Dan Slater

Followers

Following

Public Views

Interests

Uploads

Papers by Dan Slater

Conclusion: Democratising Singapore’s Developmental State

In this concluding chapter, Dan Slater illuminates a critical point—that in Singapore as in other... more In this concluding chapter, Dan Slater illuminates a critical point—that in Singapore as in other Asian developmental states, stable authoritarianism is not the same thing as static authoritarianism. Authoritarianism after development has to be especially flexible and adaptable because the challenges development poses for authoritarian stability are effectively irreversible. He argues that Singapore is perfectly poised to follow the example of countries like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea in pursuing democratic reforms, and that the People’s Action Party (PAP) would surely remain dominant under fully democratic conditions. The alternative for the PAP is to allow their relations with the most productive forces in society to deteriorate further, with troubling long-term implications for both economic development and political order. Superficial authoritarian reforms will not be good enough to return the PAP to its hegemonic glory days. Paradoxically, democratisation is the best way fo...

Making Godly Nations: Church-State Pathways in Poland and the Philippines

Comparative Politics

How does religious nationalism arise? How do national and religious identities meld? Two cases of... more How does religious nationalism arise? How do national and religious identities meld? Two cases of such fusion, Poland and the Philippines, show how national and religious identities can become nearly coterminous. Located at opposite ends of the Earth, these are two of the world's godliest nations. 1 In both countries, close to 80 percent of respondents say it is important to be Catholic to be Polish or Philippine, respectively. 2 Not only are these societies deeply religious, with rates of belief and church attendance far higher than average in the Christian world, but the churches enjoy a great deal of societal and elite deference. Since the early 1990s, when new democracies were struggling to find their feet in both countries, over 80 percent of Poles and over 90 percent of Filipinos have expressed "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the Church. 3 This deep moral authority had translated into religious notables becoming critical leaders in anti-authoritarian resistance, 4 and has allowed the Church to gain enormous policy influence in the newly democratic regimes. 5 This article leverages the Poland-Philippine comparison to offer a political and historical analysis of the merging of religious and national identities. Much of the scholarship on the fusion of religion and nationalism makes one of two analytical moves: it either 1) focuses on an external religious threat as the inspiration for religious nationalism, or 2) demonstrates how national identity and religious belief hold elective affinities, allowing church and state to work together harmoniously. In the first set of accounts, an alien threat both mobilizes and sanctifies religious nationalism as a coherent identity and political project. 6 Here, religious nationalism arises in direct, fierce opposition to a "power committed to another religion." 7 A notable example is British Protestant rule in predominantly Catholic Ireland. 8 The second set of accounts traces how religion can collaborate with the state, as church and state construct interlocking mechanisms of social and moral regulation. 9 In this scenario, church and state eliminate internal religious rivals en route to building godly nations. 10

Download

Authoritarian-Led Democratization

Annual Review of Political Science

Authoritarian regimes become more likely to democratize when they face little choice or little ri... more Authoritarian regimes become more likely to democratize when they face little choice or little risk. In some cases, the risk of democratization to authoritarian incumbents is so low that ending authoritarianism might not mean exiting power at all. This article develops a unified theory of authoritarian-led democratization under conditions of relatively low incumbent risk. We argue that the party strength of the authoritarian incumbent is the most pivotal factor in authoritarian-led democratization. When incumbent party strength has been substantial enough to give incumbent authoritarian politicians significant electoral victory confidence, nondemocratic regimes have pursued reversible democratic experiments that eventually culminated in stable, thriving democracies. Evidence from Europe's first wave of democratization and more recent democratic transitions in Taiwan and Ghana illustrate how party strength has underpinned authoritarian-led democratization across the world and acr...

Download

Violent Origins of Authoritarian Variation: Rebellion Type and Regime Type in Cold War Southeast Asia

Government and Opposition

Dictatorships are every bit as institutionally diverse as democracies, but where does this variat... more Dictatorships are every bit as institutionally diverse as democracies, but where does this variation come from? This article argues that different types of internal rebellion influence the emergence of different types of authoritarian regimes. The critical question is whether rebel forces primarily seek to seize state power or to escape it. Regional rebellions seeking to escape the state raise the probability of a military-dominated authoritarian regime, since they are especially likely to unify the military while heightening friction between civilian and military elites. Leftist rebellions seeking to seize the state are more likely to give rise to civilian-dominated dictatorships by inspiring ‘joint projects’ in which military elites willingly support party-led authoritarian rule. Historical case studies of Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam illustrate the theory, elaborating how different types of violent conflict helped produce different types of dictatorships across the brea...

Coercive Distribution

Mobilizing Without the Masses: Control and Contention in China. By Diana Fu. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 206p. $89.99 cloth, $27.99 paper

Perspectives on Politics

provides sufficient evidence to indicate that upward mobility is a significant problem in India t... more provides sufficient evidence to indicate that upward mobility is a significant problem in India that affects a large number of people. The rest of the book offers an explanation for why upward mobility is restricted and how to improve it. Krishna argues that the main explanation for the blockage, other things being equal, is the “microclimate” in which the poor live. By this he means a combination of material and non-material factors. The material factors include, in particular, an educational infrastructure with easily accessible schools and the trained teachers. By nonmaterial factors Krishna means attitudes, information, values, and beliefs which, he argues, are just as important and can prevent upward mobility even in the presence of the right infrastructure. To illustrate, he offers the example of Chandru, who did not pursue a college education despite a full scholarship because his family believed that higher education was “not for the likes of us” and there were no role models or counter-examples or information to contradict that belief (p. 22). In proposing solutions, Krishna again focuses on microclimate—this time the microclimate of reform. The Indian state, he argues, is distant, and centralized and proposes uniform policies that do not fit well with local conditions. What is needed is an approach to policy that is proximate, localized, and flexible. He advocates the strengthening of what he calls “street level bureaucrats”— village-level patwaris (land registrars), village council secretaries, police constables, agricultural supervisors, and what he calls “last mile” institutions. He also advocates for a model of governance that incorporates local customs or that outsources tasks to institutions such as traditional village councils (p. 169). Krishna’s focus on microclimates—and in particular, the “soft,” non-material aspects of a microclimate—is one of the most important and eloquent parts of the book. The emphasis on changing the beliefs of citizens about who they can be and who they can become recalls Amartya Sen’s (1999) capabilities approach to development and welfare, revisited here in very concrete ways. And the emphasis on a localized, flexible approach to development suggests an illuminating connection with James Scott’s (1999) critiques of the modern, universalizing state, arrived at via a very different route. But in the end it is precisely the prescription for reforming the microclimate of development that deserves greater interrogation, not only by a reviewer, but also by the author. Krishna advocates the strengthening of streetlevel bureaucrats while glossing over the many ways in which street-level bureaucrats can and have contributed to the problem of reform through rent-seeking or other kinds of exploitative behaviour. Krishna acknowledges such behaviour, but does not fully engage with the problems it poses for his prescription. He simply asserts that it is a consequence of a “design weakness in the system” (p. 161) that can be neutralized by better training, motivation and citizen-centred institutions that enforce local accountability. The Broken Ladder would have been strengthened by a systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of such institutions where they do exist. They have, for instance, been built into the design of the National Rural Employment Guarantee programme, as well as in panchayati raj (village self-government reform) in several states. Similarly, the book has a relatively uncritical approach to local customary institutions and practices, recommending that they be incorporated into local governance without fully engaging with the question of how these institutions can often magnify inequalities, or give new form to patriarchal or other socially conservative practices. Krishna notes that this possibility exists but dismisses it rather lightly: “Newspaper accounts have highlighted the monstrous judgments handed down on occasion by some traditional institutions. But these aren’t the only decisions they make, and they aren’t the only traditional institutions.” (p. 169). The Broken Ladder would have benefited from a more extended discussion of, and a more critical approach to, the local.

Building Blocs: How Parties Organize Society

Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews, 2016

Download

The Power of Counterrevolution: Contentious Origins of Dominant Party Durability in Asia and Africa

Abstract will be provided by author.

State Power and Staying Power: Inherited Infrastructure and Durable Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Tunisia

State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability

Journal of International Affairs, Sep 22, 2011

The contemporary literature on authoritarian durability focuses more on democratic-looking instit... more The contemporary literature on authoritarian durability focuses more on democratic-looking institutions such as parties, elections and parliaments than the institution in which authoritarian regimes are most importantly embedded: the state itself. This article argues that state power is the most powerful weapon in the authoritarian arsenal After clarifying the regime-state distinction and explaining why regime durability involves more than just duration, we discuss four "infrastructural mechanisms" through which authoritarian regimes stabilize and sustain their rule: (1) coercing rivals, (2) extracting revenues, (3) registering citizens and (4) cultivating dependence. Since state apparatuses are the institutions best geared for performing these tasks, their effectiveness underpins authoritarian durability in a way that no other institution can duplicate. And since state power is shaped by long-term historical forces, future studies should adopt the kind of historical perspective more often seen in leading studies of postcolonial economic development than of authoritarian durability. ********** "You should no more confuse the state with its government than you would confuse a fine Jaguar automobile with the person who drives it." Professor Robert Frykenberg (1) States and regimes are perennial yet largely parallel obsessions in political science. (2) When scholars study the state, they commit to exploring the extent rather than the form of government. (3) Specialists on regimes undertake the inverse commitment, asking how and why the state's power is constrained rather than extended and expanded. One conversation centers on whether and why regimes are democratic or authoritarian, while the other asks whether and why states are capable or incapable of effective governance. In this article we aim to bridge these parallel conversations by arguing that state power is the strongest institutional foundation for authoritarian regimes' staying power. (4) The intellectual division of labor between studies of regimes and states is both essential and unfortunate. Professor Frykenberg's pithy formulation distinguishing states from the governments that run them (or in authoritarian settings, the regimes that run them) proves useful for understanding why. (5) The separation is essential because states and regimes are analytically distinct, but unfortunate because states and regimes are empirically intertwined. Though all metaphors have their limits, we find the notion of the state as a kind of machinery that is linked but not reducible to the actors who operate it helpful in three respects. First, states are apparatuses that vary considerably in their power to undertake political tasks and accomplish political ends. Where states exhibit substantial "infrastructural power," or the capacity "to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm," the regimes that run them are the most immediate beneficiaries. (6) Where states look more like jalopies than Jaguars, the regimes that command them find themselves in an entirely different world when trying to assert control and establish domination. Second, regime leaders are not usually the original architects of the states they operate. Drivers may customize, repair or "soup up" their cars, but they rarely build them from scratch or convert them into something that dramatically outperforms the original model. State apparatuses are typically inherited rather than originally constructed by the regimes that run them, particularly in the postcolonial world. A strong state is the best historical foundation for a durable authoritarian regime, not vice versa. Third, even the strongest state apparatus cannot entirely protect a regime from catastrophic "operator error." Though states are institutions with considerable historical momentum, they must still be led by fallible human agents. Ironically, highly capable state apparatuses may be especially vulnerable to regime incompetence, since bad leadership is more damaging when the machinery responds readily to unwise top-down commands. …

Discussion of Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Dan Slater, and Tuong Vu's Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region, and Qualitative Analysis

Journal of East Asian Studies, 2010

Comparative politics has witnessed periodic debates between proponents of contextually sensitive ... more Comparative politics has witnessed periodic debates between proponents of contextually sensitive area studies research and others who view such work as unscientific, noncumulative, or of limited relevance for advancing broader social science knowledge. InSoutheast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region, and Qualitative Analysis, edited by Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Dan Slater, and Tuong Vu, a group of bright, young Southeast Asianists argue that contextually sensitive research in Southeast Asia using qualitative research methods has made fundamental and lasting contributions to comparative politics. They challenge other Southeast Asianists to assert proudly the contributions that their work has made and urge the rest of the comparative politics discipline to take these contributions seriously. This symposium includes four short critical reviews ofSoutheast Asia in Political Scienceby political scientists representing diverse scholarly traditions. The reviews address both the methodol...

Ordering power : contentious politics, state-building, and authoritarian durability in Southeast Asia

La política comparada de las elecciones autoritarias Un debate en torno a The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism de Andreas Schedler

Politica Y Gobierno, 2015

Download

Unbuilding Blocs:?Cleavages and Cartelization in Indonesian Party Politics, 1999-2009

Nonliterate Leviathans: On the Riotous Heterogeneity of Southeast Asian States

Abstract will be provided by author.

BookProspectus deLeonDesaiTugal

The elements of surprise: assessing Burma's double-edged détente

South East Asia Research, 2014

ABSTRACT

Economic Origins of Democratic Breakdown? The Redistributive Model and the Postcolonial State

Perspectives on Politics, 2014

From Aristotle to Acemoglu and Robinson, scholars have argued that democracy possesses powerful r... more From Aristotle to Acemoglu and Robinson, scholars have argued that democracy possesses powerful redistributive impulses, and imperils itself accordingly. We challenge the validity of the redistributive model of democratic breakdown in the postcolonial world—the only cases where democracies have collapsed since World War II—because its assumptions regarding state power are questionable or even inapplicable in postcolonial settings. Our correlative analysis of cross-sectional time series data from 139 countries between 1972 and 2007 indicates that, contrary to the expectations of the redistributive model, redistributive taxation is negatively associated with the incidence of military coups and the likelihood of democratic breakdown. Furthermore, authoritarian takeovers do not appear systematically to result in reduced redistribution from the rich. More fine-grained historical evidence from Southeast Asia—a region where the redistributive model should be especially likely to hold true—...

Download

Colonialism, Cleavages, and the Contours of Contention

Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia, 2010

States and the Regimes That Run Them

Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia, 2010

Dan Slater

Uploads

Papers by Dan Slater

Log In