Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2016
Riassunto : Tra le piu recenti riflessioni sulla mente umana, il quadro teorico della “mente este... more Riassunto : Tra le piu recenti riflessioni sulla mente umana, il quadro teorico della “mente estesa” ci dipinge come dei cyborg naturali provvisti di menti “superdotate”, ottenute grazie alla capacita di sfruttare le risorse tecnologiche e ambientali in modo integrato a nostro vantaggio. In questo articolo si ripercorre la genesi teorica di questo modello a partire dalle critiche alla scienza cognitiva classica, basata sul modello delle computazioni su rappresentazioni, e in particolare all’individualismo metodologico. Successivamente, si analizza il principale argomento filosofico fornito a sostegno della mente estesa, fondato sulla plausibilita del concetto di “credenza disposizionale estesa”. Vengono poi discussi i principali aspetti problematici rilevati nel modello (problema dei criteri, fallacia della costitutivita, criterio del cognitivo) e proposte alcune repliche. Si conclude evidenziando che il principale merito del modello consiste nella proposta di una visione integrata ...
In this paper we suggest an understanding of the self within the conceptual framework of situated... more In this paper we suggest an understanding of the self within the conceptual framework of situated affectivity, proposing the notion of an affectively extended self and arguing that the construction, diachronic re-shaping and maintenance of the self is mediated first by affective interactions. We initially consider the different variations on the conception of the extended self that have been already proposed in the literature (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Heersmink 2017, 2018; Krueger 2018; Wilson, Lenart 2015). We then propose our alternative, contextualising it within the current debate on situated affectivity. While the idea that we exploit the external environment in order to manage our affective life is now rather widespread among philosophers (e.g. Colombetti & Krueger 2015, Piredda 2019), its potential consequences for and connections with the debate on the self remain underexplored. Drawing on James’ intuition of the “material self”, which clearly connects the self and the emotion...
Starting from the discussion on the original set of criteria advanced by Clark and Chalmers (1998... more Starting from the discussion on the original set of criteria advanced by Clark and Chalmers (1998) meant to avoid the overextension of the mind, or the socalled cognitive bloat, we will sketch our solution to the problem of criteria evaluation, by connecting it to the search for a mark of the mental. Our proposal is to argue for a "weak conscientialist" mark of the mental based on transparent access, which vindicates the role of consciousness in defining what is mental without, however, identifying the mental with the conscious. This renovated link between mind and consciousness, spelled out through the concept of transparency, further develops some of our previous work on the topic and is partially inspired by .
What is an affective artifact? A further development in situated affectivity
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2019
In this paper I would like to propose the notion of “affective artifact”, building on an analogy ... more In this paper I would like to propose the notion of “affective artifact”, building on an analogy with theories of cognitive artifacts (cf. Casati 2017; Fasoli 2018; Heersmink, 2013, 2016; Hutchins 1999) and referring to the development of a situated affective science (cf. Colombetti 2014; Colombetti and Krueger 2015; Colombetti and Roberts 2015; Griffiths and Scarantino 2009). Affective artifacts are tentatively defined as objects that have the capacity to alter the affective condition of an agent, and that in some cases play an important role in defining that agent’s self. The notion of affective artifacts will be presented by means of examples supported by empirical findings, by discussing a tentative definition and classification, and by considering several related but differing notions (cf. Colombetti and Krueger 2015; Heersmink 2018). Within the framework of situated affectivity, the notion of affective artifacts will represent a further step in the enterprise of understanding how the environment helps us scaffold our affective processes. I will conclude that affective artifacts play a key role in the philosophy of cognitive science, the philosophy of technology and in the debate about the self.
Clark and Chalmers (1998) introduced the extended mind hypothesis, according to which some mental... more Clark and Chalmers (1998) introduced the extended mind hypothesis, according to which some mental states can be realized by non-biological external resources. A lively debate has flourished around this hypothesis, connected with the issues of embodiment, embeddedness, situatedness and enaction (cf. Clark, 2008; Menary, 2010; Shapiro, 2011). Two of the main criticisms addressed to the functionalist version of the extended mind thesis have been the so-called "coupling-constitution fallacy" and the alleged lack of a mark of the cognitive (Adams and Aizawa, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2010a,b). According to Adams and Aizawa, extended cognition is a logical possibility, but is not instantiated in our world. Following this view, they defend a "contingent intracranialism," based on a specific mark of the cognitive that they propose. In this paper I intend to show that neither criticism is effective against the extended cognition thesis. In particular: the mark of the cognitive pr...
Oggetti personali ed emozioni: il caso degli artefatti affettivi
In this paper I would like to elaborate the idea of “affective artifact”, framing it in the lands... more In this paper I would like to elaborate the idea of “affective artifact”, framing it in the landscape of situated affectivity (Piredda 2019). Affective artifacts work in the domain of affectivity like cognitive artifacts do in our cognitive life: they sustain, help and transform affective processes and experiences, through the interaction between them and the agent. After having introduced and discussed the idea of affective artifacts, I will propose some elements for their classification and compare it with similar notions, like evocative objects (Heersmink 2018; Turkle 2007) and affective scaffolds (Colombetti, Krueger 2015). Lastly, I will consider some possible criticisms and propose some potential further developments.
Natural born pedagogy : approcci filosofici e sperimentali alla pedagogia digitale
Review of the book E. Gola & G. Piredda (2016). Natural born Pedagogy. Approcci filosofici e ... more Review of the book E. Gola & G. Piredda (2016). Natural born Pedagogy. Approcci filosofici e sperimentali alla pedagogia digitale. Milano, IT: Guerini Scientifica
Ricevuto: 5 giugno 2015; accettato: 5 novembre 2015 █ Riassunto Tra le più recenti riflessioni su... more Ricevuto: 5 giugno 2015; accettato: 5 novembre 2015 █ Riassunto Tra le più recenti riflessioni sulla mente umana, il quadro teorico della "mente estesa" ci di-pinge come dei cyborg naturali provvisti di menti "superdotate", ottenute grazie alla capacità di sfruttare le risorse tecnologiche e ambientali in modo integrato a nostro vantaggio. In questo articolo si ripercorre la genesi teorica di questo modello a partire dalle critiche alla scienza cognitiva classica, basata sul modello delle computazioni su rappresentazioni, e in particolare all'individualismo metodologico. Successivamen-te, si analizza il principale argomento filosofico fornito a sostegno della mente estesa, fondato sulla plau-sibilità del concetto di "credenza disposizionale estesa". Vengono poi discussi i principali aspetti proble-matici rilevati nel modello (problema dei criteri, fallacia della costitutività, criterio del cognitivo) e propo-ste alcune repliche. Si conclude evidenzi...
Mente estesa e apprendimento digitale: considerazioni epistemologiche sul processo di valutazione
In this paper we will deal with the relation between conceptual analysis and technological integr... more In this paper we will deal with the relation between conceptual analysis and technological integration in the extended cognition and mind debate. The question is: is there a conceptual nucleus/core, which is largely independent from empirical facts like technological integration or will technological progress erase the mind’s boundary by itself? After having rehearsed the debate’s main points and characteristics, we will confront this problem in the specific case of education. Here, common practices imply epistemological points of view which (implicitly) endorse or reject an extended conception of mind and cognition, as the case of competence evaluation will show.
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Papers by Giulia Piredda