Rural credit markets have been at the center of the policy intervention in developing countries o... more Rural credit markets have been at the center of the policy intervention in developing countries over the past sixty years. Many governments supplying cheap credit to farmers and poor people, but these interventions failed, because policy makers have inadequate understanding of the working of rural credit markets. Microfinance institutions working on group based and joint liability. Through group, they solved the problem of monitoring, screening and enforcement. But, still, there are some obstacles present in rural credit market, which do slow the process of reaching the finance to the extremely poor person.
The advocates of rural credit argue that access to finance can substantially help in the reductio... more The advocates of rural credit argue that access to finance can substantially help in the reduction of poverty and promoting gender empowerment. Access to credit may contribute a long-lasting increase in income by means of a rise in investments that can generate income and diversify source of income. It can also contribute in empowering women in the decision making process of economic nature, family planning, marriage, participation in social and political activities. Many studies go not in favor of this type of argument. Present study shows that rural credits programme do not have any significant impact on gender dimensions. In some case, the status of beneficiaries group has deteriorated against control group. Actually, the programme is not wrong in itself but the implementation process of the programme has much type of weaken.
In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the impact of monitoring within group based le... more In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the impact of monitoring within group based lending programmes on moral hazard behavior of its participants, based on the data from an extensive questionnaire held in Uttar Pradesh, India among 200 participants. Study finds new information that agent who is outsider of the group, it may be credit officer or other who nurtured and form the group, may be an emergent determinant of loan repayment. We find support for the fact that monitoring by the credit officer do help to reduce moral hazard behavior of group member and improve the repayment of loan. This study supports the emerging BCs model in India and in the world level. The main idea is that it reduce the marginal cost of monitoring and group conflict emerged by peer monitoring within group.
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Papers by Ramu Maurya