Social Externalism and Semantic Deference: A Reexamination of Dignāga's Apoha Theory
Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2025
In this study, I attempt to reexamine Dignāga’s apoha theory through the lens of semantic deferen... more In this study, I attempt to reexamine Dignāga’s apoha theory through the lens of semantic deference. The present paper consists of two main parts. In the first part, I will demonstrate that based on PS(V) 5.25−30 and PS(V) 5.34, Dignāga’s apoha theory should be counted as a social externalist theory of reference. I will also explain how this makes him very contrasting to a group of Apohavādins represented by Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, whose theories have a strongly individualistic character. Then, in the second part, I will first elucidate how Dignāga’s account of the use of words supports the idea of semantic deference and explains the phenomenon of imperfect mastery—viz., a speaker can competently use a word to refer to things without fully mastering that word. Then, I will illustrate how PS(V) 5.34 and PS(V) 5.50b represent two different traditions about semantic deference in the history of philosophy. And finally, there will be a brief discussion of the problem of ungroundedness in Dignāga’s apoha theory as presented in PS(V) 5.34.
The semantic internalist–externalist debate is one of the central themes in contemporary philosop... more The semantic internalist–externalist debate is one of the central themes in contemporary philosophy. The present paper aims to explore the dispute between Śāntarakṣita and his opponents over the meaning of words (śabdārtha) in the śabdārthaparīkṣā chapter from the perspective of the internalist–externalist debate in semantics. The present paper consists of three main parts. In the first part, I will elucidate the internalist character of Śāntarakṣita’s apoha theory and the externalist characters of his opponents’ theories. The second part will be an examination of an Indian Externalist Argument against Śāntarakṣita’s apoha presented in the chapter. In the third part, I will explore how Śāntarakṣita attempts to refute this argument by resorting to the Dharmakīrtian notion of adhyavasāya (false ascertainment). Additionally, to emphasize a contemporary approach, I will offer and highlight the intercultural interpretations of these Indian externalist and internalist arguments.
The aim of this study is twofold. First, to clarify these two Kumārila-Śāntarakṣita debates about... more The aim of this study is twofold. First, to clarify these two Kumārila-Śāntarakṣita debates about apoha, namely, [1] on the means of knowing apoha and [2] on the basis of establishing apoha, by exploring the correspondence between the pūrvapakṣa and the uttarapakṣa of the TS (with the help of Kamalaśīla’s commentary, the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā—TSP, when necessary). And second, to shed some light on the foundationalist/antifoundationalist characters of the Indian theories of meaning which may have escaped from contemporary scholars’ attention.
Reevaluating Dignāga’s Apoha Theory: As Revealed by Bhāviveka’s Critique
Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2023
Pramāṇavādins are antirealists on the problem of universals by virtue of the fact that they deny ... more Pramāṇavādins are antirealists on the problem of universals by virtue of the fact that they deny the existence of real universals. Dignāga, therefore, offered apoha theory to explain how the denotation of objects is possible without postulating real universals. According to Apohavāda, a word, for instance “cow”, denotes a cow not by referring to a real universal “cowness,” but by excluding it from those which are non-cows, such as horses. In recent years, there is a discussion about what the genuine cause of exclusion in Dignāga’s apoha theory is. One line of interpretation suggests that, in the case of the word “cow,” the cause of exclusion is sāsnādidarśana (perception of dewlap, etc.). On the other hand, some scholars maintain that it should be adṛṣṭi (non-observation) or adarśanamātra (mere non-observation) instead of sāsnādidarśana. The present paper consists of two parts. The first part will be an elaboration on the philosophical implications of the above-mentioned philological inquiry. I will show that if the cause of exclusion is sāsnādidarśana, then Dignāga should be considered as a conceptualist about universals and a foundationalist about human cognitions. On the contrary, if it is adṛṣṭi, then Dignāga should be characterized as a nominalist as well as an antifoundationalist. In the second part, l will explore what the cause of exclusion is through a Mādhyamika critic of Dignāga, namely Bhāviveka. I will demonstrate that the critique of apoha theory launched by Bhāviveka indicates that Dignāga does not regard sāsnādidarśana as the cause of excluding non-cows.
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