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Ben Saunders

University of Southampton, Politics and International Relations, Faculty Member

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From 1st September 2014, I am Senior Lecturer (=Associate Professor) in Political Philosophy at the University of Southampton.

I completed my BA (2003), MPhil (2005) and DPhil (2008) at Jesus College, Oxford. I then held lectureships in philosophy at the Universities of Oxford (2008-10) and Stirling (2010-14).

http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5147-6397
Supervisors: Prof David Miller
Address: Politics & IR
Murray Building
Highfield Campus
University of Southampton
Southampton
SO17 1BJ

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Papers by Ben Saunders

Sortition: Past and Present

by Keith Sutherland, Josine Blok, Irad Malkin, Daniela Cammack, Paul Cartledge, Ruth Chang, Barbara Goodwin, Nadia Urbinati, Helene Landemore, Laurence Morel, Joanna Podgórska-Rykała, Ben Saunders, Yves Sintomer, Graham Smith, Paolo Spada, and Peter Stone

Journal of Sortition, 2025

Since ancient times sortition (random selection by lot) has been used both to distribute politica... more Since ancient times sortition (random selection by lot) has been used both to distribute political office and as a general prophylactic against factionalism and corruption in societies as diverse as classical-era Athens and the Most Serene Republic of Venice. Lotteries have also been employed for the allocation of scarce goods such as social housing and school places to eliminate bias and ensure just distribution, along with drawing lots in circumstances where unpopular tasks or tragic choices are involved (as some situations are beyond rational human decision-making). More recently, developments in public opinion polling using random sampling have led to the proliferation of citizens’ assemblies selected by lot. Some activists have even proposed such bodies as an alternative to elected representatives. The Journal of Sortition benefits from an editorial board with a wide range of expertise and perspectives in this area. In this introduction to the first issue, we have invited our editors (including James Fishkin, Graham Smith, Yves Sintomer, Helene Landemore, Josiah Ober, Paul Cartledge and others) to explain why they are interested in sortition, and to outline the benefits (and pitfalls) of the recent explosion of interest in the topic.

‘Eat Me’: Vegetarianism and Consenting Animals

Democracy and future generations

Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia e questioni pubbliche, Oct 5, 2014

t is sometimes suggested that democratic principles require that everyone whose interests are aff... more t is sometimes suggested that democratic principles require that everyone whose interests are affected by a decision should be included in the decision-making demos. For instance, Kristian Skagen Ekeli writes that "everyone whose living conditions and life prospects are seriously affected by a collectively binding decision, should also have the opportunity to influence the decision process and participate or be represented in the making of that decision." 1 Lecture 17 of Mulgan's Ethics for a Broken World begins with an observation and two important questions: "present decisions always impact (often very seriously) on future people. Not everyone affected by affluent "democratic" decisions was able to vote. But was this really democratic? Did affluent democracies treat future people justly?" 2 These two questions need to be taken separately, since it is possible, firstly, for democracies to act unjustly and, secondly, for

Sex Discrimination, Gender Balance, Justice and Publicity in Admissions

Journal of Applied Philosophy, Feb 1, 2010

This paper examines the problem of selecting a number of candidates to receive a good (admission)... more This paper examines the problem of selecting a number of candidates to receive a good (admission) from a pool in which there are more qualified applicants than places. I observe that it is rarely possible to order all candidates according to some relevant criterion, such as academic merit, since these standards are inevitably somewhat vague. This means that we are often faced with the task of making selections between near-enough equal candidates. I survey one particular line of response, which says that we should allow our choice of borderline candidates to be guided by non-relevant criteria such as gender-balancing. I argue that this would not, as commonly objected, be a case of sex discrimination if it is to be applied either in favour of men or women. Nonetheless, I argue that such policies are problematic because they violate the demand for publicity, which is required for legitimacy and to assure everyone that discrimination has not in fact taken place. Instead, I suggest that, if we are concerned to avoid discrimination, there may be a case for using lotteries as tie-breakers, not on grounds of fairness but to prevent taint of bias. Discrimination on grounds of sex, race, religion or age is often illegal. Even where it is not illegal, it is generally morally unjustified to favour one person over another on grounds not relevant to the matter in question. On the other hand, however, numerous attempts to combat the effects of unjustified discrimination, such as affirmative action programmes, have themselves been accused of being equally discriminatory. 1 This paper is not concerned with advantaging members of a previously disadvantaged group. Rather, I address the justification of seeking to promote group balance or diversity. I focus on sex, 2 but the arguments are supposed to apply more broadly to other categories such as race or religion. It is sometimes suggested that, where we are selecting a group of people for some good, such as college admission or jobs, then if we have already selected a disproportionately large number from one group (whether that group be men or women), we should favour members of the other group in deciding between borderline cases, in order to achieve a balance of men and women. This policy means that some candidates will be selected, rather than equally-qualified others, because of their sex and therefore it may well fall foul of legislation on sex discrimination. Since the policy does not predictably disadvantage either men or women, however, I shall argue that what is wrong with it is not that it is discriminatory-indeed, on this count it has something to be said for it, as it will act to counter any unconscious bias leading to the initially unequal sex distribution. Nonetheless, I conclude that such policies should not be endorsed because they fail to satisfy important criteria of publicity.Those excluded on grounds of balance will never be able to know whether selectors acted even-handedly in pursuing the goal of balance

Organ Donation: Opt In and Opt Out Strategies

eLS, Dec 17, 2012

Objectives. To overcome the shortage of organ donors, Scotland and England are introducing an opt... more Objectives. To overcome the shortage of organ donors, Scotland and England are introducing an opt-out organ donor registration system in 2020. This means individuals will be automatically considered to consent for donation unless they actively opt-out of the register. Research has found that emotional barriers play a key role in donor decisions under opt-in legislation, yet little is known about factors that influence donor decisions under opt-out consent. Our objectives were to investigate attitudes towards organ donation and opt-out consent from individuals who plan to opt-out, and to explore the reasons why they plan to opt-out. Design. Qualitative interview study. Methods. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 individuals from Scotland (n = 14) and England (n = 1) who self-reported the intention to opt-out of the register following the legislative change to opt-out. The interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed using thematic analysis. Results. Three main themes were identified: (1) consent versus coercion, which describes the perception of freedom of choice under an opt-in system and fears of 'government interference' and threatened autonomy under opt-out, (2) self-protection, encompassing fears of medical mistrust, bodily integrity concerns, and apprehension regarding the recipient selection process, and lastly, (3) 'riddled with pitfalls', which includes the notion that opt-out consent may increase susceptibility of stigma and reproach when registering an opt-out decision. Conclusions. This study reinforces existing opt-in literature surrounding medical mistrust and bodily integrity concerns. A threat to one's autonomous choice and heightened reactance arising from perceptions of unwarranted government control have emerged as novel barriers. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Book Review: Political Theory: The Luck of the Draw: The Role of Lotteries in Decision Making

Political Studies Review, Apr 4, 2012

Saward briefly outlines provisional conditions of democratic legitimacy, but he argues that presu... more Saward briefly outlines provisional conditions of democratic legitimacy, but he argues that presumptive constituents should remain the final judges of whether someone actually represents them. And such judgements, Saward writes, are best assessed on a case-bycase basis. In this respect, The Representative Claim both offers useful insights into the concept of representation and raises important questions for empirical research.

Reformulating Mill’s Harm Principle

Mind, Aug 30, 2016

Mill's harm principle is commonly supposed to rest on a distinction between selfregarding conduct... more Mill's harm principle is commonly supposed to rest on a distinction between selfregarding conduct, which is not liable to interference, and other-regarding conduct, which is. As critics have noted, this distinction is difficult to draw. Furthermore, some of Mill's own applications of the principle, such as his forbidding of slavery contracts, do not appear to fit with it. This article proposes that the self-regarding/ other-regarding distinction is not in fact fundamental to Mill's harm principle. The sphere of protected liberty includes not only (most) self-regarding conduct, but also actions that affect only consenting others. On the other hand, the occasional permissibility of interfering with self-regarding conduct can plausibly be explained by reference to the agent's consent. Thus, the more important distinction appears to be that between consensual and non-consensual harm, rather than that between the self-regarding and non-self-regarding action. That is, interference can be justified in order to prevent non-consensual harms, but not to prevent consensual harms. It is argued that the harm principle, thus reformulated, both captures Mill's intentions and is a substantively plausible position.

Minimum pricing for alcohol: a Millian perspective

Contemporary social science, Feb 1, 2013

Tasting democracy

Public Policy Research, Sep 1, 2010

First, do no harm: Generalized procreative non-maleficence

Bioethics, Aug 8, 2017

The Democratic Turnout ‘Problem’

Political Studies, Dec 5, 2011

Defining the demos

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Sep 22, 2011

Altruism or Solidarity? The Motives for Organ Donation and Two Proposals

Bioethics, Jul 25, 2012

Book Review: Democracy and Disenfranchisement: The Morality of Electoral Exclusions, by Claudio López-Guerra

Political Theory, Sep 23, 2015

6. Bickford, Dissonance; Dobson, Listening, 36. 7. Bennett, Vibrant Matter; Coles, Rethinking Gen... more 6. Bickford, Dissonance; Dobson, Listening, 36. 7. Bennett, Vibrant Matter; Coles, Rethinking Generosity; Connolly, Ethos; Connolly, World of Becoming; Connolly, Identity/Difference; Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). Dobson’s neglect of agonistic democracy might stem from his misunderstanding of it. He writes that “agonists cannot know what they are agonizing about without listening out for contending points of view” (Listening, 97). This way of posing the problem identifies agony as the fundamental experience of this sort of agonistic politics, but one does not get that sense from reading agonistic democrats, who affirm contestation, uncertainty, contingency, and risk. Something about those experiences may be agonizing, but Dobson’s characterization remains inapt. 8. Connolly, Ethos of Pluralization. 9. Coles, Rethinking Generosity. In fairness, Dobson does briefly discuss receptivity (Listening, 20), but this also undermines his claim that Bickford is the only political theorist who has emphasized listening. 10. Listening, chap. 4. 11. Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 12. Listening, 172. 13. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 14. Listening, 64–66. 15. Ibid., 67. 16. Ibid., 68. 17. Ibid., 69. 18. Ibid., 68.

AMBIGUOUS ACCOUNTABILITIES - Valerie Sperling: Altered States: The Globalization of Accountability (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pp. viii, 388. $85.00, $27.99, paper.)

The Review of Politics, 2010

Introduction: Symposium on Democratic Authority

Representation, Apr 1, 2010

The Food Additives and Contaminants-Surveillance Database is a searchable database containing all... more

Combining lotteries and voting

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Jan 27, 2012

The Athenian practice of sortition (random selection) has inspired a number of recent proposals f... more The Athenian practice of sortition (random selection) has inspired a number of recent proposals for democratic reform. Some theorists suggest that politicians themselves be selected randomly, thereby producing a statistically representative sample of the population (Callenbach and Phillips, 2008). Others seek ways of combining lotteries with the more familiar modern practice of voting. I shall confine my comments to two recent proposals of this latter sort. My aim is to explore similarities and differences between ex ante and ex post lottery voting, in order to clarify when each may be preferable. In a recent article in this journal, López-Guerra (2011) suggests abolishing universal suffrage, instead having only a randomly selected subset of the populace vote in elections. Though he is reluctant to endorse this policy all things considered, he argues that it would likely produce better outcomes, since it allows selected voters to participate in a programme of education and deliberation prior to the actual election. This proposal is similar to that of a national ‘deliberation day’ (Ackerman and Fishkin, 2005), except that participation is restricted to a sample of the population, largely on grounds of cost (López-Guerra, 2011: 218–9, 222). The second proposal is one that I have developed elsewhere (Saunders, 2010), namely (ex post) lottery voting. This is an alternative to majority rule; elections are held as normal, but rather than the majority winning automatically, a single, randomly selected vote determines the outcome. Consequently, each side has a chance of victory proportionate to the level of support it enjoys among the electorate. At first sight, these two policies are quite different. López-Guerra claims that democracy is possible without universal franchise, provided that all have a chance of being enfranchised. My suggestion is that democracy is possible without majority rule, provided that all have a chance of being decisive. These proposals could be combined: we could restrict the franchise to a random sample of the population and have their decision determined by a randomly selected individual. It is, however, fruitful to compare

Making Voting Pay

Politics, Jun 1, 2009

Those who regard low turnout as a particular problem for democracy are sometimes led to endorse c... more Those who regard low turnout as a particular problem for democracy are sometimes led to endorse compulsory voting as a solution. However, even if there is a moral duty to vote, such legal coercion seems illiberal. This article, by appeal to the analogous case of blood donations, suggests that we should consider instead paying people incentives to vote. This would achieve the aim of increasing turnout, particularly among underrepresented groups, without threatening individual liberty in the way that compulsion seems to. The turnout problem It is sometimes suggested that the turnout problem facing modern democracies is sufficient to justify compulsory voting. However, even if there is a duty to vote, many find the idea of legal coercion troubling. This article suggests an alternative means of increasing turnout based on the carrot rather than the stick: that is, incentive payments to encourage turnout. While I cannot prove that this proposal is preferable to compulsion, it seems less objectionable, in terms of individual liberty, and possibly more efficient, so it is worthy of more consideration. Aristotle classified forms of government according to whether they involved the rule of one, few or many (Aristotle, 1992, p. 189 (1279a22 ff.)). Thus, what distinguishes democracy from oligarchy or dictatorship is the breadth of the franchise. While Athenian democracy was actually little more than a broadly based oligarchy, with participation rights restricted to male citizens (excluding women, resident foreigners and slaves), modern democracies are characterised by a near-universal franchise. Since the nineteenth-century Reform Acts, we have seen a steady expansion in voting rights, which now include the poor, women and those aged 18-21. There are ongoing practical and theoretical debates about further expanding the franchise, including lowering the voting age to 16 and enfranchising foreigners whose interests are affected (Goodin, 2007). This widening dispersal of power can only be seen as increasing democracy, yet there are reasons for concern. It is generally observed that turnout in many modern democracies is low and falling (e.g. Lijphart, 1997, pp. 5-7). Despite wide formal enfranchisement, fewer and fewer wish to exercise their vote. The result is that power is again wielded by a self-selecting group of active citizens, while others are effectively excluded from politics. High rates of abstention may be seen as a problem for various reasons. One might wish that voting was truly universal, perhaps because one values the ideal of an

Normative consent and organ donation: a vindication

Journal of Medical Ethics, Mar 23, 2011

In an earlier article, I argued that David Estlund's notion of 'normative consent' could provide ... more In an earlier article, I argued that David Estlund's notion of 'normative consent' could provide justification for an opt-out system of organ donation that does not involve presumptions about the deceased donor's consent. THE POLITICS OF TAKING ORGANS Potts et al question how it is that one can allow people to opt-out if doing so is morally wrong. 2 It is not the role of the state to enforce all of our moral obligationsdfor example, fidelity.

Opt-out organ donation without presumptions

Journal of Medical Ethics, Aug 9, 2011

This paper defends an 'opt-out' scheme for organ procurement, by distinguishing this system from ... more