John Skalko
I hold a PhD in Philosophy from The Center for Thomistic Studies at The University of St. Thomas (TX), where I did my dissertation on intrinsically evil actions that involve an evident rupture in natural teleology. During my time at UST, I also worked in bioethics under one of the pioneers of field, the late Prof. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., with Oxford University Press.
My areas of specialization are Applied Ethics, Philosophical Animal Cognition, and Thomas Aquinas, but I also possess competence in Medieval Philosophy, Modern Philosophy, Bioethics, Philosophy of Nature, Logic (both Aristotelian & symbolic), and Thomistic Epistemology.
My current areas of interest largely consist in the philosophy of cognition (particularly as applied to animals) as well as some work on the ethics of AI.
In animal cognition, I have been working on a book delineating the history of thought on animals from Aristotle thru Darwin to current research on recent ape studies such as Nim Chimpsky. I also have been doing work on the stages of animal action in light of the cognitive framework of Thomas Aquinas via Albertus Magnus & Avicenna as applied to my observations of over 50 animal species in Costa Rica.
In the realm of AI, I am interested in the question of the ethics of lethal autonomous robots and cyberwarfare as applied to justice in going to war.
Supervisors: Steven Jensen (dissertation director), C. F. J. Martin (reader), Thomas M. Osborne, and Jr. (reader)
My areas of specialization are Applied Ethics, Philosophical Animal Cognition, and Thomas Aquinas, but I also possess competence in Medieval Philosophy, Modern Philosophy, Bioethics, Philosophy of Nature, Logic (both Aristotelian & symbolic), and Thomistic Epistemology.
My current areas of interest largely consist in the philosophy of cognition (particularly as applied to animals) as well as some work on the ethics of AI.
In animal cognition, I have been working on a book delineating the history of thought on animals from Aristotle thru Darwin to current research on recent ape studies such as Nim Chimpsky. I also have been doing work on the stages of animal action in light of the cognitive framework of Thomas Aquinas via Albertus Magnus & Avicenna as applied to my observations of over 50 animal species in Costa Rica.
In the realm of AI, I am interested in the question of the ethics of lethal autonomous robots and cyberwarfare as applied to justice in going to war.
Supervisors: Steven Jensen (dissertation director), C. F. J. Martin (reader), Thomas M. Osborne, and Jr. (reader)
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Papers by John Skalko
PLEASE NOTE: this is the penultimate version. Please cite only the finalized version forthcoming in the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
PLEASE NOTE: this is (hopefully) the penultimate draft of the paper before publication with the Proceedings of the ACPA. The paper still needs to go through the proofing process. Please only cite the finalized published version!
Aquinas held that lying is always a sin, an evil action (ST II-II, Q110, A3). In later terminology it falls under what would be called an intrinsically evil action. Under no circumstances can it be a good action. Following Augustine, Aquinas held that even if others must die, one must still never tell a lie (ST II-II, Q110, A3, ad 4, DM Q15, A1, ad 5). Yet when it comes to self-defense and capital punishment Aquinas’s reasoning seems at odds with itself. One may kill a man in self-defense (ST II-II, Q64, A7). Similarly, just as a diseased limb may be cutoff for the sake of the good of the whole, so too may an evildoer who is dangerous to the community be killed for the sake of the good of the whole community (ST II-II, Q64, A2). Herein lies the tension: why does Aquinas hold that it is licit to kill in self-defense or in capital punishment on account of the common good, but that one may never tell a lie on account of the common good? I argue Aquinas does indeed have a consistent account. Killing and lying are not analogous, despite the prima facie temptation to lump them together.
NOTE: an updated and revised version of this paper has been published in the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Please cite the published version.
This paper analyzes the different accounts of Aquinas and Scotus and then goes onto argue for the Thomistic position based upon scriptural interpretation and upon some more recent magisterial documents.
Opponents of Thomism, attacked the real distinction by exploiting the typical usage of the potency-act distinction. As a result, development was needed in understanding the notion of potency and act as used within the real distinction. This paper traces that history.
Animals do not have an intellect. Current ape studies actually support this view.
Publications by John Skalko
PLEASE SEE THE BELOW LINK TO ACCESS THIS ARTICLE FOR FREE:
http://www.teof.uni-lj.si/uploads/File/BV/BV2018/01/Skalko.pdf
[Feel free to message me for a copy, as I cannot post it in full here.].
The full article can be found here: https://www.pdcnet.org/C1257D43006C9AB1/file/33FB3CCD049B4347C1257D560065EC2E/$FILE/ncbq_2013_0013_0003_0069_0083.pdf
Drafts by John Skalko
I argue that given a proper definition of male and female it logically follows that there are only two biological sexes. This paper is a more robust, albeit short, philosophical account of the later article published in Public Discourse. Comments and charitable criticisms are welcome. I am working on developing it into a much longer article for another publication.
Dissertation by John Skalko
There has been much discussion in the literature in the last few decades concerning what constitutes a lie. Many different definitions have been proposed. For the sake of greater clarity, I begin with a broad division of definitions of lying into what I call the moral and non-moral definitions of lying (each of which has further subdivisions). The moral definitions of lying include moral terms such as “right,” “undue,” “unreasonable,” or “wrong” within the definition. Non-moral definitions, by contrast, include no moral terms either explicitly or implicitly. Non-moral definitions are overwhelmingly the more widely accepted view, both among philosophers and the common man. Nevertheless, it is important to treat the moral definitions, which would, if correct, have a significant impact on the debate over the morality of lying.
Book Reviews by John Skalko