
confabulatory memory, where memory-conjunction errors has a privileged position.
logical omniscience, what is impossible for finite reasoners (real reasoners). The most common strategy for dealing with the problem of logical omniscience is to interpret the models using a notion of beliefs different from explicit beliefs. For example, the model could be interpreted as describing the beliefs that the reasoner would hold if the reasoner were able reason indefinitely (stable beliefs). Then the model would describe maximum rationality, what a finite reasoner can only approach in the limit of a reasoning sequence. This strategy has important consequences to epistemology. If a finite reasoner can only approach maximum rationality in the limit of a reasoning sequence, then the efficiency of reasoning is epistemically (and not only pragmatically) relevant. In section 1, I present
an argument to this conclusion. In section 2, I discuss the consequences of this conclusion, as, for example, the vindication of the principle 'no rationality through brute-force'.