Papers by James Elliott
Bulletin de l’Académie Belge pour l’Étude des Langues Anciennes et Orientales, 2020
oliticians nowadays seem all-too-ready to appeal to the "Wisdom of Hindsight." To paraphrase the ... more oliticians nowadays seem all-too-ready to appeal to the "Wisdom of Hindsight." To paraphrase the opening to one of Rabbie Burns' poems 1 : "O wad some Pow'r the giftie gie us", life would be the sweeter, if I be really freed from blunders-if not "a foolish notion." As the editor of the International Greek New Testament to Luke 2 in 1984 and 1987, I had accepted what the appointed language specialists had told me about "their" version. It was only later that I realised that much of the alleged versional support that I showed in that IGNTP apparatus and even singular and sub-singular versional readings could and should be avulsed. Many are purely inner-versional, relevant only if one's aim is to look at that particular manuscript, its scribe and that version in toto; many concern definite articles, personal pronouns, particles, conjunctions and other "little" words; or are word-order variation or certain verbal tenses. None-or very few-ought to be in the apparatus to a Greek New Testament, which I then thought I was being expected to produce. The wisdom of hindsight may indeed have encouraged me to jettison many an abbreviation for those versions. So, today's message (or "text") is to have only very few and relevant versional variants in an apparatus
New Testament Textual Criticism:The Application of Thoroughgoing Principles, 2010
A Bibliography of Greek New Testament Manuscripts. J. K. Elliott
The Biblical Archaeologist, 1991
The Purdue Historian, 2013
Part I-The Socratic Elenchus "I found this [Socratic] method the safest for myself and very embar... more Part I-The Socratic Elenchus "I found this [Socratic] method the safest for myself and very embarrassing to those against whom I used it; therefore, I took delight in it, practiced it continually, and grew very artful and expert in drawing people, even of superior knowledge, into concessions the consequences of which they did not foresee, entangling them in difficulties out of which they could not extricate themselves, and so obtaining victory that neither myself nor my causes always deserved."-Benjamin Franklin, Papers 1 What is the elenchus? Consider this excerpt from Plato's Euthyphro: "Is the pious [itself] not the same and alike in every action? … Tell me then what this form itself is, so that I may look upon it and, using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another's that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not." 2 Here, Socrates is interrogating Euthyphro, a self-reported religious expert, as to the nature of piety. When Socrates first enquires as to what exactly "piety" is (notably a self-serving enquiry, as Socrates is about to hear his own trial regarding his alleged impiety), Euthyphro quickly states that piety is his imputation for his father's wrongdoing. Socrates, however, is not very fond of this response; in fact, he points out that Euthyphro's response is indeed an example of piety, not a definition; moreover, Euthyphro's answer seems to be morally ambiguous (is it right to impute your father?). The quotation above is Socrates' follow-up-having claimed that certain acts can be pious, Euthyphro has committed himself to believing that there is some sort of intrinsic quality to these "pious actions"; Socrates now enquires as to this intrinsic quality (namely, "the pious [itself]"), and Euthyphro is now forced to justify his claim and explicate this apparent intrinsic quality. This bit of text exemplifies what the Greeks called elenchus (Attic: ελεγχοςto scrutinize, refute, or cross-examine), and what we now call the "Socratic method". It is important to note that Socrates was not the inventor of the elenchus, however-the honorary title is merely 1 Quotation pulled from Nails, Debra, "Socrates", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition), Ed. Edward N. Zalta. Emphasis placed by myself.
Religious Studies
J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion... more J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes ‘Ultimism’ – the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality – to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In this article I shall argue that Ietsism – the proposition that there is merely something transcendental worth committing ourselves to religiously – is a preferable object of assent. This is for two primary reasons. First, Ietsism is far more modest than Ultimism; Ietsism, in fact, is open to the truth of Ultimism, while the converse does not hold. Second, Ietsism can fulfil the same criteria that compel Schellenberg to argue for Ultimism.
In an unsung yet excellent paper, W.Z. Harvey set out to explain how both Maimonides and Spinoza ... more In an unsung yet excellent paper, W.Z. Harvey set out to explain how both Maimonides and Spinoza have similarly problematic views on the nature of the knowledge of good and evil. In it, he proposed an answer to solving the problem. In the many decades since, debates surrounding this topic have flourished. A recent paper by Joshua Parens, his conclusions mark a distinction between Spinoza and Maimonides that threaten to undermine Harvey’s solution to the problem. I will argue that, although Parens’ distinction forces us to revise Harvey’s contention, Harvey’s argument is still generally valid.
J. L. Schellenberg’s Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion tha... more J. L. Schellenberg’s Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes ‘Ultimism’ – the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality – to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In this article I shall argue that Ietsism – the proposition that there is merely something transcendental worth committing ourselves to religiously – is a preferable object of assent. This is for two primary reasons. First, Ietsism is far more modest than Ultimism; Ietsism, in fact, is open to the truth of Ultimism, while the converse does not hold. Second, Ietsism can fulfil the same criteria that compel Schellenberg to argue for Ultimism.
Book Reviews by James Elliott
Drafts by James Elliott
Although the relationship between faith and intellectual humility has yet to be specifically addr... more Although the relationship between faith and intellectual humility has yet to be specifically addressed in the philosophical literature, there are reasons to believe that they are incompatible, especially when judging from popular writings and pre-theoretical intuitions. In this paper I attempt to specify and explicate this incompatibility, which is found in specific conflicting epistemic attitudes they each respectively invite. I first suggest general definitions of both faith and intellectual humility (understood as intellectual virtues), building off current proposals in the literature, in an attempt to portray both in as broad and uncontroversial a manner as feasible. I then move to arguing how this prima facie incompatibility aligns with these understandings of faith and intellectual humility, and illustrate how this incompatibility is even clearer on one recent theory. I close by considering one avenue of response for those who want to maintain that, while conflicting in these ways, intellectual humility and faith can be simultaneously virtuous.
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Papers by James Elliott
Book Reviews by James Elliott
Drafts by James Elliott