Books by Susanna Schellenberg
'The Unity of Perception is a splendid achievement. It fuses the representational, phenomenal, an... more 'The Unity of Perception is a splendid achievement. It fuses the representational, phenomenal, and epistemic dimensions of perception into a coherent whole, bound together by their common basis in the exercise of perceptual capacities. Central to the account is Schellenberg's broadly Fregean theory of perceptual content, which assigns a pivotal role to modes of presentation (MOPs). Schellenberg develops the theory in impressive detail, applying it to a wide range of cases. ' Michael Rescorla, UCLA, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 'Schellenberg's excellent book will undoubtedly have a wide audience among philosophers of mind and epistemologists. Among other virtues, it offers (i) innovative and plausible arguments for the superiority of representationalist theories of perception over disjunctivist and naive realist theories, (ii) the first systematic attempt to develop the view that the contents of perceptual states are robustly particular, with entities like Hillary Clinton and that table serving as their constituents, and (iii) a sustained defense of the idea that our concepts of perceptual evidence are externalist in character. The book is unique in the current literature in seeking accounts of the metaphysical and epistemological dimensions of perception that are mutually reinforcing. ' Christopher Hill, Brown University 'The Unity of Perception offers a grand synoptic vision of how perception, consciousness and knowledge fit together. It is a remarkable achievement . . . there is every reason for philosophers with an interest in mind or epistemology to read The Unity of Perception. ' Alex Byrne, MIT, Analysis 'Capacities are powerful predictive, explanatory tools for theorizing about subjects, minds, and performance. According to The Unity of Perception, capacities anchor a systematic, far-reaching account of perception and perceptual consciousness. ' Casey O'Callaghan, Washington University in St. Louis, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 'The Unity of Perception is an ambitious and wide-ranging book-one that presents a unified account and then uses it to address Big Questions about perception . . . Schellenberg' s proposals are important, and will play a role in future discussion of these matters. ' Jonathan Cohen, UCSD, Analysis 'Rich and rewarding. ' Matthew McGrath, Rutgers University, Analysis 'The Unity of Perception is an interesting and thought-provoking book. The central view-capacitism-and its broad implications for philosophy of perception, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science make this book a valuable contribution to anyone working on perception, and I have no doubt that it will draw a great deal of well-deserved attention. '
Papers by Susanna Schellenberg
What Is Explanatorily Fundamental in an Analysis of Perception?
Logic, epistemology, and the unity of science, 2024
Schroeder on reasons, experience, and evidence
Philosophical Studies
Fregean Particularism
Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 18, 2018
Chapter 4 develops Fregean particularism, thereby providing the details of my account of singular... more Chapter 4 develops Fregean particularism, thereby providing the details of my account of singular content. Fregean particularism advances a new understanding of singular modes of presentation: perceptual content is constituted by the perceptual capacities employed and the particulars (if any) thereby singled out. These modes of presentation can be individuated at the level of content types and token contents. Perceptions, hallucinations, and illusions with the same phenomenal character are constituted by employing the same perceptual capacities; they thereby share a content type. But the token content of perception, hallucination, and illusion differs at least in part. If one perceives a particular, one employs perceptual capacities that successfully single out that particular. Thereby, the token content is constituted by the particular singled out and thus is singular content. If one fails to single out a particular (perhaps because one is suffering an illusion or hallucination), the token content is gappy.
Perceptual Evidence
Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 18, 2018
Chapter 7 introduces a distinction between two kinds of evidence: phenomenal evidence (evidence t... more Chapter 7 introduces a distinction between two kinds of evidence: phenomenal evidence (evidence that corresponds to how our environment sensorily seems to us) and factive evidence (evidence that is determined by the environment to which we are perceptually related). Regardless of whether we are perceiving, hallucinating, or suffering an illusion, we have phenomenal evidence. However, when we perceive, we have additional factive evidence. The rational source of both phenomenal and factive evidence lies in employing perceptual capacities: perceptual states have epistemic force due to the epistemic and metaphysical primacy of employing perceptual capacities in perception over employing them in hallucination or illusion. So epistemic force stems from an asymmetric dependence of the employment of perceptual capacities in hallucination and illusion on their employment in perception. Insofar as both kinds of evidence stem from properties of the perceptual capacities employed, capacitism provides a unified account of phenomenal and factive evidence.
Bayesian Liberalism
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 23, 2020
This article defends liberalism, that is, the view that perceivers are justified in their percept... more This article defends liberalism, that is, the view that perceivers are justified in their perceptual beliefs simply on grounds of the perceptions on which the beliefs are based. By critically discussing several conservativist objections, it shows that liberalism is compatible with standard Bayesianism. This argument calls into question an assumption in the conservatist objections, an assumption that can be traced back to Pyrrhonian skepticism, namely, that the acquisition of perceptual evidence is primarily a matter of forming introspective beliefs about seemings or appearances. By contrast, this essay argues that the formation of introspective beliefs is an extra step over and above the acquisition of perceptual evidence. Forming the relevant introspective beliefs requires the possession of seeming or appearance concepts. However, subjects can acquire perceptual evidence, on this view, even if they lack these concepts or are incapable of forming the relevant introspective beliefs. Thus, the essay defends Bayesian liberalism.
Capacitism and Alternative Views
Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 18, 2018
Chapter 10 discusses the difference between capacitism and relevant alternative views: knowledge-... more Chapter 10 discusses the difference between capacitism and relevant alternative views: knowledge-first epistemology, reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. Capacitism is a distinctive externalist view of evidence and knowledge that does not invoke reliability, remains steadfastly naturalistic, and in recognizing a metaphysically substantive common element between perception and hallucination avoids any commitment to disjunctivism.
The generality and particularity of perception
Mind & Language, Apr 1, 2022
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 21, 2017
Robert B. Brandom: Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Experimenting and Discoursive Committment
Argument 2.1 Allocentric Frames of Reference and Alter-Ego Vantage Points 3. The Self-Location Ar... more Argument 2.1 Allocentric Frames of Reference and Alter-Ego Vantage Points 3. The Self-Location Argument 4. Conclusion III. SELLARSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON PERCEPTION AND NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT 1. Functional Roles and Rules of Application 2. Relating Thoughts to Objects 3. Intuitions and Demonstratives 4. Conclusion v IV. PERCEPTUAL CONTENT, REPRESENTATIONS, AND RELATIONS 1. Relations and Representations 2. Relational Contents 3. Criticism of Object-Dependent Perceptual Content 4. Perceptual Content without Epistemic Intermediaries 5. Conclusion BIBLIOGRAPHY vi I have older debts. I am strongly influenced by Friedrich Kambartel, my advisor in Frankfurt. He showed me what it means to think carefully, what it means to think about topics that matter, and always to distinguish between terminological and philosophical disputes. I was lucky to have had the chance to be taught by him at an early stage and I hope that I learnt from him. My warmest thanks also to Beni Adler, Brigitta Bernet, Renata Burckhardt, and Harry Witzthum for igniting my interest in philosophy more than a decade ago and for their loyal friendship ever since. For better or worse, I wouldn't be who I am without them. My greatest debt is to my parents. I have been inspired by my mother's creativity and integrity and my father's idealism and dedication. I thank them for everything. *** I am grateful to the Norwegian Research Council for their generous funding.
Noûs, Jan 20, 2011
Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being... more Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to accounts of perceptual content on which perceptual relations to the world play no explanatory role. With austere relationalists, I will argue that perceptual experience is fundamentally relational. But against austere relationalists, I will argue that it is fundamentally both relational and representational.
The Journal of Philosophy, 2013
H ow do imaginings, beliefs, and desires relate to yield actions and affective responses? In this... more H ow do imaginings, beliefs, and desires relate to yield actions and affective responses? In this paper, I will argue that any answer to this question should satisfy the following three desiderata: (D1) Imaginings induce actions only in conjunction with beliefs about the environment of the imagining subject. (D2) There is a continuum between imaginings and beliefs. Recognizing this continuum is crucial to explain the phenomenon of imaginative immersion. (D3) The mental states that relate to imaginings in the way that desires relate to beliefs are a special kind of desire, namely desires to make true in fiction. These desires to make true in fiction do not differ from regular desires in kind, but only in content.
The Journal of Philosophy, 2008
Mind, Jul 1, 2007
I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of o... more I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that having such a conception of space presupposes that a subject represent her location in relation to perceived objects. More precisely the thesis is that a subject represents her location as the location from which she both perceives objects and would act in relation to objects were she to act. So I argue that perception depends on the capacity to know what it would be to act in relation to objects. It is striking that only agents are perceivers. I argue that it is no coincidence. Perceivers are not just passive receivers of information. They are agents in the world. The thesis that perception is dependent on action has a long history in philosophy, but has rarely been argued for in any detail. Aristotle can be read as arguing in De Anima that only beings that are self-movers can perceive.
The Unity of Perception
Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 18, 2018
Perception is our key to the world. It plays at least three different roles in our lives. It just... more Perception is our key to the world. It plays at least three different roles in our lives. It justifies beliefs and provides us with knowledge of our environment. It brings about conscious mental states. It converts informational input, such as light and sound waves, into representations of invariant features in our environment. Corresponding to these three roles, there are at least three fundamental questions that have motivated the study of perception. How does perception justify beliefs and yield knowledge of our environment? How does perception bring about conscious mental states? How does a perceptual system accomplish the feat of converting varying informational input into mental representations of invariant features in our environment? This book develops a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perception that is informed by empirical research. So it develops an account of perception that provides an answer to the first two questions, while being sensitive to scientific accounts that address the third question. The key idea is that perception is constituted by employing perceptual capacities—for example the capacity to discriminate instances of red from instances of blue. Perceptual content, consciousness, and evidence are each analyzed in terms of this basic property of perception. Employing perceptual capacities constitutes phenomenal character as well as perceptual content. The primacy of employing perceptual capacities in perception over their derivative employment in hallucination and illusion grounds the epistemic force of perceptual experience. In this way, the book provides a unified account of perceptual content, consciousness, and evidence.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 19, 2010
Noûs, Aug 1, 2017
I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in... more I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of (sensory awareness relations to) peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind-independent properties, propositions, sense-data, qualia, or intentional objects. When we attempt to reduce complex operations to simpler and simpler ones, we find in the end that discrimination or differential response is the fundamental operation. Discrimination is prerequisite even to the operation of denoting or 'pointing to'.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Dec 14, 2010
I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hall... more I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perception are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. These concepts and nonconceptual structures are identified with modes of presentation types. Since a hallucinating subject is not related to any such objects or property-instances, the concepts she employs remain empty. I argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations and perceptions can be identified with employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual structures. By doing so, I defend an ontologically minimalist view of the phenomenology of experience that (1) vindicates Aristotelianism about types and (2) amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience. Galileo: Vision is perfect. People have very good eyes. Apicius: Whose weak eyes, then, need the help of your lenses? Galileo: They are the eyes of the philosophers. When a subject sees an object instantiating certain properties, it is natural to say that it seems to her that she is seeing an object instantiating those properties because she is perceptually related to that very object and those very property-instances. So when she sees a white cup, it seems to her that there is a white cup precisely because she is perceptually related to a white cup. By definition,
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Books by Susanna Schellenberg
Papers by Susanna Schellenberg